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ABSTRACT 
 
Intellectual Property Rights in Common Bean Breeding – Opportunities and constraint 
for local and participatory approaches in Nicaragua 
 
Marie Widengård, Department of Plant Biology and Forest Genetics/Department of Rural 
Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) 
 
If intellectual property rights (IPR) are incentives for plant research, how do they affect plant 
development for the benefit of the resource-poor? 
 
This thesis analyses the implications of IPR from the perspective of small-scale users, 
providers and developers of seed. Special attention is given participatory plant breeding, i.e. 
the approach that joins farmers and professional breeders, local and formal conditions and the 
knowledge and visions held by rural communities, civil society and State. The thesis brings 
on a discussion on intellectual contributions, claims and preferences in a case of participatory 
breeding and as such, it explores the opportunities and constraints of IPR when breeding is 
done in collaboration between different actors. The legal requirements for plant breeders’ 
rights of distinctness and uniformity are observed in the field as well as genetically analysed.  
 
In general, the thesis illustrates how international trade regulations translate into national law 
and onto the field of local and participatory breeding. In focus is the common bean and 
legislative system of Nicaragua, a developing country that recently adopted plant breeders’ 
rights that go beyond world trade agreements and against farmers’ rights to exchange and 
informally sell seed. The thesis also analyses the possible impacts of rights in counter-
balance, i.e. community intellectual rights in draft.  
 
Keywords: intellectual property rights, plant breeders' rights, farmers' rights, community 
intellectual rights, participatory plant breeding, common bean, Nicaragua 
 
For comments, ideas or questions please contact: mariewidengard@hotmail.com 
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 PREFACE 
 
For as much as the diversity between people and minds is eroded because of reasons beyond 
what this thesis grasps, all too much is being lost because we do not understand. When reality 
becomes too complex, we tend to translate diversity into linear systems. In the process of 
reducing, we lose the potential of solving problems that continue to grow in dimensions. The 
problem is that the whole is bigger than its constituting parts. 
 
Ownership on life goes far beyond any legal discipline into a diversity of cultures, sociology, 
economy, politics and environmental concern. With an aim to deliver a larger picture, this 
report joins the MSc thesis works of environmental engineering and rural development. As 
such, it was an academic challenge that was born out of a concern for equitable relations, a 
respect for diversity and the desire to understand more about how one system affects the 
other. In short, how can we make parts support the bigger whole and vice verse? 
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ABSTRACTO    
 
Derechos sobre las variedades de plantas en Nicaragua 
 
El asunto sobre la propiedad de los recursos genéticos y los conocimientos asociados a ellos 
es un tema actual, y para muchos países también un asunto nuevo y alarmante. Entre ellos está 
Nicaragua, que en 1999 adoptó una nueva legislación en el área de los derechos de propiedad 
intelectual. Dentro de esta nueva legislación está incluida la ley de protección para las 
obtenciones vegetales cuyo propósito es  el establecimiento de normas para la protección de 
los derechos de las personas (naturales o jurídicas) que, ya sea por medios naturales o 
manipulación genética, hayan creado o descubierto y puesto a punto, una nueva variedad 
vegetal la cual debe ser distinta, uniforme y estable. Estos derechos se consideran como un 
derecho de propiedad intelectual y se da control exclusivo sobre las variedades inscritas en el  
Registro de la Propiedad Intelectual del Ministerio de Fomento, Industria y Comercio. Lo 
anterior contempla que para la utilización del material de reproducción o de multiplicación se 
requerirá la autorización del obtentor: nadie puede usar, vender o reproducir semilla 
correspondiente de las variedades protegidas sin permiso del titular o sin el debido pago de 
regalías. Dicha autorización no se requerirá cuando la semilla de la variedad protegida sea 
utilizada para fines de investigación en el mejoramiento genético de otras variedades o 
cuando el agricultor o agricultura la utilice con fines de reproducción o de multiplicación en 
su propia explotación. En esta monografía se analiza el impacto de los derechos intelectuales 
en Nicaragua en el mejoramiento de frijol común mediante la aplicación de practicas 
tradicionales bajo un enfoque participativo. 
 
El sistema de frijol 
 
El frijol es unos de los granos más importantes en Nicaragua ya que constituye una parte 
importante en la dieta alimenticia diaria junto con el arroz, tortilla, plátanos y huevos. La 
producción del frijol en su mayoría se encuentra en manos de pequeñ@s productores/as l@s 
que siembran dicho cultivo en pequeñas áreas. Es frecuente encontrar hasta tres variedades de 
frijol sembradas en la misma parcela encontrándose entre ellas variedades recientemente 
mejoradas por el Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agraria (INTA) o variedades tradicionales 
conocidas popularmente como variedades criollas. Estas variedades criollas actuales son 
poblaciones heterogéneas originadas muchas veces de variedades mejoradas liberadas en el 
pasado por los programas formales de mejoramiento y que han sido cultivadas y mantenidas 
desde entonces por l@s agricultores/as. Las variedades criollas poseen granos con testa de 
color rojo o rojo claro siendo el precio de este producto en el mercado mayor en comparación 
con variedades que poseen otro tipo de color de testa; sin embargo, son bastante susceptible 
plagas y enfermedades y por ende su rendimiento es con frecuencia inferior al de las 
variedades producidas por los programas formales de mejoramiento. En Nicaragua una buena 
parte de las actividades de mejoramiento, producción y mercadeo de la semilla de frijol se 
encuentra en manos de l@s propi@s agricultores/as quienes hacen uso de diferentes 
mecanismos (intercambio de semillas entre agricultores/as, autoproducción y/o venta informal 
de semillas etc) para adquirir este importante insumo. Muchas veces, sin embargo, la calidad 
del material que se usa para la siembra es deficiente o de origen desconocido lo que viene a 
afectar la producción enormemente. Tanto la producción así como el mercado de semilla 
certificada bajo la responsabilidad del sector formal es aun limitada. Sin embargo, existe una 
presión por parte de las instituciones nacionales e internacionales en reemplazar la semilla de 
las variedades locales por semilla de variedades mejoradas en vista de la necesidad de 
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incrementar los rendimientos. Lo anterior es en  parte el resultado de cambios que están 
ocurriendo en el ámbito global entre los que se pueden mencionar los derechos de propiedad 
intelectual en las semillas.    
 
Impactos de los derechos del obtentor 
 
En el caso de frijol los derechos de propiedad intelectual podrían ser un instrumento para 
recuperar el costo de inversiones porque el frijol se autopoliniza naturalmente y no hay 
necesidad comprar material nuevo cada siembra. Es decir, cuando una planta se copia 
facilmente no hay gran incentivos para comprar semillas del obtentor (o del productor bajo 
contrato y con acceso al material génetico). Con derechos de propiedad intelectual se 
garantizan regalías al obtentor. Sin embargo, no existe por el momento un mecanismo claro 
sobre la manera como dichos incentivos serán entregados al mejorador. Sobre todo se 
presenta problemas con el mecanismo del control. Puesto que el control de la semilla 
protegida está en manos del obtentor será difícil y también costoso la realización de dicho 
control principalmente durante la multiplicación e intercambio de semillas; procesos durante 
los cuales pueden ocurrir mezclas varietales. Por eso el impacto a corto plazo de ley de 
protección será mínimo ya que la práctica de producción de semillas para el propio uso o para 
intercambiar con los agricultores vecinos es bastante fuerte.  
 
Es posible que el sistema de regalías funcione a medida que haya una división más claras en 
las actividades de mejoramiento, producción y utilización de semillas es decir entre 
fitomejoradores, productores de semillas y usuarios. El mercado formal de donde un obtentor 
podría obtener regalía fácilmente es pequeño, aproximada 10% de la semilla está producida 
en el sector formal. Sin embargo, los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica están apoyando dicho 
sector a fin de lograr su crecimiento. Recordamos que las empresas multinacionales no 
empezarán a funcionar mientras el mercado de la semilla de frijol continúe siendo reducido y 
poco eficiente. Por eso es probable que un fortalecimiento del mercado de semillas sea más 
importante para una invensión y inversión extranjera que el establecimiento de los derechos 
de propiedad intelectual. Sin embargo, de hecho al fortalecerse el sistema formal, también se 
fortalecerá el sistema de derechos del mejorador. La ganancia de los derechos de propiedad 
intelectual va mano a mano con un fortalecimiento del sector formal. Por eso se puede decir 
que la ley a largo plazo podrá ayudar la formalización o industrialización de la agricultura 
nicaragüense, y eso también podría mejorar la eficacia de la producción y reducir la pobreza 
en las áreas rurales. La cuestión emergente sea ¿Qué tipo de variedades obteneremos con 
incentivos de propiedad intelectual? 
 
Hasta ahora (Febrero 2003) ninguna variedad de frijol ha sido inscrita para su protección (solo 
está inscrita la variedad de arroz ANAR-97, protegida por una asociación nicaragüense de 
arroceros). Dado que los mejoradores de frijol trabajan para el INTA o son agricultores/as 
nacionales, la pregunta es ¿quién va a pagar regalías a quién? Aunque el INTA ha entregado 
solicitudes para la protección de variedades de frijol, la posibilidad de obtener  regalías o 
ejercer un control activo es baja. Dado que el INTA está promoviendo la producción privada 
de semilla certificada (ya existen algunas compañías establecidas) bajo contrato, las 
oportunidades de obtener regalías se suben gradualmente. Se visualiza que cuando la 
producción de semilla sea lucrativa y registrada, crecerá la justificación de compartir 
beneficios con el mejorador u otros actores involucrados en la actividad semillista. Hasta 
entonces y puesto que es un instituto público, en ves de pedir regalías de las comunidades 
agrarias y de perder recursos por administración mas bien sería mejor que el INTA continuara 
con su labor de mejoramiento y difusión de semillas de variedades mejoradas. Recordemos 
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que la investigación pública tiene un papel crucial en el desarrollo de variedades menos 
commerciales, como las variedades del frijol nicaragüenses.  
 
Oportunidades y amenazas  
 
En la agenda comercial del sistema formal, el cual va creciendo con mucho ímpetu, poco 
interés existe por los beneficios inherentes del sistema local de producción de semillas basado 
en criterios locales. Actualmente existe poca integración entre los sistemas formal y informal 
lo que constituye una sería debilidad ya que a través de una colaboración real podrían juntarse 
esfuerzos para buscar soluciones a problemas reales como son la pérdida del material genético 
y el conocimiento a el asociado, y la desaparición irreversible del sistema local de producción 
de semillas que ha permitido la manutención de muchas familias rurales a través de la 
producción de semillas, alimentos e ingresos. Como consecuencia de lo anterior surgió la 
metodología conocida como Fitomejoramiento Participativo cuyo objetivo fue juntar la 
capacidad, criterios y material genético que existen en el campo con la experiencia del sector 
formal. Esta metodología está siendo aplicada en Nicaragua en los cultivos de frijol y maíz en 
las localidades de Pueblo Nuevo y Condega, ambas del departamento de Estelí. El grupo está 
constituido por 50 productores y productoras, un fitomjerador del INTA y un organismo no-
gubernamental (CIPRES) todos dedicados al mejoramiento de variedades basado en criterios 
locales. Igualmente se discuten en dicho grupo de trabajo aspectos sobre la protección de 
variedades desarrolladas dentro del proyecto en términos de control, consideraciones técnicas, 
magnitud de la distribución de semillas, involucramiento del sector formal innovativo,  
perspectivas acerca propiedad de semilla etc. La toma de decisiones es un tema complejo ya 
que se debe considerar la diversidad de puntos de vistas, objetos e información – asuntos que 
cambiaran durante un proceso innovativo y cognitivo. Por experiencia del estudio, la 
monografía proponga que si el grupo no tiene una opinión clara acerca los derechos de 
propiedad intelectual se debería presentar el tema initialmente al grupo en términos breves y 
informativos. Con el tiempo l@s participantes van a crecer en su papel de ser mejoradores/as y 
en sus habilidades de expresarse y tomar decisiones y hasta entonces no hay mandato para 
tomar una decisión verdaderamente participativa. Cuando tengan la palabra se pueden 
enseñarnos sobre la manera de pensar de l@s agricultores/as en la concerniente al derecho 
intelectual.  
 
El camino siguiente 
 
¿Qué dicen entonces l@s mejoradores del campo sobre la posibilidad de poseer variedades 
locales? El grupo participativo de Estelí todavía está en la fase de evaluación. Sin embargo, se 
nota que el grupo no está de acuerdo con relación a los derechos intelectuales; si se deberían 
aplicar por protección, como se compartiran los beneficios etc. Desde la perspectiva de unos 
agricultores que han desarollado variedades locales notamos que suportan la idea de tener una 
mayor responsabilidad en aspectos como son el mantenimiento de la calidad de sus 
variedades pero no querien controlar su uso o exigir regalías de sus colegas. Se debe recordar 
que en el sistema local, el precio de la semilla se puede decidir considerando el trabajo 
invertido (pero más bien el poder adquisición del comprador).  
 
Muchos productores que participaron en la monografía buscaban un mercado más controlado. 
Sin embargo, aunque existe la demanda de una producción y mercado más controlado no hay 
recursos en el campo nicaragüense para cubrir los costos de una producción certificada y para 
dar regalías al obtentor. El problema radica en que el precio de la semilla resulta demasiado 
elevado y también demasiado uniforme, en comparación con la semilla producida localmente 
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o la semilla regalada o donada. Por supuesto, l@s agricultores/as tampoco desean restricciones 
en su derecho de poder multiplicar las semillas libremente. Por eso es importante reconocer 
que el sistema de calidad no es lo mismo que el régimen de los derechos intelectuales ya que 
se puede tener semilla registrada y certificada sin estos derechos. Recordemos que la ley tiene 
por objeto recuperar el costo del fitomejoramiento. O sea, no es una ley para proteger 
variedades sino las inversiones del fitomejorador o más bien del empleador o empresa. 
 
En conclusión se puede decir que la ley no combina muy bien con la realidad rural ni con las 
demandas del campo. Se debe considerar, además, el asunto ético. Bajo la ley vigente solo se 
reconoce la prestación ultima, la del mejorador que desarrolle una nueva variedad la cual debe 
ser distinta, uniforme y estable. No es sencillo innovar o desarrollar variedades que cumplan 
con los requisitos técnicos que realmente se necesitan considerar durante todo el proceso 
innovativo. Tampoco es una tarea sencilla demostrar variaciones entre variedades, sea 
conocidas o nuevas, y por eso la gente del campo se preocupan por lo que se llama la 
biopiracia. En busca de instrumentos para distinguir una variedad a otra, la monografía 
exploró variaciones entre variedades por medios del análisis génetico. El resultado señaló que 
se necesita mucha información, trabajo y recursos para lograr una caracterización válida en 
por ejemplo causas legales.    
 
Es importante recordar que las obligaciones con la Organización Mundial del Comercio y en 
particular la presión de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica influyeron en que Nicaragua 
adoptara la ley de protección a los derechos del obtentor y que se adoptó con palabras que su 
aprobación era necesaria para remarcar la credibilidad del gobierno Nicaragüense y para 
fortalecer el comercio entre los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica y Nicaragua. Igualamente 
recordamos un proceso legislativo sin participación verdadera del sector agrícula o cívico y 
que se quedó con una ley protegando los derechos del obtentor a costa a los Derechos de los 
agricultores reconocidos globalmente. Como contrapeso el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 
propone en un anteproyecto un sistema para proteger conocimientos, innovaciones y prácticas 
locales. Aún no se sabe cómo va a afectar a las variedades criollas, los derechos del obtentor y  
de los usuarios, lo que sí se sabe es que la conservación de las variedades criollas, las 
prácticas tradicionales, innovaciones y conocimientos son asuntos inseparables. Por eso la 
colaboración entre grupos de personas e instituciones es importante ya que puede permitir el 
fortalecimiento de la soberanía y autonomía del sistema local de semillas y, además, puede 
permitir la integración de iniciativas y perspectivas locales con el desarrollo nacional.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of property rights on knowledge and living matters is of great concern as it 
stands in the crossroad of trade, environment and human rights. One such matter is seed 
and the issue of intellectual property rights on plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture.  
 
Seed is essential for food production; without germplasm no plants, without plants no 
food. The availability and quality of seed are therefore keys to productivity and a means 
towards sustainable agriculture and food security. In this connection, the improvement 
of seed plays a crucial role and so does the manner in which we decide to protect and 
steer plant development. Seed is also the vehicle of genetic information and diversity 
(CBDC web page). For this reason, genetic resources serve as the building blocks of 
seed and plant breeding and as such, they are intrinsically embedded in the seed-, agro- 
and food system (see illustration).  
 
Most food of today comes from a variety of domesticated species such as rice, beans 
and maize. These species are themselves divided into varieties, separated by differences 
in characteristics such as colour, taste and time required to mature in the field. This 
variation is due to differences in gene structures that emerge from a joint act of nature 
and deliberate breeding. Farmers have been improving seed for thousands of years, long 
before the first understanding of gene structures. Even so, plant improvement is 
inherently related to genetics since the key to improve populations, and in the end to 
develop varieties, lies in the permanent change in genetic structures over plant 
generations (Chahal and Gosal 2002:4). This is why the carriers of inherent traits, the 
genes, are in focus in plant development.  
 
As Mendelian genetics entered the picture, the speed of the breeding process increased 
and so did the rate of growth of productivity (Busch 1995). For some crops, about half 
of the increase in production has been ascribed to breeding new varieties (FAO 
1996:29). However, as the development of seed became a specialised (formal) 
profession, the improvement process was shifted away from the farm to research 
stations and recently into high-tech laboratories. Although hugely successful in some 
aspects, formal plant breeding and its products have in many cases not been adopted by 
or are not accessible to resource-poor farmers, mainly because of the context in which it 
evolved and operates (Lipton and Longhurst 1989). 
 
The question is how we improve, on what material and grounds, for what purposes and 
for whose benefit.   
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1.1 FARMER AND FORMAL BREEDING 
 
1.1.1 How we improve… 
 
Plant breeding has no set definition and although all genetic improvement ultimately 
comes down to selection in the field and to the personal touch of a breeder’s fingertip 
feelings, the methods and breeding objectives of farmers and formal plant breeders may, 
or may not, be as distinct as the resulting varieties. Where farmers mainly improve by 
selecting and saving seed from their harvest and in this process collect the fruits of 
natural crossings and mutants, formal plant breeders and more innovative farmers 
develop new varieties by crossing existing varieties with desirable characteristics. 
Together with differences in breeding techniques, the question on how breeders improve 
is closely related to the variety they seek.  
 
Plant varieties have no clear definition but rather take on different names and criteria 
depending on who developed the variety. Where so called modern, commercial or 
formal varieties improved within breeding programmes are often genetically 
homogenous and regarded distinct from each other based upon yields, seed colour, etc., 
the varieties developed by farmers are more genetically diverse and the varietal 
definition is not as clear-cut. Figure 1 illustrates how a combination of two varieties can 
produce a genetic variability, from which a selection process could produce a diverse set 
of varieties holding different degrees of genetic variability. Farmers are known to 
develop varieties that are more genetically heterogeneous (variety A and B) since 
“materials that contain some genetic diversity may be more suitable for variable and 
heterogeneous environments, providing them with an increased buffering capacity and 
potential to adapt” (Almekinders and Elings 2001:427). The formal breeder on the other 
hand normally seeks uniformity (variety C) to make sure that varieties perform 
uniformly and in accordance with description within certain domains.  
 
  
Variety X ♣♣♣♣♣♣♣♣  +  ♠♠♠♠♠♠♠♠ Variety Y 
 
↓ 
 
Genetic diversity 
•♣•♠♣•♠•♠♣•♠♣ Var. A   ←  •♠♣   ←     ♥•♥♣♦•♠♣     → ♠•  →  Var. B ♠•♠•♠•♠•♠•♠•♠•♠ 
 
↓ 
 
Selection 
♥ 
 
↓ 
 
♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ Variety C ♥♥♥♥♥♥♥♥ 
 
 
Figure 1 How the selection criteria determine characteristics and level of 
genetic variability in a variety. 
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1.1.2 On what material and grounds… 
 
The complexity of plant breeding is represented by the interaction between the genetic 
structures of the seed and the environment where it grows (G X E indicator). Marginal 
or heterogeneous areas present problems of high complexity not only in the breeding 
process (in the difficulties of isolating changes in genetic structures from environmental 
effects) but also in the adoption and distributional step. A variety adapted to one 
environment will probably not perform according to description in another environment 
nor will a centralised breeding programme be able to meet all needs and local criteria. 
Since formal improvement has general objectives of wide-scale adaptation and 
distribution, it has concentrated on yield potentials in favourable environments where 
varieties conserve their improved characteristics. Farmer breeding on the other hand is 
locally embedded and seed is improved directly in the locale where it is to be used and 
according to local preferences.  
 
Local seed flow  
 
Small-scale farmers in general produce crops for household consumption, for sale and 
for seed to exchange or plant in the next cycle (Almekinders 1998). The flow of the 
seed is therefore integrated with the flow of the crop, in a cyclic interaction and 
selection in and between fields, storage bags and markets, see figure 2. To this local 
flow of seed there is an external supply from formal breeding programmes, which adds 
on formally improved material of national or foreign origin.   
 
 
Figure 2 Local (or informal) System of Genetic Resources Management. 
Based on De Boef, Almekinders and Louwaars in Almekinder 
1998. 
 
 
Because of this flow, the varieties continuously adapt to environmental conditions both 
in agro-ecological terms (soils, climate, pests and diseases) and in socio-economic terms 
(food preferences, markets) (Almekinders 1998). The seed collection managed by 
farmers therefore includes seed with a wide array of origins and scales of distribution, 
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from nation wide to single farms. As such, varieties answer to many local as well as 
collective names like landraces or farmer-, traditional- or land varieties. Their common 
denominator is that they are successively improved directly in the farmers’ fields and 
known to respond to and build upon local demands and opportunities.  
 
Local and formal meets 
 
Local material has been and is successively collected and brought into ex situ 
conservation in seed banks held nationally, privately or on behalf of the international 
community. The idea is that no exchange or loss should be irreversible. If seed is 
conserved, they can return to the field in one shape or the other. Nowadays few 
collected seeds leave gene banks intact but more so its preferred gene structures. Local 
varieties are crossed with formally improved material, resistant material is combined 
with high-yielding, domestic material is combined with foreign and local preferences 
are combined with global demand. In its new shape, the genetic structures usually enter 
the field again through formal breeding programmes (see figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Local system feeding genebanks and the formal breeding system 
with plant genetic material (based on De Boef, Almekinders and 
Louwaars in Almekinder 1998). 
 
 
Formal breeding 
 
Much of the formal cross breeding aimed for the developing countries is conducted at 
the CGIAR centres (Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research). From 
here the material can take different routes and either be further developed within the 
country of head office or brought closer to the target areas through local CGIAR offices, 
public research centres or on private requests. Usually, seed reaches national grounds 
when it is still highly segregating, i.e. when populations are instable and hold a great 
genetic diversity. Early selections within these populations are normally made by 
breeders involved in public or private breeding programs, on-station and according to 
selection criteria set and practised by formal breeders. Later, promising lines are 
brought to farmers’ fields for further selection and although under the management of 
farmers, selection criteria are generally set and practised by formal breeders. In this 
phase, lines are compared, improved and stabilised within certain domains, normally in 
favourable environments because of technical and financial limitations. Thus, there are 
mainly two types of selections in the field, the selection between plants in a diverse 
GENEBANKS 
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population and the selection between uniform lines (varieties). Where the varietal 
selection is more straightforward, the selection within segregating populations is a hard 
but fruitful phase as this is when genetics first meet the environment and the full 
potential of the Genetic x Environment (G x E) interactions can be taken advantage of. 
Put differently, the field conditions during the early selection phase sets the domain for 
the future target area since material well adapting to the conditions in question will be 
kept on behalf of material that could have been preferred if planted in other 
environments. Figure 4 shows the formal selection process and how it affects genetic 
variability and farmers’ bag of choice.  
 
 
Formal selection process 
 
 
Genetic variability 
 
↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓ 
 
National agro-ecological conditions 
and formal breeding objectives 
 
↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓ 
  
High potential areas 
 
↓↓↓↓↓↓↓↓ 
Released varieties 
 
↓↓↓ 
 
Farmers’ bag of choice 
 
↓↓ 
 
Cultivation 
 
↓ 
 
Market  
 
 
Figure 4 How the formal breeding process affects the genetic diversity for 
food and agriculture. 
 
 
 
1.1.3 For what purposes and for whose benefit… 
 
Plant breeding is focused on improving the use-value of plants for food and agriculture: 
to find solutions of depressed yields, shifting disease and pest problems, excessive 
pesticide use, and physical constraints such as infertile soils and drought (CIAT 2001). 
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Operational plant breeding, though, includes varietal development, seed production, 
multiplication, processing, storing, marketing and distribution. 
 
Operational plant breeding 
 
Chahal and Gosal (2002:566) argue that “the actual impact of a variety on agricultural 
production depends on the extent of coverage and the level of performance at farmer’s 
fields”. According to Hardon and de Boef (1993), there are only scant data available 
comparing the performance of modern varieties with that of local varieties in farmers’ 
fields, under farmer management and utilising farmers’ evaluation. The available 
information, they say, suggests that modern varieties often lack additional characters 
which farmers consider important. From a case in Zimbabwe, Andrew T. Mushita 
(1993) concluded that “farmers prefer cultivating crops with a broader base to allow and 
facilitate the staggering of labour at various peak periods, to cope with different 
environmental factors, and for selection of different end-utilisation qualities”. The latter 
includes cooking and storage abilities, taste, nutrition and market acceptance. Formal 
improvement on the other hand has generally concentrated on yield potential in 
favourable environments with the use of irrigation and agro-chemical inputs 
(Almekinders and Elings 2001:426). In plain words, the varieties developed within the 
formal system are not known to recognise the context of resource-poor farmers. 
Almekinders (1998) sums up the problems for formal breeding in reaching the resource-
poor farmers: 
 
The combination of the farmers’ preferences (which may vary 
significantly between and even within zones) and on the other hand the 
variable production conditions (from season to season, place to place, 
and even field to field) make it difficult for a centralized program, with 
limited resources and implemented mainly at research stations, to be 
successful in these environments. One added complication is that most 
small farmers cannot purchase seed for each cycle, and it is 
difficult to provide them with good quality seed for each sowing 
season.  
 
Sometimes, the reason is distance, in understanding and in space. The majority of 
farmers are miles away from any formal strategies or bred varieties. Most farmers 
instead rely on the informal or local seed system for the development and supply of 
seed. The local system (as illustrated in figure 2) is still highly operational, especially in 
developing countries. In global figures, it provides 80% of the seed (or other 
reproductive material) used in food production (Weltzien et al. 2003).  
 
Whereas the formal seed sector develops and releases a few varieties every few years, 
the purpose and benefits of local improvement are of another dimension. The local 
system is characterised by contextual meaning with direct benefits and feedback 
between breeders, users and the environment. Due to the dynamic flow and adaptation 
to a diverse set of conditions, objectives and uses, small-scale farming also utilises a 
wide range of genetic diversity (Almekinders 1998). This is why farmers are recognised 
as producers, improvers and conservers of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture, and why a dynamic seed flow is vital if farmers are to proceed in this 
multifunctional task.  
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Interactions between formal and local system 
 
The formal and local systems have in many contexts been coexisting. However, due to a 
lack of recognition of farmers’ capacities and differences in character between the two 
systems, they have operated practically as separate systems (Almekinders 1998. Figure 
5  illustrates the (limited interaction) between the formal and local system. 
 
 
Figure 5 Formal and Informal System of Genetic Resources Management 
(based on De Boef, Almekinders and Louwaars in Almekinder 
1998). 
 
 
Restructuring of global agriculture 
 
There is a trend of countries looking to modernise agriculture and in this process of 
change, the local system is often criticized by the formal sector for being backward or 
thwarting development. Thus, the inherent benefits of the local system are unlikely to be 
merged into the formal system. From the local perspective, there is scepticism towards 
inviting the formal flow of technology since the risk of becoming swept over is quite 
evident. Instead, because users will prefer one system or the other, the outcome of a 
formalisation might be even higher barriers between the two systems, between breeders 
of different objectives, and between farmers of different scales and end-purposes. Or, 
only the fittest system will survive.  
 
In reality, both traditional farming systems and classical plant breeding are in for a 
change. What regards formal plant breeding, conventional techniques are in many 
respects being out competed by new biotechnology. With molecular-, genetic- and atom 
technology, plant breeders have entered the laboratories and this time in the search for 
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genes rather than new crops (Chahal and Gosal 2002:3). Following this trend, breeding 
is shifting away from the public sector into the hands of private seed industry (ibid, 
CIPR 2002, Busch 1995 and Crucible II Group 2000). In this process, agricultural 
research and plant breeding turns into big business, gene structures are tagged and 
privatised, and the rules of the game change.  
 
Agriculture is being industrialised. In this process, Goodman et al. (1987 in Busch) 
speak of appropriation of farm practices and products (such as seed production and 
multiplication) and substitution of farm products (synthetic production). To add on, 
Lawrence Busch (1995) talks of a standardisation towards one industrial discipline and 
a single and anonymous market. The shift away from local complex systems towards 
linear seed development and seasonal seed purchases is part of the global plan to 
restructure world agriculture. As seed development becomes business, seasonal seed 
purchases are heavily promoted and restrictions are put on the exploitation and seed use.  
 
When technology transfer of seed is promoted on behalf of local seed sources, it implies 
a change in agricultural traditions away from reusing, improving and producing seed 
locally, a practice known to conserve genetic diversity and farmers’ embedded seed 
knowledge. When uniform seed arrive in the field like other inputs, farmers may lose 
not only their knowledge of plant breeding and the relation and deeper knowledge to the 
seed itself but also the possibility to further improve and adapt the variety. As this 
exchange is likely to occur in many fields simultaneously, there is a loss of genetic 
diversity because the blend of genetically diverse varieties is exchanged for only a few 
varieties. Mooney (1999) argues that the loss includes not only genetic erosion and the 
erosion of species, soils, and the atmosphere - but also the erosion of knowledge and the 
global erosion of equitable relations. Many people with him argue that while genetic 
erosion threatens the world’s base of food plants, the erosion of knowledge threatens the 
human capacity to maintain and further cultivate this diversity (Amanor, Wellard, de 
Boef and Bebbington 1993:1). If local knowledge is lost, it might mean the end of the 
local system itself. Rural people face ever more problems beyond their control and as 
local capacities are impoverished, the resource-poor stand even more insecure. Formal 
assistance is expected to be rather poor; seed technology is transferred only to a limited 
extent, and to a specific target group (see figure 6). 
                                                                    
Resource-rich farmers 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
                                                           Resource- 
                                                                     poor               
 
 
 
Figure 6 Why there is a danger in trusting the formal seed system (solid) 
in providing seed to the local system (dashed).  
 
 
The control of how and which plant material is to be developed is gradually shifting 
from rural households to formal breeders and professional researchers linked to national 
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breeding programs or private companies (GRAIN 2003b). In fact, the shrinking budget 
for the public sector and the low possibility of cost recovery place ever-greater demand 
on external revenues (Rangnekar 2002). In effect, when research must pay its own cost 
the interest is turned towards crops that pay well and public research could lose its 
crucial task to develop technologies for a large but resource-poor farming community. 
This is most distressing since research conducted in the private and the public sector is 
non-substitutable as they are targeting different farming groups (Rangnekar 2002). 
Public breeding therefore plays a crucial role as regards crops that are mainly used in 
subsistence farming, such as the common bean.  
 
Thus, there are problems in responding to the needs and preferences of the resource-
poor of marginal areas spanning from genetic to global structures. Meanwhile, farmers 
are left on their own to cope with problems that are new, bigger, global, and perhaps 
even universal. This is a known fact, and it will prevail as long as formal plant breeding 
has objectives of money generation, wide-scale adaptation and/or remain with poor 
knowledge about local needs and preferences. The challenge is to avoid a projection of 
the present and instead start acting in an alternative manner. In the context of plant 
breeding, the undertaking is to further the interaction between capacities and to 
strengthen the red thread as illustrated in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7 Where to build bridges in order to create a responsible system 
that responds to local knowledge, needs and preferences (based 
on De Boef, Almekinders and Louwaars in Almekinder 1998).
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1.2 PARTICIPATORY PLANT BREEDING (PPB) 
 
How can we broaden the plant genetic diversity and base for breeding, and 
simultaneously increase farmers’ access and control of seed and its associated 
knowledge? Responding to the reality of resource-poor farmers, Robert Chambers 
(1997) argues that solutions are to be sought less by simplifying and standardising, and 
more by complicating and diversifying. To achieve this vision Chambers talks of: 
  
Reversal of normal professionalism, from the universal and simple to the 
local and complex; of normal bureaucracy, from the top-down and 
standard packages to bottom-up and diverse baskets of choice; of 
normal careers, from moving inwards to moving also outwards; of 
normal learning, from vertical and didactic to lateral and experimental; 
and of normal behaviour, from dominance to empowerment.  
 
In the context of plant improvement, this vision is embodied by the so-called 
participatory plant breeding (PPB). In effect, PPB takes complex systems as a starting 
point with an aim to support rather than to replace. 
 
1.2.1 Context meets research 
 
By applying this approach in plant research, the focus is shifted away from packaged 
deals and finished products towards joint learning between farmers and formal breeders, 
systems thinking and a generation of innovations answering to local needs and 
problems. Instead of selecting between a few released varieties, farmers get access to a 
genetic diversity that will enable farmers, with their knowledge and experience, to select 
and develop the materials that are most appropriate to their respective environments and 
particular preferences (Almekinders 1998). Figure 8 illustrates how the PPB approach 
presents farmers to a wider range of genetic diversity. In technical terms, PPB refers to 
the re-combination of genetic diversity and selection among or within segregating 
materials (in contrast to PVS which is a participatory varietal selection between fixed 
lines) (ibid). In this context, it means to exploit the complexity of the G x E interaction 
by selecting directly in the farmers’ field. In terms of development, there is a diversity 
of reasons for inviting farmers into a participatory plant breeding process. 
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In the PPB approach,  
farmers enter the process of breeding and decision-making here  
where there is a wide genetic diversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
In contrast to the conventional breeding approach where farmers enter here 
for a selection between released varieties. 
 
 
 
Time            Genetic variability 
 
Figure 8 How the PPB approach invites farmers to a wider range of 
genetic diversity than conventional breeding.  
 
The approach to invite farmers into breeding projects is a way to acknowledge farmers’ 
knowledge, local needs and preferences. It is also seen as a complement to formal plant 
breeding where niche environments are not served (Almekinders and Elings, 2001:427). 
The idea is to develop locally adapted technologies and distribute them more 
effectively, and to support local capacity for generating such technologies (Thro and 
Spillane 2000:3). Its motivation is found in increased and more stable productivity, 
faster release and adoption of varieties, better understanding of farmers’ criteria, 
enhanced biodiversity, increased cost-effectiveness, and cognitive and collaborative 
learning (Sperling et al 2001).  
 
The participatory plant breeding (PPB) is the collaboration between farmers and formal 
plant breeders, and the learning goes in two directions. For as much as it has technical 
advantages it includes the strategy to empower farmers by building knowledge and 
organisational skills in breeding, seed production, marketing and distribution and to 
bring context and meaning to formal research agendas. This implies a re-
professionalisation of research with new roles for the researcher as a democratic 
participant (Hart 1992 in Pretty 1995) and farmers becoming more involved and in 
charge of their development.  
 
 
                Formal knowledge     
 
 
 
                                                                         Local knowledge 
 
To assist in this interaction between different epistemologies there is usually a third 
actor with knowledge into both the formalised breeding and local grounds. This 
participant usually comes from a non-governmental organisation and serves as a 
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facilitator, technical assistant and/or administrator. This actor generally plays an 
important part in connecting the programme with financial donors, in bridging trust 
between partners and by strengthening the link between research and rural development.     
 
1.2.2 Research meets development 
 
In a world where R&D has gone participatory, collaborative projects between farmers, 
formal plant breeders and non-governmental organisations have great potentials in 
meeting not only the underlying philosophy of participatory research but also in letting 
research meet development. As Lawrence Busch (1995) points out “agricultural 
research is not a magic bullet that will automatically lead to development” neither is 
increasing agricultural productivity an end in itself – “it is only a means to some further 
end or ends, which are usually left rather vague but are often defined as development”.  
 
“Productivity for what and for whom, and what is development?” 
 
Busch suggests a development of low-cost, participatory production systems that focus 
on equity and food security while providing greater control over seed production to 
farmers. As a means, Shanmugaratnam suggests low cost participatory research to 
evolve surplus generating and sustainable production systems (in Busch 1995). Kate 
Wellard (1993) believes that the building of linkages between researchers and farmers 
arises from two objectives: "the need to create more responsive research systems which 
cater for the needs of farmers and the strengthening of the capacities of communities to 
undertake self-reliant development initiatives". In Gordon Prains’s (1993) words: 
 
There is an urgent need to recognise the potential complementarity of 
global and local approaches to agricultural research and development. 
Given our lack of understanding of complex, resource poor systems and 
germplasm and breeding needs, it is logical to involve rural people as 
professional partners in research and development efforts. However, 
farmer participation in agricultural research and development goes 
beyond logic to issues of equity and social justice: farming families are 
the final users of agricultural technology and as such have most to gain 
(and lose) from it. 
 
1.2.3 Development meets conservation 
 
By joining formal and farmer breeders, there is an increased understanding of local 
preferences in varietal development but also increased access to new germplasm and 
techniques. One breeding strategy is to introduce new segregating material to be 
selected by farmers based on their own preferences and in their own fields. Another 
approach is to improve local material by crossing formal and local material creating 
new varieties holding the preferred characteristics of local material but with an 
increased stress tolerance. The rationale is that improved performance of local varieties 
“make the materials more competitive with improved varieties and thereby reduce the 
likeliness that farmers lose interest in planting local material” (Alemekinders and Elings 
2001:435). Farmers are generally interested in conserving and utilising local material, 
but are sometimes unable to do so due to production pressures. If a local variety is not 
performing, farmers are likely to discard the material. By improving the material and 
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increase its productivity, locally adapted gene structures and preferences can be further 
conserved and developed. 
 
This approach does not only join formal and informal knowledge systems but also the 
aspects of conservation and utilisation of genetic resources. By conserving preferred 
characteristics and gene structures, the aspect of conservation lies closer to the role and 
realities of farmers as producers of food. 
 
1.3 CONSERVATION AND USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES 
 
1.3.1 Farmers’ perspective  
 
Farmers’ conservation of plant genetic resources is closely related to the use-value of 
crops and beyond this context farmers find little reason to conserve and develop plant 
genetic resources (CBDC 2002b). Also, under farmers’ management crops are not 
conserved in fix but are subject to various selection pressures, both natural and man-
made, in order to meet farmers’ needs, preferences and agro-ecological conditions. The 
on-going exchange, adoption and rejection of genetic material are natural phenomena in 
agriculture. Farmers do not have the possibility to keep a big seed collection and when 
one seed is preferred over the other, the preferred one is stored and the other one is 
eaten. A selection of one seed over the other could result in the loss of genotypes but 
this is a loss of small scale since farmers are many and genotypes are generally 
collectively conserved within the farming community. However, nowadays farmers are 
increasingly choosing between uniform varieties. This is an exchange of greater scale 
and thereby plant genetic diversity disappears at a faster rate.  
 
1.3.2 Genetic diversity – potential loss 
 
Nearly all countries report serious problems of genetic erosion. The main cause is said 
to be the replacement of traditional, locally adapted and genetically diverse varieties for 
uniform varieties of wide adoption (FAO 1996). This loss is viewed by many as a threat 
to food security and the sustainability of agricultural production at all levels: household, 
community, national and global. Yet, others argue that with the increased knowledge in 
genetics the loss and also the potentials of genetic diversity is quite exaggerated since 
comparisons of genetic structures from now and then have shown that many of the 
important structures are quite persistent and recurrent (Gullberg pers. comm).  
 
There is a prevailing dichotomy of emphasis between those more concerned with the 
production potential of genetic resources and others valuing the genetic diversity per se. 
Naturally, these emphases are interlinked considering the multifunctionality of 
agriculture. However, breeders, agricultural policy-makers and environmentalists put 
forward different realities or emphases, making an integrated strategy for development 
difficult to launch. Being producers, consumers and managers of these resources, 
farmers often stand in the crossfire between the utility and conservative approach. In the 
line of fire are also the traditional and farmer varieties; both held responsible for curbing 
development yet praised for their genetic diversity and as such the focus of most 
conservation efforts.  
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The preferred seed system is very much connected to one’s worldview on how to 
achieve agricultural development and the purpose of a conservation of plant genetic 
diversity for food and agriculture. It is true that plant breeding involves the selection of 
one genotype over the other and as such may provoke the loss of gene structures 
holding the solution to upcoming problems. On the other hand, plant improvement is 
dependent on a continuous supply of genetic diversity, from genebanks and from new 
crosses. To develop and to conserve are essential elements in plant breeding as well as 
in agricultural development. For this reason, the discipline ought not to be discarded 
based on its socio-economic context. This context, however, must be scrutinised 
because the questions remain: how do we improve, on what material and grounds, for 
what purposes and for whose benefit. Put differently, how are we to conserve plant 
genetic diversity in situ, respecting the reality of farmers, their objective to produce 
food and survive from one day to the other? 
 
1.3.3 Sustainable development – overarching umbrella 
 
If the overarching aim is a sustainable development, it is necessary to work towards a 
shared vision, where different interests and approaches connect with the issue of 
sustainability. The criteria of sustainable development are often defined as aesthetically 
agreeable and socially desirable, ethically defensible and economically viable, 
ecologically compatible and technically feasible, and culturally suitable and practically 
manageable (Bawden 1996). Another pillar is the equal opportunities between 
generations. Clearly, this is a negotiation of great complexity and it may be helpful to 
clarify what is to be sustained, for how long, for whose benefit and at whose cost, over 
what area and measured by what criteria (Pretty 1995:1248).  
 
What should be sustained: agricultural production or practices, genes, genetic diversity 
or any combination thereof? In this context, the FAO (2003a) proposes that sustainable 
development of agricultural biodiversity must be understood both sectorally and cross-
sectorally in an integrated and holistic manner, which takes into account biophysical 
and socio-economic dimensions. Moreover, sustainability is best captured when viewed 
as a process rather than as a specific outcome. That is, sustainable development is the 
fair and equitable process of negotiations between different interests. What about the 
negotiation between the utilisation and conservation aspects of genetic resources?  
 
1.3.4 Conservation meets use-value 
 
Alemekinders and Elings (2001:435) and Gilles Trouche (pers. comm) argue that 
agricultural development and conservation are not conflicting but complementary 
objectives. The Convention of Biodiversity attempts to regulate the aspects of 
biodiversity in a coherent, holistic manner by not only looking to conserve biodiversity 
for its own sake but also in relation to productivity. The CBD defines sustainable use as 
the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to 
the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet 
the needs and aspirations of present and future generations (CBD, Art. 2). If taking this 
to a pragmatic level, many farmers and plant breeders support the idea to conserve 
preferred traits rather than conserving varieties that are low yielding for their own sake. 
Furthermore, the PPB approach allows the farmers to select from diverse populations, 
but also to select for heterogeneous varieties that better matches farmers’ needs. As 
such, participatory plant breeding might be a tool in agricultural development but also 
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in the in situ conservation of plant genetic resources (Alemekinders and Elings 
2001:434).  
 
1.3.5 PPB meets protection 
 
Figure 9 illustrates how participatory plant breeding meets the objectives of 
development, conservation and research. If we agree that this meeting between 
perspectives and collaborators is beneficial in improving plant varieties and in extension 
to improve the livelihood of the resource poor, one crucial question arises. How can 
participatory approaches cope in a global trend of specialisation and corporate control? 
How can the social, technical, economic, cultural and spiritual context of the 
collaboration be protected so that it continues to grow and spread to areas where it is 
needed? The current trend is to protect plant research through intellectual property 
rights. The question is whether intellectual property rights are an appropriate and 
sufficient protection in the context of participatory plant breeding. 
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Figure 9 How participatory plant breeding meets the objectives of 
development, conservation and research. 
 
1.4 BREEDERSHIP AND OWNERSHIP  
 
To engage in the development of new plant varieties is both time and resource 
consuming. Normally the process from initial cross to formal release of a variety takes 
five-ten years and equally so if the research process is informal in farmers’ fields. It 
may be true that gene structures are found in situ in nature but behind any new variety 
lies a process of selection, be it unconscious or planned. In whatever form or context, 
the resources, work, time and ingenuity invested in plant breeding can be seen as the 
intellectual part of the seed. It lies within the global breeding trend to protect intellectual 
works but although gene structures constitute the intellectual part, the subject of 
protection is rather the intellectual contributions of breeders than the gene structure per 
se. In other words, the subject of protection is the breeding activity, but it is achieved 
through a protection of the breeding result, namely the plant variety 
 
1.4.1 Technical and legal protection  
 
In the case of plant varieties, intellectual property can be protected either through 
intellectual property rights or by technological means. The latter refers to a protection 
where seed either lose their characteristics if resown (hybrids) or they are sold sterile 
(terminators). In comparison, intellectual property rights are legal rights granted by 
governmental authorities, usually after a process of documentation, application and 
registration. The technical protection is possibly cheaper and more effective than 
property rights in the sense that it is self-enforcing (CIPR 2002:60) but simultaneously 
it is a protection imposing on farmers’ tradition to reuse seed. Intellectual property 
rights on the other hand are faced with large transaction costs. This is closely related to 
the abstract matters they are meant to regulate and the inherent difficulties in defining, 
owning and controlling knowledge, ideas and information. 
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1.4.2 Legal protection gaining territory 
 
So far, intellectual property rights apply only within national borders. This, the principle 
of territory, creates a complex web of intellectual protections and protection systems. 
Today there is a spectrum of national legislation from countries granting patents on 
plants or genes, to countries opposing ownership in association with living matters. 
However, the principle of territory also creates an international pressure to establish 
intellectual property rights regimes in harmony with so called free trade rules. Thus, the 
global trend is to establish a national protection system for plant varieties by granting 
internationally standardised plant breeders' rights. These rights protect the intellectual 
contribution of those breeders concerned with developing varieties that meet certain 
criteria, namely the distinct, uniform and stable varieties. Thus, varieties developed 
within the formal sector generally gain more attention in intellectual property rights 
legislations.  
 
1.4.3 Contribution vs. recognition 
 
A large part of the human legacy of knowledge of biodiversity, its importance, and 
functions have been gained and will continue to accumulate across cultures through 
agricultural practices (FAO 2003). Farmers have been improving seed for thousands of 
years and seed, along with other information in relation to planting, storing and 
cooking, have been exchanged and reproduced over time. It was not until last century 
that plant breeding also became a specialised profession conducted by formal plant 
breeders (Thro and Spillane 2000). Still, varieties developed within the formal sector 
generally gain more attention in intellectual property rights legislations.  
 
This situation calls upon a sincere revision on how to recognise and protect intellectual 
contributions and its contributors. The issue is perhaps even more crucial as these 
systems merge (when local knowledge feeds into formal knowledge systems) and when 
they conflict (e.g. when innovations are claimed and the true innovators are restricted in 
its use).  
1.5 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The field of intellectual property rights is fast growing, in territory as well as in 
protective terms. Yet, there are few analyses of how the regime will affect the diversity 
of plant genetic resources, whether and how it can help promote research and innovation 
relevant to national needs and people, or how it will affect food security and the cost 
and access to seed for farmers. In other words, the future of small-scale farmers and 
their traditional seed practices is quite insecure. Taken from another perspective, as 
users, developers and providers of seed, farmers hold the key to an operational plant 
breeding system yet their participation in its development is limited. As potential 
holders of intellectual property rights while generally being dependent on the free flow 
of seed, farmers could share light into intellectual claims beyond those given by the 
formal sector. On this basis, the study analyses intellectual property rights in Nicaragua 
from the perspective of small-scale farmers/local breeders of the common bean, 
Phaseolus vulgaris L.  
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1.5.1 Justification for choosing Nicaragua and the bean 
 
With the introduction of a new intellectual property rights regime comes along 
institutional adjustments and changes in farming practices. Nicaragua was chosen as it 
had just entered that process of change. The law on plant variety protection is new and a 
system protecting informal innovation is forthcoming. Moreover, as a country 
depending on small-scale farming, the practices of reusing, exchanging, selling and 
developing seed are part of agricultural traditions and as such essential for rural 
livelihoods. The restrictions brought by the plant variety protection (PVP) law on the 
use of seed can therefore lead to significant changes in farmers’ seed practices. 
Furthermore, intellectual property rights arrive with a shift in agricultural systems. How 
this shift will affect farmers’ access and control of the seed must be given serious 
attention. Of particular interest is the common bean as it is one of the most important 
crops in Nicaragua, both in means of bringing incomes to small-scale farmers and for 
being part of the daily dish. Thus, any impacts on the bean system will have tremendous 
effects regardless of any (dis)advantages brought forward by intellectual property rights 
in relation to other crops. Moreover, by being one of the crops under improvement in 
the Participatory Plant Breeding programme in Pueblo Nuevo and Condega, the choice 
of bean allows an analysis in the participatory breeding context. This enclosure presents 
an opportunity to closely follow a breeding project that brings together the formal and 
farmer perspective. It also gives the opportunity to take part in a genuine evaluation 
process of whether or not to seek plant breeders’ rights. In extension, it clarifies whether 
intellectual property rights are an appropriate and sufficient incentive for participatory 
plant breeding and research for the benefit of the resource poor. 
 
1.5.2 Opportunities and constraints of IPR for producers and breeders of beans 
 
The first objective of the study is to analyse how intellectual property rights affect 
small-scale users, producers, and developers of the common bean seed. This objective 
includes a real case scenario from a participatory plant-breeding programme, which 
invites the reader into a collaborative evaluation process surrounding the opportunities 
and constraints of plant breeders’ rights. The idea is to identify intellectual contributions 
in the breeding process and to communicate views and visions in relation to intellectual 
property rights among the participants. The study also meets up with farmers who are 
informally engaged in developing varieties, in the purpose of understanding more about 
incentives and objectives for local breeding.  
 
1.5.3 Potentials of biotechnology 
 
The second objective is to analyse the potential of biotechnology as a tool in plant 
variety protection. It is often said that biotechnology could be a means in agricultural 
development if only in the hands of the right people. This study applies biotechnology 
in the purpose of bringing genetic information to farmers.  
 
The study investigates the possibilities of determining the legal criteria in plant variety 
protection (PVP) law of distinctness and uniformity on the genetic level. This analysis 
includes a comparison between bean lines improved within the participatory plant-
breeding programme as well as a comparison between the research lines, a blend of 
traditional red seed and seed of another gene pool, namely the Swedish bean variety 
Stella. 
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Since this analysis is done in the framework of a participatory programme, the 
underlying objective is to strengthen the research project and to empower farmers by 
providing genetic information on varieties in development. Moreover, by examining the 
level of relatedness between five lines originating from the same combination but 
improved by different farmers under different agro-ecological conditions, the analysis 
could give valuable information on farmers’ knowledge and selection achievements.    
 
1.5.4 Contextual understanding 
 
The third objective is to broaden the understanding of this abstract matter of real effects. 
Although the debate on intellectual property rights in relation to living matters is 
intense, it is taking place above the heads of most people. This is a serious problem 
because their impacts will affect us all.  
 
The idea is to place and explain intellectual property rights in its context: how it relates 
to agricultural development, conservation of genetic diversity and farmers’ reality. For 
this reason, the study spans from small genetic structures to large agricultural systems, 
research agendas, international relations and universal rights. The connecting thread 
between these systems (or say the red thread through the study) is inherently abstract. 
Intellectuality serves as the metro between systems and helps visualise how global 
trends affect the national, local, plant and genetic level.  
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2. METHODS 
 
Perhaps the most constructive way of approaching the issue of plant genetic resources is 
to ‘agree to disagree’, one of the main characteristics of the Crucible II Group1, a forum 
that brings together a wide spectrum of opinions with an aim to mediate different points 
of view on the issues of genetic resources and its associated knowledge (Crucible II 
Group 2001:vii). This study takes on an interdisciplinary approach for analysing the 
genetic, agronomic, social, cultural, economic and political dimensions of genetic 
diversity, knowledge and equitable relations. Although acknowledging the importance 
of macroeconomics and global harmonisation, these aspects will not be in focus. 
Instead, as a fan of applicable research, the starting point of this study lies in the reality 
and opinions of farmers. To take on the perspectives of farmers is important since the 
real challenge is, in the words of Mooney (1996:8) "to build food security from the 
family to the farm to the community to the nation and on to the world". 
2.1 TOPICAL REVIEW 
 
The background and theory are grounded in a review of literature and articles covering 
the areas of intellectual property rights, plant breeding, and participatory research. This 
review includes articles on the seed theme published in national press between 1999 and 
2002. The legal framework was identified through a review of international agreements 
(TRIPS, CBD, ITPGRFA, CIAT, FTAA draft, etc), national law (seed law, plant variety 
protection law, biodiversity draft law) and governmental strategies on bio-politics. Key 
persons from governmental and non-governmental sectors were interviewed in order to 
check interpretations and to receive a general understanding of the legal atmosphere and 
long-term developmental strategies as outlined by different sectors.  
 
Since the intellectual property rights area is new to Nicaragua, it was a theme of much 
interest but also of much speculation. In order to use the experience of others in a 
similar process, the study draws on examples from legislations and reported impacts of 
other countries.  
 
2.2 FIELD WORK 
 
The first challenge was to understand the ‘reality of farmers’, and to learn more about 
local plant breeding in Nicaragua. A participatory plant breeding (PPB) programme 
between farmers, formal breeders and an NGO in Pueblo Nuevo/Condega gave a unique 
opportunity to take part in a breeding project and gain experience both in practical terms 
and during capacity-building and feed-back meetings. The one-year continuous 
fieldwork brought understanding of the local seed- and breeding system, selection 
criteria, methods and knowledge, gender aspects and the ups and downs of participatory 
breeding projects. The participatory approach also gave the opportunity to learn more 
about different opinions on intellectual property rights and the sharing thereof. 
 
The second challenge was to reveal hidden agendas. Agricultural policy in general and 
intellectual property rights in particular are very much political matters and clear 
                                                          
1 The Crucible II Group is a group of 45 individuals from the South and North including scientists, 
policy- and opinion-makers or business executives from private and public sectors, and civil society 
organisations. 
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arguments or objectives can not always be found in relation to the reality one is 
presented with. The disadvantage was the lack of dialogue between different points of 
views, giving a black and white picture when reality so often is grey. In order to gain a 
more balanced picture of the situation, actors from various sectors and backgrounds 
were interviewed in a semi-structured manner (including farmers, formal breeders, 
governmental officers, aid staff, members of non-governmental organisations, PhD and 
graduate students, consumers, traders etc.). By giving the interviewees an opportunity to 
freely approach key terms, their line of thinking and contextual framework became 
more obvious. It was for instance necessary to understand how the interviewee defined 
development in order to understand why they preferred a certain system. The recording 
was done in a similar manner by noting key ideas rather than exact formulations. The 
use of key terms also proved suitable as it avoided the difficulties in preparing questions 
that would be welcomed by all parties and by avoiding direct translations, especially in 
a theme of such sensitivity and when mother tongues differ. Furthermore, in the quest of 
getting access to a full picture, it certainly helped with a multidisciplinary background. 
Many doors shut if you are from the wrong discipline or is using the wrong language. 
The third challenge was to balance information seeking with information giving.  
2.3 PARTICIPATORY AND SYSTEMIC APPROACH 
 
The study was conducted in the ethos of participatory research. In this respect, it aimed 
to first listen and then proceed into discussions and collaborative learning. The approach 
to combine objectives with a participatory plant-breeding programme was important as 
one study alone has difficulties in meeting the criteria of true participatory research. By 
leaving the technical objective to be negotiated with the research partners was an 
important approach as it contributed to the research process and at the same time built 
trust and consistency in the discussions along the intellectual property theme.   
 
2.3.1 Genetic analysis 
 
After discussions with the participants in the PPB programme it was suggested that a 
genetic analysis on the research lines would be valuable both for the participants and the 
scientific community internationally. The analysis was to show the levels of genetic 
uniformity and distinctness in bean lines. The method used was PCR based RAPD 
(Polymerase Chain Reaction based Random Amplified Polymorphic DNA) whereby 
amplified DNA samples of plant individuals were tested for electrical charges. By 
examining banding patterns, it would then be possible to determine whether DNA 
sequences vary in between individuals. The plan was to use local resources at the 
National University of Agriculture (UNA). However, the analysis was finalised at the 
collaborating Swedish University of Agricultural (SLU), which in turn made possible a 
comparison between laboratory environments and more distinct gene material. 
 
2.3.2 Intellectual discussion 
 
After bringing on the intellectual property issue, it was felt important to bring on the 
issue among the participants in the PPB project without limiting the discussion to legal 
rights of control, that is, to go beyond the formal possibilities and project objectives as 
these may not answer to the preferences of today or the possibilities of tomorrow. The 
strategy was to give the farmers the opportunity to reflect upon these issues and make 
farmers part of the decision-making from the very beginning. The initial discussions 
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aimed more towards understanding farmers’ moral rights and the claims thereupon; who 
were the true innovators and on what premises were the innovations to be used and 
distributed. By turning the focus on moral rights, plant breeders’ rights were 
subsequently explained and presented as a possible option for the future. During a 
Mesoamerican meeting between participatory breeders, these issues were further 
elaborated much to the help of differences in seed systems, institutional supports and 
values.  
 
These discussions were continued amongst individual plant breeders, from the formal 
sector as well as innovative farmers in the North Central parts of Nicaragua. To further 
understand the implications of plant breeders’ rights (from the perspective of the rights-
holder as well as for the user of protected varieties), the ones with titles or applicants 
were asked for objectives and attitudes towards the informal seed market and future 
royalties and enforcement.    
 
A systemic approach helped in analysing the interactions between systems from the 
small of genes to the large of universal rights. In favour of explaining the larger 
pictures, important details may have been lost. However many studies have been 
conducted on systems in isolation. This is why this study instead aimed to cross over 
systems in order to present a more holistic view. Another idea was to present a vision by 
using the experience from the participatory project as an inspiration for an alternative 
seed system.  
 
To bring a living process down on paper was indeed the hardest task of all. Hopefully, 
much of the result is left in the field and in the minds of people. This written report aims 
to be a general discussion guided by the experiences from the fieldwork during the year 
of 2002. 
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3. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (IPR) – GLOBAL 
AND CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND  
 
3.1 INTERNATIONAL (DIS)AGREEMENTS  
 
The issues of intellectual recognition and food security are matters of international 
relevance and essence. Agriculture is dependent on a global flow of genetic resources. 
Genetic information is of high interest in global trade and big business. There is 
therefore a growing collection of laws regulating the rights in relation to genetic 
resources and its associated knowledge, including rights of ownership, intellectual 
property, stewardship, access and national sovereignty (GRAIN 2002a). At the same 
time, there is a growing pressure of harmonising these rights between laws and within 
the international community. Nonetheless, because biodiversity is multifunctional there 
seems to be as many perspectives as grounds for disagreements.    
 
3.1.1 Resources in public or private domain  
 
According to a principle in the Convention on Biodiversity (Art 3), States have the 
sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies. Thus with the signing of the CBD in 1993, natural resources went from being 
the property of humankind to becoming State property. The rationale was to deal with 
the Tragedy of Freedom in the Commons, the situation where individuals tend to 
overexploit. The intellectual property part is another subject matter. Some argue that 
intellectuality is of public property while others argue that it is a highly private matter.  
 
The division of public and private domain is the foundation of any intellectual property 
rights. IPR is a means to remove from the public domain certain subject matters defined 
by law into the private domain where they may not be copied, used or exploited without 
the prior authority or consent of that owner for as long as this right subsists (GRULAC 
2000). The prevailing ground for disagreement is that living matters are distinct from 
say artistic works or computer models. Firstly, they are the essence of our survival. 
Secondly, it is easy to conceptualise the real and abstract but in reality, it is difficult to 
separate the seed itself from its intellectual part. While someone may claim a plant, 
animal or microorganism as his or her exclusive property, the living matter will 
continue to reproduce regardless of permission.  
 
Which knowledge can and should be protected or not is much an ethical issue but it is 
also a matter of technical feasibility. According to the Crucible II Group (2001:70) 
technical feasibility depends upon variables including (1) the scope of knowledge the 
law is intended to cover, (2) the conditions for the protection included in the law, (3) the 
rights conferred on rights-holders2 regarding the covered knowledge and (4) whether or 
not the law is meant to be retroactive. These variables are essential for any enforcement 
and legal security; still they are often left behind in the legislative process because of 
                                                          
2 The term ‘rights-holders’ will be used instead of ‘ownership’ as the latter often is interpreted as 
ownership to material things instead of ownership of rights. Also, the possessive term will be used in the 
general discussion on farmers varieties, this to ease the reading and not to indicate any moral claims or 
ownerships. 
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their great complexity and matters of conflicts. These issues are therefore often left 
unresolved in the international negotiations.   
 
3.1.2 Multilateral agreements on multifunctional matters 
 
Although genetic resources and their associated knowledge are matters of national 
sovereignty, there is an international pressure towards a harmonised protection regime. 
Prior to the GATT Uruguay Round of trade negotiations held between 1986 and 1994, 
intellectual property rights were mainly administered by the UN organisation WIPO 
(World Intellectual Property Organisation). The aim of the Uruguay negotiations was to 
shift the regulatory focus away from WIPO to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and therein permit the use of trade-based remedies to enforce international intellectual 
property rights standards (Ekbar 2001). Since WIPO treaties’ lack effective enforcement 
mechanisms this was said to constitute a barrier to world trade, an opinion mainly 
voiced by developed countries and transnational companies. These discussions resulted 
in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
included within the family of treaties administered by the WTO. To date, TRIPS is the 
most comprehensive multilateral agreement on intellectual property (Ekbar 2001). 
 
With TRIPS, the international community has given green lights to intellectual property 
rights associated with genetic resources (see p.23), followed by acceptance in the 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD, Art 16) and its newer extension, the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA, Art. 12.3d). 
Legal texts aside, the international community is by no means in agreement. Ikechi 
Mgbeoji (2001) helps draw the parting: 
 
“Law and institutions created and/or controlled by states with powerful 
and influential commercial and industrial interests (such as the TRIPS) 
maintain the view that the patent system is an instrument useful for 
sustaining biological diversity and indigenous peoples, and for 
protecting genetic diversity. On the other hand, international law and 
institutions created and/or sustained by the United Nations, including 
the CBD, have been far less sanguine about the purported beneficial 
impact of an expanded patent system on bio culture and indigenous 
peoples.” 
 
Somewhat in the crossfire stand the CGIAR centres and the germplasm held in trust for 
the benefit of the international community. Although these centres hold only about 10% 
of the global entries, they are important since the collections are reputed to be the most 
complete, best documented and best preserved globally (GRAIN 2002b). As the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) 
is coming into force, the germplasm held in trust enters the mulitlateral system.  
 
The International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) is one of the CGIAR centres 
holding 31 400 accessions of the Common Bean of which almost all are designated 
material, i.e. held in trust for humanity (Koo et al 2002). The status of the material 
collected before the signing of the FAO agreement in 1994 is still unclear. This is why 
CIAT encourages germplasm donors to permit the designation of material pursuant to 
the agreement (CIAT policy II: 2). According to the agreement with FAO, CIAT will 
not claim legal ownership over designated germplasm, nor will it seek any intellectual 
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property rights over that germplasm or related information (CIAT IPR policy, V: 2). 
Nonetheless, the centre may seek to protect products of its research by obtaining 
appropriate intellectual property protection. In seeking intellectual property rights, it is 
guided by its commitment to serve the resource poor rather than by opportunities to 
obtain recurring revenues (CIAT IPR policy, III: 12). According to their IPR policy, 
CIAT will endeavour to produce and distribute research products that are “free and 
clear” of restrictions imposed by third-party intellectual property rights (IV: 2). But is it 
possible to protect geneplasm coming from CIAT?  
 
Designated germplasm is made available to recipients under conditions set forth in a 
Material Transfer Agreement (MTA) where all recipients must agree not to claim legal 
ownership or seek intellectual property protection over the designated germplasm or 
related information (CIAT IPR policy, V: 4). This, however, confers to the material as it 
arrived to the centre. The CIAT policy on intellectual property rights as well as the 
ITPGRFA concern material in the form received. Receivers may seek protection after 
alterations or rather according to the national intellectual property rights regime. This 
means that components of the germplasm accessions (such as individual genes) and 
derivatives (selections made from the plants or descendents of crosses) may be legally 
appropriated by anyone through IPR (GRAIN 2002b). The centre therefore has poor 
control over the material once held in trust.  
 
The dilemma of the centres is to ensure a free flow of genetic material (to anyone) while 
safeguarding the interest of the resource poor. The centres have a strong voice in the 
intellectual debate and their stand is crucial in terms of remaining with the trust and 
responsibilities once given.   
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3.2 PLANT VARIETY PROTECTION (PVP) 
 
3.2.1 TRIPS and plant varieties 
 
There is vast knowledge in relation to genetic resources. In relation to these, TRIPS 
reads: 
 
 
TRIPS (Article 27.3b) 
 
Members may exclude from patentability:  
plants and animals other than micro organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological 
and microbiological processes.  
 
However, Members shall provide for the  
protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis 
system or by any combination thereof. 
 
 
 
 
Plants can therefore be excluded from patent systems but plant varieties must be 
provided with some form of intellectual property system, either patents or an effective 
sui generis system (a system especially designed for its purposes). However, none of the 
key elements, such as ‘plant variety’ and ‘effective’ has any globally accepted 
definition. These crucial elements remain susceptible to domestic politics and interests 
(Mgbeoji 2001). Thus, the mandatory requirements could preserve significant leeway 
for national governments to work out the manner in which they will balance protection 
of intellectual property rights against other international obligations and national 
objectives (Helfer 2002).  
 
3.2.2 UPOV and Plant Breeders’ Rights   
 
Most developing countries are choosing the sui generis option with some kind of plant 
variety protection law and the provision of plant breeders’ rights (GRAIN 2002a). The 
global trend is to adopt a PVP law copying the regulations of the UPOV Convention3. 
UPOV is an intergovernmental organisation with objectives to protect new varieties of 
plants by intellectual property rights. Its first Act was drafted in 1961 and was later 
revised in 1978 and 1991. The Act of 1991 is stricter than the older version in so that it 
leaves less flexibility for the implementation of plant breeders’ rights in national law.  
 
Many of the new members of UPOV are born out of so called TRIPS-plus agreements 
(CIPR 2002:62 and GRAIN 2003a). GRAIN talks of 90 such agreements where United 
States and Europe are putting direct pressure on developing countries to adopt and 
                                                          
3 UPOV (Union internationale pour la protection des obtentions végétales) and its International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants is found on www.UPOV.org. 
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enforce higher standards of intellectual property protection than the WTO prescribes 
(GRAIN 2003a, b). Usually, the industrialised counterpart takes an active role also in 
the legislative process by presenting and promoting a finished draft copy. This line of 
attack is strongly critiqued for undermining national sovereignty and local democracy.  
 
The regulations of UPOV are often criticised for answering more to the reality of the 
drafting countries, i.e. developed countries with certain socio-economic, agrarian and 
scientific-technological structures (Cervantes 2002). In spite of many opponents, the 
web of patents and other intellectual protections are spreading rapidly. Since knowledge 
is non-exhaustible but rather thrives by its utilisation, the rationale is not found within 
the tragedy of the commons but in the commitment to protect intellectual contributions, 
or perhaps in the nature of things.  
 
3.2.3 Grounds and consequences 
 
According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is a State’s commitment to 
ensure “the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author” (Article 27). This 
obligation is repeated in the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Art 15.1c). However, according to Helfer (2002) the policy goal of granting 
intellectual property rights to plant varieties is founded principally on an instrumentalist 
approach; the protection should provide adequate incentives for breeders to invest in 
breeding but the ultimate goal is not to reward creators but the enhancement of social 
welfare. The plant breeder is to recoup his or her investment by exclusive rights and 
herein avoid others, so called free riders, from freely copying seed without sharing the 
cost of breeding. In return, there is an improvement and release of new varieties. 
Opponents say this is nonsense, intellectual property rights is a way “to control the 
market, the competition, full stop” (GRAIN 2003d).  
 
To implement an intellectual property rights system initially designed for the seed 
systems of developed countries has its motives, and will therefore have its 
consequences. In the context of developing countries it carries the risk of disrupting the 
collective way of thinking and behaving as well as restricting farmers’ rights to reuse, 
exchange and sell seed, the very practices that form the basis of their traditional role in 
conservation and development of plant genetic resources (CIPR 2002:68). These 
traditional rights are generally sought for through exemptions in the rights-holders 
control.  
 
3.2.4 Exemptions in Plant Breeders’ Rights 
 
There are two common exemptions where the rights-holder is restrained from 
demanding payments for the usage of protected varieties, the breeders’ and farmers’ 
exemptions. Without the authorisation of the rights-holder, breeders may freely use 
protected varieties for breeding purposes and farmers may engage in traditional 
practices such as saving and reusing seed for private purposes (Helfer 2002). The 
rationale behind these exemptions stem from the counterbalance of plant breeders’ 
rights and the good of society at large and, according to CIPR (2000) what regards the 
farmers’ exemption, on the rationale that the intent is further production of grain and 
not reproduction for sale of seed.  
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The exemption for farmers to reuse protected seed without any authorisation or payment 
is implicitly secured in the UPOV Act 1978 since it only concerns commercial activities 
whereas the newer Act of 1991 leaves it to the national law to secure farmer 
exemptions. That the right to reuse seed has shifted from a natural right to a legal 
exemption is much criticised by farmer movements, much so because the right becomes 
“subject to political decision-making and prone to restrictions in the future” (van Wijk 
1995). Accordingly, restrictions on the farmers’ exemptions come in several forms 
(GRAIN 2003d): 
 
• farmers are prohibited from saving seed of certain crops 
• only certain farmers (e.g. those with a specific farm size or income level) can enjoy the privilege 
• farmers have to pay an additional royalty to the breeder for any seed that they save on the farm 
• farmers can save seed, but not exchange it (they can only grow it on their own farm) 
• farmers can save seed and exchange it, but they can not sell it 
• farmer can save, exchange and sell seed, but only without using the name of the variety 
 
3.2.5 Plant Breeders’ Rights vs. Farmers’ Rights 
 
When farmers compete with rights-holders on the market of the protected seed, there is 
a conflict between farmers’ rights and plant breeders’ rights. The rights of farmers are 
not intellectual property rights but are often in tension with intellectual property rights. 
Farmers’ rights stem from the past, present and future contributions of farmers in 
conserving, improving and making available genetic resources and the rights are 
increasingly being recognised in international law. According to the preamble of 
ITPGRFA, farmers have the right to save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed and 
other propagating material, and to participate in decision-making regarding, and in the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from, the use of plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture. These rights are fundamental to the realization of farmers’ 
rights. Some jurisdictions prohibit informal exchange and sales of protected varieties, 
activities that are considered part of traditional agriculture. Farmers’ rights also clash 
with intellectual property rights because many farmers and farming communities wish 
not to claim exclusive rights in plant varieties and/or have not been able to do so in the 
varieties they have developed over time.  
 
3.2.6 DUS criteria vs. breeding agenda 
 
Most laws on plant variety protection usually set up two aspects of the requirements for 
the protection of a variety, the technical requirements and the administrative-legal 
criterion. The latter refers to a unique denomination and novelty in regards to the time 
of commercialisation. The technical requirements, known as the DUS criteria, state that 
a plant variety must be distinct from other varieties, uniform and stable over generations 
in order for it to gain legal protection (CIPR 5.3b with modifications):  
 
1. Distinctness: a variety must be clearly distinguishable, in one or more 
characteristics, from any other variety whose existence is a matter of common 
knowledge at the time when protection is applied for. This requirement ensures 
inter-varietal identification. 
2. Uniformity: a variety must be sufficiently uniform in its distinguishing 
characteristics, such that different individuals of the same variety are reasonably 
similar. This requirement ensures intra-varietal uniformity. 
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3. Stability: a variety must be stable in its distinguishing characteristics, i.e. it 
remains unchanged after repeated propagation or, in the case of a particular 
cycle of propagation, at the end of each such cycle. This requirement addresses 
varietal identification across time. 
 
How IPR affects research priorities is a crucial question since its justification lies in 
giving incentives for breeding for the good of society. As such it steers breeding in a 
certain direction. The DUS criteria however are criticized for not answering to 
agricultural demands. According to a literature review by Rangnekar (2002) three 
problems are noted with the DUS criteria:  
 
(a) The exclusive focus on distinctness of characteristics is considered a low 
threshold for ‘inventive step’, which tends to enable the easy grant of protection 
(e.g. cosmetic breeding). 
(b) The demand on uniformity is an excessive burden that has, at times, deleterious 
effects on biodiversity.  
(c) The high demand on stability is considered an economic deterrent to the quick 
release of new varieties. On the demand on uniformity,  
 
In addition, farmers usually seek more genetically heterogeneous seed material, which 
makes it more adaptable and suited to their agro-ecological environments. 
 
The DUS criteria that define what knowledge can be protected exclude all but a small 
proportion of total knowledge on genetic resources. Some members of the Crucible II 
Group argue ”in this way, they preserve a necessary, utilitarian balance between 
restricted areas of protected knowledge and the freely manoeuvrable public domain” 
(Crucible II Group 2001). Others in contrast seek to modify existing intellectual 
property rights and the DUS criteria to permit farmers themselves to claim exclusive 
rights in plant varieties they develop informally (Helfer 2002).  
 
3.3 SUI GENERIS COMMUNITY RIGHTS 
 
Another approach to protect informal innovations apart from modifying existing plant 
variety protection law is through so called sui generis community rights that are rights 
designed especially for informal knowledge systems. The highest declaration in a forum 
of indigenous peoples states “indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the 
full ownership, control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property. They 
have the right to special measures to control, develop, and protect their sciences, 
technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and other genetic resources, 
seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora…” (Draft Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in Crucible II Group 2001:37).  
 
3.3.1 Holistic protection on moral grounds 
 
Where protection of intellectual property means enforcing private, exclusive economic 
rights to a specific creation in order to prevent others from using or reproducing it, 
protection of traditional knowledge, necessarily implies protecting the whole social, 
economic, cultural and spiritual context of that knowledge so that it continues to be 
produced and reproduced (GRAIN 2003e). Although the latter has clear social benefits 
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and therefore in theory could stem from the instrumental approach, the political and/or 
agricultural reality suggests that farmer innovations do not need the same incentives or 
protection system. Instead, granting these intellectual property rights are more related to 
the moral commitment to compensate innovators and to protect human (intellectual) 
rights. “Indigenous and local peoples have a right to have their knowledge protected, 
not because protecting it will create incentives for more innovations, but because it is 
theirs” (Crucible II Group 2001:96). Under the rationale that rights are rights, and 
should not be undermined by utilitarian considerations, some members of the Crucible 
II Group (2001:106) argue that it does not matter that one potential result of creating 
strong rights for a wide range of knowledge would be to tie up the system. ‘Why should 
we trust formal sector innovators with strong rights, and not indigenous and local 
communities’, they ask.  
 
3.3.2 Rights of benefit sharing 
 
Sui generis community rights are often included in biodiversity laws and are generally 
considered to counter balance breeders’ rights and industrial innovations, giving legal 
rights to fair benefit-sharing rather than exclusive rights of control. For instance, when 
an outsider wishes to access innovations there is a need for a prior informed consent 
(PIC) from the innovators and in this, contracts are to be established on future rights. 
Although not intellectual property rights, the Crucible II Group argues “there is very 
little conceptual or justificatory distance between the creation of access laws that 
include PIC provisions for indigenous and local communities and the creation of 
intellectual property protections for their benefit” (Crucible II Group 2001:41). This 
approach meets the vision of the CBD for fair and equitable sharing of benefits and the 
need to reward and support farmer contributions to plant genetic resources through 
benefit sharing mechanisms, such as payments, technology transfers and collaborative 
research programmes. 
  
3.4 PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS 
 
Although the goals of participatory plant breeding are wide-ranging from enhancing 
biodiversity to empowering marginalised farmers, one of the main purposes of PPB is to 
develop new plant varieties (Weltzien/Smith et al 1999:xi). These varieties may 
sometimes be of interest for commercialisation and/or protection by intellectual 
property rights, patents or breeders’ rights. When plant varieties are improved in 
collaboration between various actors the question may arise who the actual breeder is 
and who, in case protection is desired, might be the holder of intellectual property 
rights. Thus, collaborative programs raise new questions and challenges for recognising 
collaborative innovations in Intellectual Property regimes (Crucible II Group 2000:11). 
Then again, participatory plant breeding provides the opportunity of following the 
practical process of innovation and to guide a fair benefit sharing based on actual 
contributions (Weltzien/Smith et al. 2000).  
 
3.4.1 Joint breedership - joint ownership 
 
International agreements and national law are very vague on the linkage between the 
quality of collaboration and the legal rights flowing from it. Breeding as such is a broad 
term, stretching from genetic engineering to evaluation in the fields, and it may 
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therefore be difficult to decide who the legal breeder is. What is clear though is that for 
making any claims on intellectual property rights, there is a requirement of some sort of 
intellectual contribution.  
 
In reality, there is a range of options to define ‘joint breedership’, from a permissive 
approach (one creative contribution) to a restrictive approach (a creative contribution to 
a very specific stage, such as the development of DUS varieties). As international 
agreements leave poor guidance to the relation between collaboration and property 
rights, it is a question for national law and/or contracts to determine the contributions 
required to establish joint breedership and its consequences for intellectual property 
rights. On this, the term collaboration is sometimes found in national law but it is 
seldom specified which contributions at which stage of the process establish ‘joint 
breedership’. This allows participants to decide upon the future sharing of right. 
However, it is generally so that the legal field is lagging behind the technical aspects of 
collaboration. (CGIAR PRGA 2001) 
 
Almekinders and Elings (2001:436) argue that the “recognition of farmers’ contribution 
to the development of the variety is an ethical issue, but may be of less practical 
relevance than questions on who will be responsible for the submission and costs for the 
variety maintenance and basic seed production”. With the introduction of breeders’ 
rights, the situation is put into a new light. Nowadays farmers’ contribution also brings 
questions of who decides upon whether protection should be applied for, of who would 
be responsible for the submission and costs of application and maintenance, and who 
would have control over decisions and be the collector of royalties if protection is 
applied for. It seems as if the participatory programmes going on worldwide have either 
said no to intellectual protection on ethical grounds or they stand on the doorsteps 
evaluating pros and cons of breeders’ rights. A review by the CGIAR System wide 
Program on Participatory Research and Gender Analysis shows that in formally led 
programmes, varieties have either been fed into the formal system without 
acknowledging the input of farmers or released and diffused informally to farming 
communities (Weltzien et al. 2003:112). The issue is very complex as it spans over 
ethics, group agreements, and genetic diversity all the way to economic speculations in 
a non-linear way.  
 
3.4.2 Quality of participation – link to intellectual property claims 
 
In the intellectual property rights context, participation must be linked to some degree 
of intellectual contribution. Sperling et al (2001) suggest three elements relevant for 
analysing the quality of participation of farmers and researchers: the degree and stage of 
participation, and the functions performed by the participants (CGIAR PRGA 2001). 
These elements will clarify who does what in the collaboration, and in turn makes 
possible an analysis of property sharing arrangements. However, as case studies of PPB 
show these elements often change as the program matures, and that research processes 
are iterative rather than linear (CGIAR PRGA 2001). The elements below are therefore 
time-dependent, an aspect which must be taken into consideration in any analysis. The 
elements marked with * suggest intellectual contribution relevant for plant variety 
protection. 
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Quality of participation 
 
i. Degree of participation 
*Consultative (Information sought from farmers/ other clients, scientist-
led) 
*Collaborative (Task sharing along lines determined by formal research 
program) 
*Collegial (Researchers support farmer-initiated/managed program) 
 
ii. Functions performed by participants 
*Technical expertise 
Organisational skills 
*Information giving (trade-offs and preferences 
Teaching/ skill building (extension 
Field labour 
Provide inputs (land, *seed, funds, etc) 
 
iii. Stage of involvement in breeding process 
Defining overall goals 
Defining breeding targets (e.g. identification of farmers’ plant ideotype 
and most valued characters) 
*Generating variability  
*Selection in early segregating populations 
*Variety testing  
*Variety evaluation 
Seed multiplication/ distribution 
 
 
3.4.3 Joint breedership – joint benefit sharing  
 
The approach of participatory plant breeding aims at joining breedership with joint 
benefit sharing. Again, to closely follow the practical process of innovation could be a 
guide to fair benefit sharing based on actual contributions (Weltzien/Smith et al 2000). 
In participatory plant breeding, roles are often reversed from classical breeding. In many 
PPB cases, farmers are in charge of the last innovative contribution, building upon the 
works of formal breeders and the accumulated innovations by generations of farmers. 
As such, farmers could legally reap the benefits of many former innovators by using the 
PVP provisions and in this their contributions would integrate into the legal approaches 
for intellectual recognition in plant improvement. Again, it is a system opposed by 
many fellow farmer movements.  
 
3.5 JUST RIGHTS   
 
Plant breeders’ rights and patents are often blamed for only recognising the last 
contribution, or for crediting the people in power to design rules and regulations to their 
own benefit. It should be underlined that most IPR are not benefit sharing; they focus on 
the last inventor and credit the contributions the system has decided to credit. Are these 
just rights? 
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3.5.1 Justice as fairness 
 
According to Plato justice is what is to the advantage of the powerful (in Barry 1989:4). 
John Rawls on the other hand sees justice as fairness where the fairness of the 
circumstances under which agreements is reached is transferred to the principles of 
justice agreed upon (Barry 1989:265), i.e. if laws or contracts were negotiated in a fair 
manner any reading would be just. Thus in this sense, justice emerges in a situation, as a 
course of conduct that is accepted by all parties. To allow stakeholders to participate in 
the legislative process in a fair manner is therefore crucial for making rights just. Figure 
10 illustrates the dynamics between perspectives included in the decision-making 
process and the perceived justness of the law.  
 
 
   Perspectives 
 
 
 
   Law 
 
 
 
     Justice 
 
 
Figure 10 The more perspectives included in a decision-making process, the 
more just will be the outcome… 
 
In reality, the participation of indigenous, local and farming communities in the 
legislative process is limited and the sphere holding scientific (formal) knowledge has 
had the privileged of designing most laws on plant variety protections. Third world 
countries (which are rich in biodiversity) consistently propose amendments in the 
TRIPS requirements to include information on the origin of the material and its 
associated knowledge, prior informed consent (PIC) from governments/communities, 
and proof on fair and equitable benefit sharing (Byström and Einarsson 2002:33). In 
short, to make intellectual property rights compatible with the CBD objectives of 
sharing the benefits of genetic resources and its associated knowledge in a fair and 
equitable way. How this is practically done is beyond the scope of this paper4, however 
these issues are intrinsically interlinked: 
 
“When one seeks to reconcile the knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities with intellectual property, the main problem seems to be a lack of recognition of 
the special interests of the indigenous communities and the design of systems for monitoring the 
use of their works according to criteria suited to the subject matter to be protected. In the same 
line of thought, it is also important to take due account of the principles of justice and equity 
that should preside over the sharing of benefits of any practical, commercial or industrial result 
that might emerge from the intellectual efforts of indigenous and local communities.”  
                                                                                                 (GRULAC 2000)  
                                                          
4 For an excellent overview on the issue and an Argentinean case, see “Access to and Intellectual Property 
Rights over Genetic Resources with a Special focus on fair and equitable benefit sharing” by María 
Dolores Pigretti Öhman, the International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics, Lund 
University, 2002.  
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3.5.2 Justifications 
 
Some make a distinction between good and bad intellectual property rights. These 
voices oppose a privatisation of genetic resources and its associated knowledge by 
private industry, but in the same breath advocate the protection and exclusive rights of 
indigenous and local peoples’ knowledge (comments during the Mesoamerican 
conference, Managua 2002). Such protection is often referred to or thought of as 
defensive or passive protection with the aim to reduce biopiracy. Swanson (cited in 
Banerjee) argues that intellectual property rights on living matters is a very rational 
approach to the resolution of the biodiversity problem:  
 
To a large extent, the extension of ‘intellectual property’ regimes to 
include natural resource-generated information simply levels the 
playing field between those societies which are more heavily endowed 
with human capital and those that are more heavily endowed with 
natural forms of capital.  
 
What this quote fails to recognise is that intellectual property regimes born in a playing 
field of inequitable power relations are unlikely to have an equalising effect. Under 
these circumstances, it is important to look beyond the judicial system and reflect upon 
the motives for providing such rights. Those opposing intellectual property rights in 
relation to living matters do this not only on moral grounds but also because they put 
little faith into a system designed by and for the stronger party. As such, they believe 
that even so-called good intellectual property rights are a capitulation to a system with 
few intentions of protecting the interest of informal innovators.  
 
Ultimately, the impacts of intellectual property rights on genetic resources are directly 
related to the seed system, its level of technology, breeding, seed exchange and genetic 
diversity. As a preview, the concept of justice as fairness serves as an indication of what 
is to come. 
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4. NICARAGUA – THE GROUND TO EXPLORE 
 
 
Nicaragua’s history is paved by erosion of biodiversity, knowledge and inequitable 
relations. It has lived through colonisation, exploitation, deforestation, dictatorship, 
revolution, civil war and natural disasters. In the backwaters came its fair shares of 
agricultural reforms; from export crops and State support in the 1960-70’s, to State 
control, co-operatives and green revolution in the 80’s, to state withdrawal and 
liberalism in 90’s (Marin and Pauwels 2001). This process did not only include changes 
in the agricultural system and crops but also a change in the very people owning, 
managing and cultivating the land because of expropriations, migrations, occupations 
and reoccupations. The strategy of today is to formalise the agricultural sector. This is a 
part of the route to modernise rural Nicaragua. The road though, is long and full of 
pitfalls. The ten years of revolution, embargoes, State control and civil war were 
devastating for the agricultural development and the recuperation is hampered by 
natural disasters, falling export prices and inconsistent policies. Both the State and its 
citizens rely on outside help, be it the World Bank, aid organisations or Nicaraguans 
working abroad (20% of the population according to CIPRES 2003a). Most 
Nicaraguans survive through aid, reciprocity and small profits as goods and services 
change hands. The informal market is large and people still rely on informal networks 
and safety nets to a large extent.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Map of Nicaragua (CIA 2003) 
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Table 1 Nicaragua in figures and rule 
 
Nicaragua in figures 
 
Area: around 130 000 km2  
Capital: Managua (around 1, 1 million, 2000)  
Population: 5.4 million (UN 2003)  
Labour force: 1.7 million (CIA 1999) 
Unemployment rate: 23% plus considerable underemployment (CIA est. 2001)  
Inhabitants/km2: 39 (2000)  
Natural population growth: 2,3 % (2001)  
Literacy: 67 % (1999)  
Ethnic groups: Mestizo (mixed Amerindian and white) 69%, white 17%, black 9%, Amerindian 5% 
Language: Spanish (English, Mesquite, Sumu and Ramas)  
Religion: Catholics 80 %, Protestants 
Natural resources: lumber, fish, seafood, some gold, silver and cupper  
Budgets: revenues: $726 million and expenditures: $908 million, including capital expenditures of $NA 
(CIA est. 2000) 
External dept: US$6.1 billion (CIA 2001) 
GDP: 12,3 billion US dollars (CIA est. 2001 of purchasing power parity) 
GDP- real growth rate: 2,5% (CIA est. 2001) 
GDP/capita: US$473 (2000)  
Sector share in GDP: agriculture 32 %, industry, construction and mining 22 %, service and others 46 % 
(2000) 
Exports: US$609.5 million f.o.b. (CIA est. 2001) 
Export goods: coffee, shrimp and lobster, cotton, tobacco, beef, sugar, bananas; gold  (CIA) 
Export partners: US 57.7%, Germany 5.3%, Canada 4.2%, Costa Rica 3.3%, Honduras 3% (CIA 2000) 
Imports:  US$1.6 billion f.o.b. (CIA est. 2001) 
Import partners: US 23.9%, Costa Rica 11.4%, Venezuela 9.9%, Guatemala 7.9%, Mexico 5.9% (CIA 
2000) 
Currency: 1 cordoba = 100 cevantos = US$14, 9 (June, 2003)  
Membership in international organisations: UN, OAS, CACM, WTO, IMF, WB.  
 
Source when not given: Countries in pocket form (Länder i fickformat), No 704, 2002, the Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs 
 
 
Nicaragua in rule 
 
Government type: Republic 
Executive branch:  Chief of state and head of government: President Enrique Bolaños Geyer and Vice 
President Jose Rizo Castellon (since 10 January 2002). 
Cabinet: Council of Ministers appointed by the president.  
Elections:  President and vice president elected on the same ticket by popular vote for a five-year term.  
Election results of November 2001: Bolaños Geyer (PLC - Liberal Constitutional Party) elected president 
- 56.3%, Daniel Ortega Saavedra (FSLN - Sandinista National Liberation Front) 42.3%, Alberto Saborio 
(PC - National Conservative Party) 1.4%; Jose Rizo Castellon elected vice president 
Legislative branch: Unicameral National Assembly (93 seats; members are elected by proportional 
representation to serve five-year terms): Liberal Alliance (ruling party - includes PLC, PALI, PLIUN, and 
PUCA) 42 seats, FSLN 36 seats, PCCN 4 seats, PCN 3 seats, PRONAL 2 seats, MRS, PRN, PC, PLI, 
AU, UNO-96 one seat each. 
Judicial branch: Supreme Court (16 judges elected for five-year terms by the National Assembly) 
Legal system: Civil law system; Supreme Court may review administrative acts 
 
Source: CIA 2003 
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4.1 ROUTE OF DEVELOPMENT 
 
Nicaragua holds enough natural resources to feed its population. Situated in the heart of 
the tropical Central America with favourable climates, fertile soils and the region’s 
lowest population pressure and most extensive social division of land, Nicaragua could 
support rural life quality. Yet politics and natural disasters have placed the country at 
rank 118 based on the Human Development Indicator, with 50% of the population 
living below the national poverty line (UNDP 2002).  
 
Nicaragua has traditionally relied on a few mineral and agricultural exports to sustain its 
economy. Historically, the national wealth benefited only a few elite families of Spanish 
descent, primarily the Somoza family, which ruled the country with US backing 
between 1937 and the revolution in 1979 (BBC News 2003). Nowadays, the national 
wealth is on sale on a market where prices often do not cover the cost of production 
(CIPRES 2003b). 
 
4.1.1 From Somoza to Bolaños 
 
The Sandinistas, a leftist intellectual guerrilla with strings to Marx, Castro and Che 
Guevara initiated the revolution against Somoza. In 1978, the opposition against 
governmental suppression and corruption had spread to all classes of society and the 
civil war was a fact. In 1979, the incumbent powers were overthrown and the 
Sandinistas moved into State office. During the revolution in the 1980’s, the Sandinistas 
began redistributing property and made huge progress in the spheres of health and 
education (BBC News 2003). They also created co-operatives and supplied them with 
vehicles, animals and seed. Along with material resources came a large number of rules 
for commercialisation and harvesting. These were meant to control market forces but as 
such, they also affected farmers’ decision-making and incentives.  
 
The revolutionary government also supported the green revolution and an agricultural 
development of large scale and high input farming. The Sandinistas’ leftist orientation 
however attracted US hostility, which in turn led to trade sanctions and a US-sponsored 
counter-revolution, the Contras (ibid). Parallel to US embargo and the following 
necessity to farm for its own subsistence, the Nicaraguan agriculture intensified and 
soils were overexploited and filled with chemicals.  
 
Eventually, the war wore down on people and in this process the Sandinistas lost most 
of the almost unanimous support they had once received for liberating Nicaragua from 
the Somoza dictatorship. In consequence, the Sandinistas lost the first free election in 
1990 in favour of a more liberal party headed by Violeta Chamorro, the widow of a 
murdered opposition leader during the Somoza regime. Doña Violeta, having the crucial 
US support and soothing character came to unite parties and led the nation into peace 
and politically towards the right. During her governance, subsidies were cut and 
cooperatives started to fall apart. Co-operatives did not only lack resources and a 
common vision, but were also faced by legal and land tenure problems. More so, State 
withdrawal and its lack of regulations and credit systems resulted in large price 
fluctuations which hit hardest the most vulnerable, the small-scale farmers (Marin and 
Pauwels 2001). Although peace brought some economic growth, lower inflation and 
lower unemployment, the country was soon to be hit by the Hurricane Mitch in 1998. 
This killed thousands, rendered 20% of the population homeless, caused billions of 
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dollars worth of damage (BBC News 2003) and turned fertile land into rocky 
landscapes.  
 
In November 2001, Enrique Bolaños was voted into office as candidate of the 
governing Liberal Constitutionalist Party. He had served as vice-president under 
President Arnoldo Alemán since 1996, but has since then sought to distance himself 
from Alemán’s stained reputation and gone in the lead to fight against corruption (BBC 
News 2003). In August 2002, a large corruption affair made its way to the former 
president Alemán who still partly governed the country as head of the National 
Assembly. Alemán was charged with money laundering and embezzlement during his 
term in office and was placed under house arrest after legislators voted to strip him of 
immunity from prosecution (ibid).  
 
4.1.2 Rural development 
 
Around 44% of the Nicaraguan population are rural. Although being the largest 
employer the rural area includes the majority of poor (Marin and Pauwels 2001). The 
governmental actions lack an integrated rural strategy and interventions are weakened 
by poor coordination and continuity, in labour and in visions (Ligia Ivette Gómez, 
Nitlapan-UCA 2001). As a result, most of the work towards rural development is in the 
hands of non-governmental organisations. These have, in a practical sense, taken over 
State responsibility. In some areas, mainly those affected by Hurricane Mitch, 
practically all families are involved in some sort of aid program, receiving their hens, 
fruit trees and capacity buildings from outside. The NGO CIPRES (2003a) says that the 
poverty is so critical that one notices a change in the political agenda of the international 
agencies: nowadays everyone talks of the poverty, the extreme poverty, and the hunger 
and poor nutrition. Agendas are caught between soothing extreme poverty through food 
aid programs or the slow yet sustainable objectives of democracy, participation, 
empowerment, food security, income generation and improved livelihoods. Many 
nationals in the field of rural development believe that food aid is only fortifying the 
dependency and wish to shift the agenda towards productive areas and their 
commercialisation  (Nuñes Soto 2002 and Lanuza pers. comm).  
 
4.1.3 Agricultural development 
 
Any development in a country based on agriculture goes through the rural and 
agricultural sector. In Nicaragua, the agricultural sector is an important source of food, 
income, employment and foreign exchange; it stands for around 30% of the national 
GDP and 68% of export incomes (MAGFOR 2001).  
 
In comparison to the other Central American countries, agricultural productivity is low. 
In 1999, the level of production was only 90% of the historic peak in 1978 just before 
the revolution, yet the area under production had increased by 25% (Marin and Pauwels 
2001). Along with a continuous restructuring of the agricultural system and limited 
resources for agricultural research and extension services, the civil war, natural disasters 
and movement of people working within the agricultural sector have resulted in a loss 
of embedded farmer knowledge. The ratio of grain production and area under 
production is still decreasing and so is people’s security to maize, rice and beans 
(MAGFOR 2001), the basic meal for the Nicaraguans together with plantains, eggs and 
cheese. 
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Rising agricultural productivity can directly improve the livelihoods of rural people, 
urban consumers and the national budget (CIPR 2002). Whether producing for 
household needs, domestic or export markets, there are grounds for improving the 
agricultural sector and its extension service. The question is: in what way?  
 
4.1.4 Formal development 
 
During the revolution in the 1980’s, Nicaragua tried to follow its own mode. It was a 
revolution in the spirit of Sandino, the national hero who once fought for a Nicaragua in 
charge of its own development. Sandino was killed together with the ten thousands of 
lives later lost in the revolutionary war. Nicaragua’s people have fought world powers 
and the majority will fight no more. In times of globalisation Nicaragua is following the 
path of others, in much a path of unknown consequences. From a situation where most 
farmers cultivate for subsistence, the agricultural minister presents calculations that 
Nicaragua would profit from importing food instead of producing it (Aurelio Llano 
pers. comm). Nicaragua is currently spending a third of its export income on importing 
basic foodstuff (CIPRES 2003b). This is done in a country with opportunities of 
producing for national self-sufficiency in foodstuffs with lands for cattle, beans, rice, 
and maize but with poor capacity to compete with US and European products benefiting 
from subsidies and dumped prices.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAGFOR 2001) believes the main problem 
in grain production lies in the management on farm level, especially in the usage of seed 
of poor genetic quality, the cultivation of mixtures of land varieties and improved 
varieties and production in areas not suitable for particular crops. The ministry therefore 
calls for a change in technology and in the areas selected for the production of grains. 
This change in technology also implies a cultural change well recognised by the 
ministry; farmers need to abandon traditional practices of reusing seed and instead buy 
new certified seed each season. The strategy is to strengthen the formal system, i.e. the 
chain consisting of scientific plant breeding, a regulated seed production by specialised 
producers and an organised distribution or marketing of the seed to farmers as defined 
by CBDC (2002). The strategy is visualised through the Seed Law of 1998 in which the 
seed system is to be formalised and programs like libra por libra where farmers are 
offered to exchange grains for certified seed. As part of this trend towards formalising 
the system of seed production and commercialisation is the newly established plant 
variety protection law and its breeders’ rights.  
 
4.2 PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS 
 
4.2.1 IPR package in harmony with WTO and UPOV 
 
For a century, the Patent Law of 1899 regulated the Nicaraguan legal field of 
intellectual property rights. In April 1999, a new package of laws was presented for the 
National Assembly that was to meet the obligations of trade agreements with the United 
States and World Trade Organisation (WTO). New intellectual areas were included and 
among them was the innovativeness behind plant varieties. Six months later, the Law on 
plant variety protection (PVP) was adopted and the innovativeness of breeders received 
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legal protection and rights of control over new, distinct, uniform and stable varieties by 
the provision of plant breeders’ rights (PBR). 
 
Nicaragua is a member of UPOV 1978, yet the country chose to implement many of the 
stricter provisions of the 1991 Act. The Nicaraguan Law gives rights-holders the control 
basically over all acts involving the seed of a protected variety (production or 
reproduction, preparation for the purpose of reproduction and multiplication, 
commercialisation, exportation, importation and donation). With the exemption for 
farmers’ private use and breeders’ improvement of the protected variety, these acts all 
require the authorisation from the rights-holders. In compliance with the 1991 Act, 
rights-holders also remain in control over essentially derived varieties (varieties closely 
related to the protected variety).  
 
The application process sets up the technical requirements of DUS and the 
administrative-legal criteria as mentioned before (Art 16-20). The novelty criterion as 
regards time of commercialisation is set to less than one year in Nicaragua and 4 years 
on foreign market (Art 17). UPOV does not state criteria or methodologies for the 
examination process but instead gives directives (see UPOV’s system for examination, 
document TG 1-2). Nicaragua has chosen to give the applicant much responsibility in 
conducting field trials and presenting data. This is a cheaper system and more suitable 
for a registration office with limited resources where applicants are to present results 
from field trials and other information clearly demanded by the office. The examination 
has three steps (Chapter V): 
 
1. Exam of form: Administrative step to check application and denomination. The 
denomination check includes a review of CD – ROM Plant Variety Database 
and other documentation. 
2. Technical exam of DUS criteria normally documented by the applicant. 
3. Technical assessment by a committee that may ask for additional information, 
field trials or laboratory work for the purpose of comparative analysis. The 
committee constitutes of (MIFIC 2002): 
 
1. - Director of Seed, MAGFOR 
2. - Head of Registration and Control, MAGFOR 
3. - Registrator of Intellectual Property, MIFIC 
4. - Head of the Department for the Protection of Plant Varieties 
5. - One representative from MARENA 
6. - One representative from UNA 
7. - One representative from UNAN (University of León) 
8. - One representative from INTA  
 
The application demands a publication in the Daily Official Gazette to make known to 
the public that someone is intending to protect and claim a variety (Art 46). However, to 
protect a variety is not a one-step ordeal. The rights-holder must annually submit 
information, documents or material to prove that the variety maintains as it was once 
protected and pay US$ 330 each year (Art 57, 85). The protection is valid for 20 years 
(Art 22). Nicaragua adopted a flexible system where all species can be protected. There 
are however technical limitations since each species requires its own routine. Today, 
there are routines for rice, beans and maize but the idea is to develop routines for other 
crops as applications drop in (Zelaya pers. comm). 
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4.2.2 Legislative process under bilateral pressure 
 
As mentioned before many of the new UPOV members are born out of TRIPS-plus 
agreements and Nicaragua is no exception. Here the intellectual discussion started in 
January 1998 when the President Arnoldo Alemán met and agreed with the former US 
Ambassador Lino Hernandez to provide a system of intellectual property rights and 
herein adopt the UPOV convention as national law.  
  
In the drafted Bilateral agreement, Nicaragua agreed to “provide adequate and effective 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights” (Art 1). This in accordance 
with TRIPS requirements, but the bilateral draft continued: “to provide adequate and 
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, each Party shall, at a 
minimum, give effect to the substantive provisions of the UPOV Convention” (Art 2). 
The National Assembly adopted this bilateral agreement some months later. By doing 
so, it limited Nicaragua’s possibilities to adopt a unique system answering to national 
circumstances and interest and rushed the country into an intellectual property rights 
regime, disregarding the facts that the TRIPS granted a longer preparation time and that 
the 27.3b article is still under revision (see page 24).  
 
In August 1998, during a meeting organised by the Ministry of Environment and 
Natural Resources (MARENA), several organisations learned by chance, as Magda 
Lanuza puts it, that the Nicaraguan government had committed itself to join UPOV 
(Lanuza et al 1999). In April 1999, Alemán introduced a PVP bill that was a mixture of 
the two acts UPOV 1978 and 1991. Seven months later, the National Assembly 
approved the very same bill as law.  
 
Who opposed and who was in favour? 
 
In large, the interest groups resembled the advocates and opponents identified by Jaffe 
and van Wijk in a study over PVP laws in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay and 
Mexico (van Wijk 1995).  
 
Advocates of the PVP law:  
(1) Domestic seed companies which want to protect their new plant varieties in 
order to obtain royalty income, 
(2) Domestic public agriculture research institutes which face considerable budget 
reduction and are looking for additional income sources (INTA),  
(3) Subsidiaries of foreign seed companies which want protection of their varieties 
and breeding lines in order to enter the Latin American seed markets,  
(4) Foreign governments, which aim at an overall strengthening of intellectual 
property protection in Latin America (US-Nicaragua Bilateral Agreement).  
 
Opponents were representatives from civil society, opposing the privatisation of 
biological resources and traditional knowledge, but more so opposing genetically 
modified organisms/transgenetic crops (Lazuna et al 1999). Most opposition focused on 
the issue of transgenetics rather than Plant Breeders Rights’ of legal control over the 
seed market (article review, 1998-2001). Magda Lanuza (pers. comm.) stated that this 
was regrettable but at the time the law was debated, few actually realised the difference. 
The law may indirectly attract transgenetic material to Nicaragua because of the 
provision of intellectual property rights, but this could rather be an issue for a 
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biosecurity law or protocol. Nonetheless, the fact that the two sides were discussing 
different issues gave a situation of two.  
 
The public did in fact not understand or rather was little informed about the plans and 
potential effects of intellectual property protection in the seed industry and farming in 
general. These were issues for the environmental and intellectual elite with poor public 
awareness. Though Nicaraguans are generally politically engaged, grass-root 
mobilisation is weak due to a lack of democratic traditions and necessary infrastructure 
for information and participation. Today, foreign aid money runs much of the lobbying 
and campaigning for public awareness from a top-down approach. Even so, during the 
time of the legislative process, any opposition would have had problems making its 
voice heard. 
 
Who voted and who appealed? 
 
The PVP bill arrived at the National Assembly with the label ‘urgent’ since in Alemán’s 
words ”Nicaragua already is a member and signatory of UPOV” (Lanuza et al 1999). 
The civil society was ravished by the untruthfulness of this statement and over the 
pretension to approve a law without any public discussion. NGOs, ecologists, 
representatives of the universities and indigenous peoples jointly alerted the National 
Assembly. This interrupted the urgency procedure and allowed the opposition to present 
alternative versions to the Environment Committee (Lanuza et al 1999). Among these 
were (Lanuza et al 1999): 
 
¾ The exclusion of transgenic germplasm 
¾ Broadening of the farmers’ exemption to cover the use of the harvest 
¾ A registry under the Ministry of Agriculture to guarantee national sovereignty 
over genetic resources 
¾ A linkage with the development of sui generis laws for the protection of plant 
varieties under Article 27.3b of TRIPS 
¾ Subordination of the PVP law to Nicaragua’s rights and obligations under the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
As a result, the National Assembly approved a first reading including several of the 
amendments presented by civil society (Lanuza et al 1999). This mobilised the pro-
UPOV forces in favour of the government’s original draft. According to voices in 
opposition of the draft, the US threatened to exclude Nicaragua from the Initiative of the 
Caribbean Cuenca and to deport all Nicaraguans living in the US. An analysis made for 
Forum Syd (Byström and Einarsson 2002) supports the extent to which a country can go 
in bilateral negotiations. In October 1999, the law was up for vote in the Assembly. 
After 40 minutes plenary discussion the changes were rejected and the Assembly was 
left to vote on the bill that had originally been presented (Pommier, IRAM pers. 
comm.). It was a close decision where the majority votes came from the governmental 
party and its liberal allies. According to Lanuza et al (1999), MIFIC had distributed a 
document in the National Assembly saying, “The plant variety protection is a matter of 
intellectual property rights, which in turn have nothing to do with the use and 
commercialisation of seed”. Although the government with arguments of improvements 
in agricultural production and technical capacities supported the PVP law (Lazuna et al. 
1999), all sectors including civil and governmental, say the law was a direct result of 
international pressure and not any domestic demand for intellectual property rights. The 
 43
Humboldt Centre describes the decision as ‘witnessed’ by representatives from the 
religious communities, indigenous people, ecologists, farmers, and consumers 
(Humboldt Centre 2001:2) as “a case of bilateral pressure to go beyond international 
obligations, which in themselves already are heavy” (Lanuza et al 1999). In September 
2001, the National Assembly ratified the UPOV 1978 membership. 
 
The PVP law have been appealed in the Supreme Court of Justice. The claim was 
brought forward by a broad spectrum from the civil society, claiming that the PVP law 
and UPOV membership are unconstitutional, violate the General Environmental Law 
and contradict the CBD (Centro Humboldt 2000b). These appeals are still pending, 
some say frozen because of political interests of individual judges.  
 
 Honourable President… 
We ask that the Law for the Protection of New Plant Varieties be withdrawn. We also 
implore Nicaragua to cancel its application for accession to UPOV. We hope that, 
instead, Nicaragua may promote the development of sustainable agriculture, collective 
intellectual rights and the rights of farming and indigenous communities. Nicaragua 
should resist the privatisation of life forms and work for the exclusion of biodiversity 
from TRIPS. 
    (Part of campaign letter, in Lanuza et al 1999) 
 
 
4.3 THE COMMON BEAN AND ITS SEED SYSTEM 
 
Some 8 000 years ago, the Common Bean Phaseolus vulgaris L., was still a wild 
growing vine of the highland of Middle America and the Andes. Since then the species 
has been going through phases of domestication, evolution under cultivation and 
mutation, selection, migration and genetic drift and today it is one of the major food 
crops grown worldwide in a broad range of environments and cropping systems (Gepts 
and Debouck 1991). These processes still take place in different places of the world 
with distinct wild populations as original material. This results in a species of great 
diversity with great spectra of colours, shapes, taste, and growth habits. Nicaragua is in 
the centre of this diversity, and the Common Bean is also a central part in the 
Nicaraguan meal, often eaten three times a day. The Nicaraguan preference however is 
quite particular, the small and shiny clear red bean of the Mesoamerican grouping.  
 
4.3.1 Beans in general   
 
The Nicaraguan bean market offers a beautiful blend of red nuances, a mix not only 
colourful but full of genetic diversity. Take a pick, but the pickier you are the larger the 
pocket book you need. The traditional small red will cost you more than the darker, 
bigger varieties developed by the national breeding programme. But please while you 
are there, look beyond the market place and step into the fields and meet the variety that 
never reaches the urban consumer. Alongside formally bred varieties cultivated for the 
market you will find more of the local blend, neatly sown in different lines or in a 
random pattern of distinct plants and colours. This is where some farmers develop their 
own varieties and where varieties take on local names, such as the black and white 
poneloya, one of the earliest varieties of the season and in this lies the name, long 
awaited after a long and dry summer and therefore a sure eye-catcher.  
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The average farmer sows around three varieties on plots of 1-4 ha, but later in the 
season you might have problems seeing distinct plots and varieties for all the plants. 
Beans cover around 60% of the agricultural land, from the lowlands to steep hills in the 
mountains. Nicaragua has two bean seasons; four if you are in a lucky spot, so whether 
or not you are a bean eater, Nicaragua’s beans, fresh, tasty and gas-free, will be your 
converter. From a producer’s perspective, it is not a production of high profits but rather 
a production dependent on growing conditions and tolerance to heat, pests and diseases.  
 
Table 2 shows bean production during the three seasons of Primera, Postrera and 
Apante in 2002/2003. Missing is the season of irrigation, Riego from February through 
April, but because few have access to irrigation this is a small season in comparison. 
The production under Apante is limited to the rainy environments in the South and 
Atlantic coast.  
 
 
Table 2 Bean production in Nicaragua, 2002/2003  
 
Season 
Area under 
bean production 
(000 ha) 
Expected 
bean production 
(000 000 kg) 
 
Yield* 
kg/ha 
 
Yield* 
qq/mz**
Primera     (May-Aug) 56 45 848 13,1 
Postrera    (Sept-Dec) 85 65 744 11,5 
Apante       (Dec-Jan) 114 68 621 9,6 
Total*** 254 178 758 11,7 
* based on harvested area/production 
**qq and mz are national measures, see transformations below. 
*** Note that figures are twice as high as Nitlapán review in 1996 (Marin and Pauwels 2001:20). 
Source: MAGFOR statistics 2003 
 
Table 3 Transformations 
Transformation 
 
1 manzana (mz) = 7 029 m2 
1 hectar (ha) = 10 000 m2 = 1.4 mz 
1 libra = 454 grams 
1 quintal (qq) = 100 libras = 45.4 kg 
1 qq/mz = 64.7 kg/ha 
US$ 1 = 14.5 Córdobas (C$) 
 
 
Transformants per average 
 
3 mz (average farm) = 2.1 ha 
1.4 mz (average bean production area per farm) = 1 ha 
10qq/mz (average bean production) = 614 kg/ha 
25- 35 qq/mz (good bean production) = 1590- 2270 kg/ha 
3 -5 C$/libra (average grain price) =  
                                 300 -500 C$/qq = 0.45 – 0.56 US$/kg 
700 C$/qq (average seed price) = 1.1US$/kg 
0.5 qq/mz (average seed usage) = 32 kg/ha 
1 seed (average seed multiplication rate) => 45 seeds 
3 beans = 1 gram  
 
 
 
4.3.2 Criolla – a mixture of beans 
 
The older varieties are normally referred to as criolla, literally a mixture and a mixture 
of traditions per se. Generally, the criolla is a mixture of types but having gross 
agronomic uniformity, a collection Chahal and Gosal (2002:83) refer to as land 
varieties. How great a mix the criolla actually represents differs from farmer to farmer 
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(and the extent to which the seed interacts in the cycles of plant-back, consumption, 
seed exchange as illustrated in figure 2).  
 
Most farmers participating in the study held land varieties uniform when it came to seed 
colour and size, flowering and maturing period. The general idea though is that most 
farmers store and plant seed randomly and if any, selection is made at the time of 
sowing based on seed colour and size. 
 
Newer varieties released from the national breeding programme INTA are so far 
normally kept isolated from the older varieties. The newly released varieties are bigger 
and darker red or black. In general, these varieties are reused only once or up to three-
five years before they are exchanged for new seed of preferably more resistant varieties. 
More over, farmers give these varieties less attention. Farmers speak of adaptation to 
local agro-ecological conditions but more often they talk about the problem of 
degeneration, i.e. the material looses its qualities.    
 
Although newer varieties usually are held separate, their seed sometimes join the criolla 
collection (mechanical mixing between different types of beans is in itself a criolla) 
(Oscar Gómez pers. comm). Some farmers also continue selecting from within formally 
released varieties, to the extent that the material is finally considered a traditional 
variety and thus acquires the name criolla (Bravo, INTA and farmers pers. comm). 
Below is portrayed how formal varieties diffuse into the local seed collection. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 How formal varieties (outer arrow) blend into the local seed 
collection (inner circles). 
 
 
4.3.3 Trade-offs between formal and local 
 
The newer, formally bred varieties are claimed to have higher yields and resistance to 
diseases. Still, the older bean varieties have something the formal breeders do not seem 
to get right i.e. the small red grain. The red colour is a highly complex trait that tends to 
get lost when crosses are made (Beebe pers. comm, in Thro and Spillane 2000:16) and 
this happens when crosses are made with disease resistant varieties like the DOR 
combinations, which are darker and bigger than the preferred little red bean. Because of 
the lack of known resistance to diseases, there is no longer any formal production of 
crosses with criollas (such as Estelí 150). Please note the dark trend in table 4 of 
releases between 1979 and 2001. 
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Table 4 Formal bean releases in Nicaragua, 1979-2001  
Year of 
Release 
New Name 
 
 
Original 
Identification 
or Code 
Genealogy Seed Colour 
or Market 
Class 
2001 INTA Nueva Guinea Negro Tacana (DOR 364 x G 18527) x (DOR 365 x 
LM-30-630) 
Black 
2001 INTA Cardenas DOR 500  (DOR 364 x G 18521) x (DOR 365 x 
LM-100) 
Black 
2001 INTA Estelí CM-12214-25  Red 
2001 INTA Rojo  EAP-9510-77 MD-30-75 x DICTA 105 Red 
2000 INTA Canela   Red 
1999 INTA Masatepe  DOR 364 x SEL 1077 Red 
1999 INTA Jinotepe   Red 
1996 COMPAÑIA  RAB 463 G 18244 x MUS 6 Small red 
1994 CNIGB 93 DOR 391  Small red 
1993 COMPAÑIA 93 PVA 692  Small red 
1993 DOR 364 DOR 364 BAT 1215 x (RAB 166 x DOR 125) Small red 
1990 ESTELI 90A CNIGB 1-90 Orgulloso x BAT 1654 Small red 
1990 ESTELI 90B CNIGB 2-90 Orgulloso x BAT 1836 Small red 
1990 ESTELI 150 CNIGB 3-90 Chile Rojo x RAO 36 Small red 
1985 REVOLUCION 85 HT 772202 Porrillo Sintetico x S 257-4 Small red 
1984 REVOLUCION  83A BAT 1217 G 4791 x G 3657 Small red 
1984 REVOLUCION  84 BAT 1514 BAT 93 x BAT 1155 Small red 
1984 REVOLUCION  84 A FB 8383 BAT 1155 x BAT 304 Small red 
1983 REVOLUCION  83 BAT 1215 G 4791 x G 3657 Small red 
1983 REVOLUCION  79A BAT 789 G 4122 x G 3988 Small red 
1981 REVOLUCION  81 A 40 G 4495 x G 7131 Small red 
1979 REVOLUCION  79  BAT 41 G 4122 x G 3988 Small red 
1979 REVOLUCION 82 HONDURAS 46 
 Small red 
1979 BRUNCA BAT 304 G 4495 x G 5711 Black 
Source: CIAT 
 
4.3.4 Dark trend 
 
For its rarity and popularity, the small and red criolla still have a higher price on the 
market. In the Mayoreo market in Managua, beans are sold per pound and most vendors 
sell two kinds of ‘varieties’: red beans at 5 cordobas/libra and black beans at 4 
cordobas/libra. Although referred to as black bean it is rather purple like a DOR. The 
red kind includes criollas but also bigger grains from formal but redder varieties. Some 
of the red diversity has direct origins in the farmer practice to sow mixes but perhaps 
more in middlemen stretching the red line for larger profits by mixing darker seed with 
red. As the farmer sits down to calculate incomes, it is more profitable to cultivate 
formal varieties considering that these varieties usually give higher yields. Criollas are 
therefore increasingly sown for household purposes while the formally bred go to the 
market. The outcome is that the urban population may eat cheaper but darker beans and 
farmers lose their relation to the seed.  
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Many breeders and salespersons believe this to be an inevitable trend (Kauffmann, 
INTA and salespersons at Mayoreo market). “Farmers must understand the importance 
of genetic improvement as an income generator and consumers must alternate their taste 
in accordance to productivity.” After all, they say, the very black bean is more tolerable, 
high yielding, nutritious and tasty. Many farmers are also interested in new varieties, 
colours and markets. It almost appears as if liking the black bean is something 
thrillingly naughty, like flirting with the complex relation to Costa Rica and its taste for 
black beans.  
 
4.3.5 How traditional is the criolla? 
 
It is difficult to provide accurate data on the existence of true land varieties (gene 
material originating in Nicaragua and developed in farmers’ field) versus the adoption 
of formally bred varieties. The origin of the seed used in the field is an issue though in 
times when formally improved varieties are heavily promoted on behalf of criollas. If 
farmers are to adopt newer varieties, older varieties are likely to be replaced and 
discarded. Thus, the question is whether these older varieties constitute a national and 
traditional seed treasure or whether the exchange is from one formally bred variety to 
another.  
 
People promoting certified seed, but also other unbiased actors, claim that there is not 
much of a seed treasure to be lost since what farmers today refer to as criollas have in 
fact been acriolladas, undergoing creolisation. That is, varieties introduced in the 1950-
60’s from the US, have been added to or have substituted the national collection 
(PROMESA and IRAM pers. comm). This exchange is on going. Auerelio Llano, head 
of INTA’s bean section says there hardly exists any true bean criollas but that these 
have largely been exchanged for INTA varieties. Others from the environmental sphere 
like the Humboldt Centre, Magda Lanuza and the National University of Agriculture 
(UNA) believe these statements to be exaggerations. Sure, Oscar Gómez from UNA 
says, many varieties introduced in the 1950-60’s are still found in the fields but these 
varieties were few and are only a small part of the great diversity still existing in the 
field.  
 
Depending on how criolla is defined, the level of adoption of formal varieties will be 
accordingly. According to the Regional Programme of Beans (PROFRIJOL) the share 
of area sown to formally improved varieties was 30% in 1996. Adoption is probably 
higher the closer to cities, the more relation to aid organisations and research institutes, 
and perhaps the bigger the farm and commercial objectives. Figure 13 shows a regional 
comparison on the usage of land varieties versus formally improved varieties in 1996. 
Since then, the area under production has increased as well as the use of formal bred 
varieties (Gómez pers. comm). 
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Central American bean areas 
using criolla versus formally improved varieties
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Figure 13 Area under bean production using land varieties or formally 
improved varieties in Central America, 1996 (PROFRIJOL). 
 
 
4.3.6 Seed (in)security 
 
The essence of any grain production is the availability and quality of seed. Farmers 
sometimes keep cultivating land varieties because it is the only seed they can access, but 
often because these are closer to farmers’ knowledge and demand less management, 
time and inputs yet producing for household needs and preferences. Still, free seed 
supply and low maintenance aside, some land varieties have reached the stage where 
producing them gives negative return up to the point where farmers sow them only for 
the conservation of the national seed treasure (PRODESSA, ADDAC and farmers pers. 
comm). 
 
Moreover, in times when farmers struggle to survive the next day there are few seed left 
for resowing after a long and dry season without production. In many families, seeds 
intended for sowing are prioritised as food. Seeds for the first season are therefore often 
accessed through the local market or from anywhere possible and reused only in the 
second season. This seed is seldom produced for its seeding purpose but refined by 
informal traders and sold without any quality control. Since the seed market is 
unreliable, the control of what plants arise is accordingly.  
 
Farmers must not only prioritise food over seed saving, but seed storage per se is 
according to Aurelio Llano, INTA the biggest problem in the line of production. That 
seed need tender love and care is generally not recognised. Grain and seed tend to get 
the same treatment, ignoring that the quality of the material of reproduction is a main 
factor towards good yields.  
 
In a situation where seed is either prioritised as grains or grains are refined into seed 
there are two complementary approaches to increase seed security:  
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a. To increase the control over seed production and assist farmers in accessing 
externally produced seed. 
b. To support farmers in producing, storing and reusing seed. 
 
The figure below again shows the staple from figure 13 and the question is how the 
share between formal varieties and criolla will look in the future. Has there been an 
increase in the use of varieties developed and produced by the formal sector or is the 
criolla still dominating in the field? The major question is what distribution best secures 
farmers’ access and control of seed, and how to get there.  
 
 
                Formal varieties     
 
 
 
                                                                         Criolla 
 
Figure 14 In 1996, the criolla was used on 70% of the bean land. The 
arrows show the increase of one type on behalf of the other. 
 
This paper will first explore the interaction between formal and local seed and then 
analyse the role of intellectual property rights in shaping the future seed system.  
 
 
4.3.7 Seed system under formal control 
 
In the formal system, seed production is regulated and controlled, varieties are 
registered, producers and seed are certified with MAGFOR and seed bags come with 
stamps of certification.  
 
For the purpose of a seed production under control, there are five formal categories of 
seed in Nicaragua (Kauffmann, INTA, pers. comm): Genetic/breeder seed, 
basic/foundation seed, registered seed, certified seed and authorised seed. The three 
first types are used in the seed multiplication process with different standards of purity. 
In early 2002, there were seven registered bean varieties, see table 5. Certified and 
authorised seeds are produced by controlled, certified and authorised seed producers, 
who generally sell the seed to companies who in turn sell it to farmers for grain 
production. In addition, there is the category apta, a category INTA wants to eliminate 
due to its poor quality (six or more multiplications).  
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Table 5 Registered bean varieties, 1997-2002, and the availability of formal seed. 
Availability 
Feb 2003 
Coverage 
 
VARIETY  
  
SEED 
CATEGORY 
kg 
(000) 
qqs ha Mzs 
REGISTERED 5 .4 120 105 150 INTA MASATEPE 
    CERTIFIED   
INTA JINOTEPE 
  
REGISTERED   
REGISTERED 28 620 545 775 INTA CANELA 
  CERTIFIED 76 1 682 1478 2 103 
REGISTERED 4,5 100 88 125 
CERTIFIED 40 882 775 1103 
INTA ESTELI/DOR 364 
AUTHORISED   
INTA ROJO  
  
REGISTERED   
INTA NUEVA GUINEA REGISTERED   
 CERTIFIED   
INTA CARDENAS 
  
REGISTERED   
TOTAL  155 3404 2990 4255 
Source: Seed Dept, MAGFOR 
 
 
4.3.8 Low certified demand 
 
The market of certified seed in Nicaragua is new and small with estimations around 10-
15% of the total seed supply for grains, lower in the case of beans. In comparison to 
maize, improved bean seed is considered expensive (800 C$/qq or 1.2 US$/kg). This   
price is very high when one knows that seed can be accessed fairly well on the informal 
market or reused from the own harvest for 400-0 C$/qq. Certified seed is also sold in 
large amounts whereas small-scale farmers prefer buying smaller amounts just before 
the sowing time to match the chosen variety to the expected features of the growing 
season. The reason for the low demand for certified seed according to Bravo, INTA is 
not only financial. Bravo believes that the tradition of buying and using seed (and not 
grain) was lost during the revolution when there was a lack of commerce and resources 
(pers. comm).  
 
Moreover, considering that land varieties are said to store and reproduce at a higher rate 
than commercial varieties (Herrera and Gómez pers. comm), the question is whether 
new seed must be accessed externally for every season or whether farmers can choose to 
invest in new material when they see it fit. If land varieties are to be exchanged for 
commercial seed it is necessary to make sure that the seed will reproduce or that farmers 
will be able to access seed externally for each season.  
 
4.3.9 To certify demand - libra por libra 
 
In the agricultural year of 2002/03, a national campaign was launched in favour of 
certified seed. The libra por libra scheme is a programme of technical assistance and 
exchange of poor quality seed (grain) for certified seed to a cost of 3 million US$ 
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(MAGFOR 2003a). The programme reached 102 445 small-scale farmers and 100 000 
ha with 59 552 qq certified seed (MAGFOR 2003a: MAGFOR year 2002/2003) of 
which 8000 qq (363 tons) were bean seed (MAGFOR 2002). The purpose according to 
MAGFOR is to raise the awareness of the importance of seed quality and in 
continuation, farmers will adopt the use of quality seed for sowing and therein increase 
yields, labour productivity and food supply for the household and local market. 
MAGFOR (2002) visions that if farmers use and buy new seed every season, food 
security will increase and so will income-generating production.  
 
 
 
 
 
Since the promoting consultant PROMESA had US connections, NGOs accused the 
whole scheme for running the errands of Monsanto. Both INTA and the USAID 
PROMESA denied this and claimed that they worked for higher yields and food 
security for the good of the Nicaraguans. PROMESA was also informing about and 
promoting certified seed at universities to change the attitude among those directly 
involved with farmers (e.g. UNA seminar and IPR courses). José Manuel Bravo, INTA 
also reassured that the seed for exchange were seed that can be found in the regular 
market and not any transgenetic seed, which was the accusation by some NGOs (pers. 
comm). Continuously, Bravo denied the accusation of biopiracy (rumours said 
exchanged seed were sent to US gene banks). This seed or grain rather, Bravo said, will 
go directly to food aid programmes. The element of exchange was to avoid handouts 
and instead create a feeling of responsibility. Since Nicaragua’s history of aid 
dependency and high inflation has given an attitude of remittance, the factor of material 
exchange was to change this attitude by obliging a personal contribution. The exchange 
however was much criticised because farmers would exchange seed that reproduced for 
seed that would not and farmers would be caught in a system where seed had to be 
bought every season (Lanuza pers. comm). Julio Gómez (ADDAC pers. comm) 
wonders why organisations working in the rural areas were not consulted when the libra 
por libra scheme was prepared. “As it is designed today it will not solve the problem of 
seed insecurity because it is only the farmers with seed savings who can exchange”, he 
says critically. More so, he continues, vulnerable farmers will be the ones buying into 
the propaganda of seed business since older farmers with more knowledge in selection 
and reuse processes are more negative to buying hybrids. Julio’s Gomez’s personal 
opinion is that libra por libra is a struggle against criollas and that the underlying 
purpose is to take away farmers autonomy in favour of seed companies’ profit.  
 
Other organisations are more positive towards the exchange program. One agronomist 
from the project FondeAgro in Matagalpa said farmers were happy to exchange since 
certified seed gives higher yields. He points out that the exchanged amount of seed is 
only good for around 1.5 manzanas and the farmers continue sowing criollas on the rest 
of their land. The farmers can therefore compare characteristics and performance 
directly in their own fields.  
 
In practical terms, aid organisations or INTA extension officers handed out coupons and 
payback was supposedly to be realised after harvest. For the second season of Postrera 
2002, PROMESA was no longer an actor and the material exchange was transformed 
into price reductions where the farmers were to pay 20% of the market price for 
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certified seed. The organisation facilitating the distribution of coupons was also 
responsible for giving technical assistance in relation to the usage of certified seed. That 
such technical assistance was often lacking and seed was delivered after optimal sowing 
date were only part of the critique pointed towards the seed exchange programme.  
 
Many farmers still hold the opinion that improved seed is mainly suited for favourable 
areas. To change this attitude, PROMESA tried its best to organise field days and 
present field trials where improved seed produced more, and was financially more 
profitable even in marginal areas (Seed fair, Matagalpa and Estelí, 2002). Nelson 
Navarro from the seed company APROSEN says bean criollas per average produce 18 
qq/mz and certified seed 40 qq/mz. If these estimations and studies are correct and if the 
results will reproduce over several seasons, it will nonetheless be difficult to break 
through the mistrust of farmers in adaptation and quality control in certified bags. 
“Certified seed is only business” said one larger-scale farmer at a seed fair in Estelí. 
“When using farm-saved seed, the whole profit goes to the farmer”, he argued. 
Nonetheless, he agreed that certified seed could give a higher production, but that this is 
a somewhat risky investment that not many can afford.  
 
Oscar Gómez, UNA believes that INTA employees should talk clearly with the farmers 
and explain not only the boundaries of varieties but also the requisites needed to 
produce. More so, to make clear that if the farmer cannot follow the requirements or the 
farm does not hold the right conditions it is better not to spend money buying the seed 
because ultimately, the improved variety will produce just as much or less than the seed 
adapted to the farm.  
 
4.3.10 Support to farmer seed system 
 
Parallel to the scheme to increase farmers’ access to externally produced seed is the 
strategy to support farmers in producing, storing and reusing seed. This is an approach 
taken on especially by UNA and NGOs involved in organic farming. One strategy is to 
establish local seed banks with clear descriptions on days to maturity, resistance, colour 
and cooking abilities. The purpose is to create a dynamic form of so called ex situ and in 
situ conservation. When conserved in national or international collections, at 
universities or institutes, the road is long between seed bank and field since access is 
formalised and intellectual property rights could be a constraining factor. With local 
banks, diversity is conserved ex situ but closer to the prime users. The farmer borrows 
seed at the time of sowing and returns the same or more after harvest time. This gives 
clear advantages of close, free, secure and direct access to seed while storage and 
quality control can be arranged with common funding. In addition, the farmer does not 
need to enter the market with all it includes of price fluctuations and risks of buying 
seed of poor quality. A secure access to seed of good and known quality allows the 
farmer to sow when preferred, and cultivate and experiment based on known 
parameters.  
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Participatory plant breeding is another strategy to support local capacities while 
generating improved varieties based on farmers’ criteria and preferences. This approach 
join the formal and local system and can be seen as creating a new distribution scheme 
in the zone of transition. In Nicaragua, there is currently two PPB programmes: a CIAT 
project in rice and sorghum established in 2002, and the Participatory Plant Breeding 
Programme in maize and beans in Pueblo Nuevo and Condega. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4 PARTICIPATORY PLANT BREEDING IN PUEBLO 
NUEVO/CONDEGA  
 
4.4.1 Agricultural background 
 
Pueblo Nuevo and Condega, situated in the region of Estelí in the north of Nicaragua 
(see map on page 33), are communities with long traditions in cultivating beans and 
maize. In 1972, tobacco was introduced when two tobacco companies saw potentials in 
the fertile soils close to the river. The cash crop soon became popular among the 
farmers and tobacco, maize, beans and later also tomatoes were cultivated in a rotating 
system. Soon came pests and viruses, especially the whitefly and with it the golden 
mosaic. Tobacco is relatively resistant to the golden mosaic but the whitefly extremities 
make the tobacco leavess black. In order to limit harvest failure a large amount of 
pesticides was sprayed around the area (Herrera pers. comm). The whitefly also spread 
from the tobacco to nearby crops, and while the tobacco was tolerant, beans, maize and 
tomatoes were severely affected. 
 
 
The Golden Mosaic and breeding for resistance 
 
Although land varieties generally have acquired genes for resistance to common diseases and pests 
(Chahal and Gosal 2002:83) they hold low resistance to new diseases. According to Almekinders and 
Elings (2001:429) the relation between plant diseases and seed quality is an area in which farmers’ 
knowledge often falls short. Many farmers have poor knowledge in selection methods and they usually 
select from the bag of grains based on seed size and colour. Another reason for land varieties’ low 
resistance to newer diseases could be the sudden and powerful spread of viruses to which a selection 
process can not keep up.  
 
One such example is the whitefly Bemisa tabaci Genn. and the golden mosaic it carries. The whitefly is 
one of the main pests in tropical and subtropical regions. The tiny white fly may cause direct damage such 
as plant nutrient loss, physiological disorders and honeydew excretions or act as virus vectors for eg. the 
golden mosaic (Brown 1994). Lacking immune cultivars and a virus that is uncontrollable by 
agrochemicals, the main target has been the fly itself (Morales 2001). High doses of insecticides have 
globally resulted in resistant whiteflies and contaminated agricultural environments and products. 
According to Francisco J. Morales (2001), breeding for disease resistance has proven to be a 
complementary and sustainable control method. Morales states that there is both direct and circumstantial 
evidence indicating the existence of adequate genetic variability in the primary and secondary gene pools 
of most cultivated species. This variability, Morales argues, can be exploited within and between 
cultivated species and their relatives using both conventional and advanced crop improving techniques, 
such as molecular marker assisted selection. 
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Problems of seed quality 
 
The golden mosaic virus is still one of the largest problems in the area and in the lower 
areas where it flourishes; grain production is often unprofitable and subsequently 
abandoned. The effects of the virus stand in direct relation to weather conditions, and 
the farmers of Pueblo Nuevo have poor control over the virus and production levels. In 
reality, 80% of the beans for consumption are today bought from the market. Apart 
from decreasing yields the disease also limits seed saving. The virus is not seed borne 
but affects seed quality. Affected seed is therefore not saved for the next cropping 
season. Where formally released varieties are reused for some seasons, local varieties 
lack resistance and are in the process of disappearing. Oftentimes, seed is bought in the 
market for every new cycle, or donated from one of the many non-governmental 
organisations in the area. This seed is referred to as certified seed of poor quality control 
and farmers say they have poor knowledge of its adaptability to local conditions. There 
also exists local exchange; seed is exchanged for labour or other resources such as food. 
Overall, poor access to seed is perceived as a large problem.  
 
Problems of climatic changes 
 
The area was severely hit by the Hurricane Mitch in 1998. The once fertile land around 
the river in Pueblo Nuevo was filled with stones, rocks and trees and almost 100 ha of 
the best agricultural land were lost. Nowadays, people talk of climatic changes affecting 
agriculture such as heavy flooding in combination with longer dry seasons and severe 
drought. As most people cannot afford an irrigation system, they depend on the 
production during wet season, a season that is shortened due to a longer dry season. 
These climatic effects are said to be worsened by deforestation, including the land 
clearing for agriculture and the cutting down of trees for tobacco production. These 
climatic changes have direct relation to the demand for new agricultural skills. New 
methods and methodologies are needed to cope with a degraded landscape and changing 
climates. 
 
4.4.2 Initiation of PPB programme  
 
The non-governmental organisation CIPRES (Centro de Investigación y Promoción del 
Desarrollo Rural y Social) was funded in 1990 and was soon to establish a field office 
in Pueblo Nuevo. From a dialogue with farmers in the area it became clear that one 
large problem was the lack of seed, in particular seed adapted to local preferences and 
conditions. In 1999, on a Dutch initiative and Norwegian sponsorship, CIPRES 
introduced a programme of participatory plant breeding of the common bean and maize 
in Pueblo Nuevo and the neighbouring community of Condega. Today the programme 
engages 50 farmers, a formal plant breeder from INTA and the CIPRES staff.  
 
4.4.3 Roles of participants 
 
The formal plant breeder from INTA (Julio Molina) has the role of a technical adviser. 
Molina explains the methodology for selection and together with the producers decide 
on the type of field, quantity of seed to use, form and season of harvesting. CIPRES 
facilitates the research process by giving technical advice and helps in the 
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administration and management of meetings and data. Moreover, in the words of 
Molina, CIPRES is the representative of the farmers.  
 
The breeding process itself is very much managed by the farmers. There is an 
experimental group of twelve farmers, nine in the case of beans. These farmers are 
directly engaged in the everyday activities of planting, collecting data, selecting, 
harvesting and so on and if the formal breeder or CIPRES give advice, the ultimate 
decision always lies with the individual farmer. Thus the farmers have until now 
selected seeds individually though largely based on the same selection criteria, which 
were negotiating in the initial phase of the programme.  
 
The other farmers participating are in much a body of advisers but they will increasingly 
take part in the selection evaluation and process. The collective group takes part in 
meetings, culinary tests and discussions around the cultivation, selection and future 
path. More so, as they take part in the research process they are also learners on how to 
manage their own selection process in the future.  
 
 
Words noted by CIPRES staff during a field day             
 in Condega, 2001: 
 
The farmer handling the parcel explained the 
enthusiasm behind carrying out research because it is 
in this phase that one as a producer realises what 
kind of variety one is developing and one can classify 
the most preferred one. That is why I have been able 
to reach the point where these materials are uniform 
and I believe I will remain with three and thereafter 
classify two based on weight and reproduce these to 
make seed available to the others in my community 
and sell it at a price more accessible to farmers.  
Capcity meeting in Pueblo 
Nuevo, 2002. 
 
4.4.4 Breeding objective 
 
The objective is to develop one or two varieties per crop that answers to farmers’ 
preferences and low-input management. Initially, the objective was to improve local 
varieties and in the case of maize, several local and improved varieties were also 
crossed and brought under selection and further crossings by farmers. In the case of 
beans, no promising, resistant local varieties could be identified. This is why the bean 
breeding was initiated by selecting between pure lines and by selecting within 
segregating populations brought from CIAT. Since then, crosses have been made at the 
University of Zamorano, Honduras between improved varieties and local criollas from 
the higher altitudes of Pueblo Nuevo. In the bean line, the objective is to develop a 
variety that is resistant to the golden mosaic and drought with high yields and grains of 
clear red colour and good taste. When it comes to the criterion of taste, soup seems to be 
the most critical dish. It appears as if heavy seed is not only preferred because prices are 
set per weight, but also because a heavy soup is thought of as containing much iron. 
Women are considered experts in the area of taste and they add that clear red is 
preferred for soups but the darker red is acceptable for other purposes such as making 
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traditional gallo pinto (fried rice and beans). The consumer criteria are also related to 
the tolerance of saving beans after cooking. The criteria of size and shape seem to be 
employed unconsciously rather than outspoken. Again, the size of the grain is not so 
important as the yield, a reason why farmers prefer heavy seed. Ultimately seed will be 
selected on the basis of storage abilities. These criteria are meant to answer to the 
preferences of the household as well as market demand. 
 
That farmers themselves set the criteria is the special feature of PPB, said farmers and 
formal breeder in chorus. There are often worries that farmers base too much value on 
colours. Yet in this case, colours have been an important communicator in which formal 
and local criteria differ since farmers have shown preference in clear red where most 
formal breeders would have selected darker red (Molina pers. comm). Perhaps the dark 
trend in varieties is put in another light. The criterion of taste has been brought into the 
selection at a later stage, mainly due to the shortage of seed. Although the first 
organised culinary test failed, it was said that some lines still in the research were not 
perceived as having a good taste. On the other hand, farmers continued sowing lines 
that had been discarded in the research process, mainly because they were still 
considered valuable for its good taste. From the reaction and interests of other farmers 
in these tasty but lower yielding lines, it becomes clear that yield has perhaps taken 
unfair dominance in the selection process. This was emphasised when a farmer 
explained that a tasty, beautiful and fast maturing line had been discarded based on its 
lower yield with the other farmers replying ‘only because of that’. That taste came in 
late in the selection phase was therefore regretful for three reasons; firstly, lines may 
have been discarded although having superb taste; secondly, lines were kept although 
having poor taste; and thirdly, women did not feel as participating as fully as men in the 
research process. 
 
4.4.5 Programme objectives 
 
“Knowledge is as important as the seed”. The farmers say they have gained knowledge 
they thought they would die without knowing. A new area has been opened up to them: 
the knowledge of how to select and breed towards set criteria.  
 
The programme opened up a space that have been closed to us for a long 
time - things they (the formal plant breeders) have been able to do. 
(Words during a meeting) 
 
Capacity building and local entrepreneurship are at focus in the programme and so is the 
creating of alternatives to the conventional seed system. There is an outspoken desire by 
the farmers to develop skills and increase local interest and knowledge in plant breeding 
while at the same time to find ways not to depend on the conventional seed market.  
 
In seed terms, the objective is to meet household demand in seed and grain and in 
extension, to multiply and distribute seed locally and nationally. Through the alliance 
with CIPRES the farmers have a partner dedicated to making production feasible and 
finding commercial opportunities, often so through cooperation. For now the idea is to 
release varieties informally through the network of CIPRES and for this purpose 
produce seed traditionally and outside of formal control. The next step of entering the 
formal system is under evaluation, mainly by taking the interest of the participating 
farmers under consideration.  
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4.4.6 Future path along production  
 
What will happen when the project ends? That is, when funding ends in 2004 and 
perhaps also the CIPRES-farmer collaboration. The regional coordinator Rafael Guerro 
has good faith that the project will find new financial support. If not, Guerro believes 
the collaboration will continue because of the good relations that have been established 
between the participants. The farmers in turn trust the agronomists and organisations 
involved in the project and have confidence that the PPB will continue. The question is 
in what form the collaboration will continue, in seed production, breeding or any 
combination thereof. 
 
One thing is clear, farmers will continue breeding and passing on knowledge to friends 
and family. Many farmers also wish to fortify the collaborative aspects, perhaps by 
working and selecting collectively in shared fields. There are thoughts on establishing 
an association between the many co-operatives and farmers involved in the project and 
to create a small seed company. Until now, it is viewed as a drawback not to be able to 
exchange seed freely as there is shortage of seed even for the research process. More 
over, the farmers wish to produce seed coming from their own innovativeness, in 
contrast to the other small but certified seed producers who multiply formally improved 
seed. The farmer breeders wish to continue selecting within early generations, to work 
with ‘own’ material such as the criolla and they wish to continue setting own criteria. 
By continuing the model of a few experimenting farmers and another group more 
involved in giving advice and reproducing seed, the programme could continue 
improving varieties while multiplying seed for larger distribution.  
 
Javier Pasquier from CIPRES thinks a wider distribution can be done in collaborations 
with INTA and MAGFOR since it lies within their objectives to distribute seed of high 
adoption potential. INTA also wishes to turn seed production private to be able to 
concentrate on its research role. Julio Molina believes there is a large market demand 
for the participatory seed and the varieties could perhaps best be marketed through 
pamphlets made by the farmers and distributed by INTA.  
 
The scale of distribution is yet to be negotiated. Every case has its own opportunities 
and constraints and it is important to keep visions within the sole purpose of the specific 
plant-breeding project. Farmers speak of international distribution and understandably, a 
wide distribution is tempting. However, since the farmers wish to create a secure seed 
system, then large-scale distribution also implies large-scale stability evaluation in 
different types of agro-ecological conditions. Today, INTA is conducting parallel 
research on the research line and INTA could further assist in this evaluation process 
through its established evaluation system and farmer contacts. An important question is 
whether wide diffusion  lies within the objectives of the PPB project in question?  
 
4.4.7 Integration vs. alteration 
 
Up to this point the project has built on knowledge and has as such presented a 
refreshing alternative to development projects and seed improvement. But knowledge 
generation is about to be transformed into generating money. “We will end up a seed 
company with intellectual protection but I will not like it”, one farmer said critically 
during a discussion in the field. Now is the time, the farmer argued, to make a statement 
that we are against capital powers and to find alternatives so that we can cope without 
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inputs from big business. In contrast, the farmer said, the project is about to feed into 
the capitalistic system and by doing so the project demonstrates that it lacks a wider 
vision.  
 
Capitalism, the regional facilitator Rafael Guerro said, is the reality of Nicaragua, 
socialism is long gone and nowadays projects need to carry its own cost. Where the 
visiting Cubans promoted free sharing and collaborations in-group, Guerro explained 
that the Nicaraguan group lived in a different reality without governmental support or 
security net. The participatory project in Nicaragua can therefore not be so generous. 
 
"It is not the people who make the yeast who eat the bread". With that, a farmer wished 
to explain that, “development is a process and although we are working towards better 
livelihoods, it is not us who will see the result”. Many Nicaraguans have left house and 
family and fought for revolution, sometimes they have lost all but their experience. For 
them a great meaning of life is to build knowledge and experience, and to work for an 
alternative route where development is in one’s own hands.  
 
4.5  DISCUSSION - SPREADING SEED THROUGH A NEW APPROACH  
 
There is a wish to multiply, and to be able to share. Javier Pasquier, the CIPRES 
coordinator, talks of the socio-economic aspects in terms of making varieties accessible 
to others and that PPB is much cheaper than seed production by seed companies. Today, 
NGOs buy large quantity of seed at large costs, costs that could be reduced if alternative 
forces come together in production and distribution or costs that could be reduced if the 
methodology of participatory plant breeding was spread rather than its seed.  
 
4.5.1 Dynamic production of locally improved varieties  
 
If every locale has its group of experimenting farmers connected to farmers giving 
advice and reproducing seed, new, improved and locally adapted varieties could reach 
more farmers at a faster rate. Seed production could generate local income and 
innovative farmers could continue learning and experimenting. This model however is 
conditioned. It demands an inflow of new genetic diversity through contacts with formal 
breeders, other innovative farmers and gene banks. It demands a well-organised and 
successive evaluation process and distribution scheme. In this, farmers may have to rely 
on or accept quality differences because of a shorter evaluation process. It also requires 
knowledge about and resources for administration and an income distribution from seed 
producers to breeders. Moreover, the model would have to work outside of formal 
control, thus not entirely integrate into the formal structure, or the formal system needs 
to be made more flexible.  
 
To formalise the participatory breeding would make projects sustainable, even after 
international financing is ended. After all, participatory projects cost money. If the 
Pueblo Nuevo/Condega programme turns successful in the parameters of formal plant 
breeding, then the approach would have larger chances of finding its way into the 
formal plant-breeding scheme.  
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4.5.2 PPB opportunities and constraints 
 
Agricultural practices have their own way. The varieties, still within experimentation or 
rejected varieties have already started their diffusion within the informal seed system. If 
other farmers show interest, they are given some seed to cultivate in their own plot. 
However, in general, other farmers are not interested in the research process but more so 
in the seed emerging from it. “Other farmers come and ask for seed but no one will ask 
to learn more about how to develop his or her own variety”, the participants said and 
concluded with “other farmers think we are a strange group.”  
 
Trust in the system 
 
Not everyone is an innovative farmer. Selection of the individual farmers is an 
important factor for the success of participatory projects. In the Pueblo Nuevo/Condega 
case, the staff of CIPRES had good knowledge of the farmers in the area and the 
farmers’ attitude towards research and ability to work long-term. Furthermore, not every 
formal breeder or extension worker fits into the role of participatory breeder or 
facilitator. In the Nicaraguan case, the PPB relies on the personal interest and attitude 
held by the formal breeder Julio Molina. He is supported by the bean chief Aurelio 
Llano, INTA and its backers, but the process would probably have fallen short had it not 
been for Molina’s ambition.  
 
Everything always comes back to the word: trust. In a world of development where 
most development schemes end up half-done or medium enforced, trust is a key 
parameter in any success of sustainability. If the connection to the formal sector is 
weak, disrespectful or unengaged the participatory plant breeding approach will fall as 
short as any technology transfer. In the Pueblo Nuevo/Condega case, there is the crucial 
trust between participants, strongly emphasised by the warm and supportive personality 
of the regional PPB facilitator, Conny Almekinders. It is difficult to formalise an 
approach that so much pivot on trust and personal attitudes, but if farmers and other 
professionals in the area of genetic resources would come together more often the gap 
would be easier to fill. 
 
Participation as defined by farmers 
 
The term participation is widely used within programs of research and development. 
However, although many projects are labelled ‘participatory’ few actually apply 
participatory methodologies in the research and/or development process.  
 
During a gathering between participants from PPB projects in Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Honduras, Mexico and Nicaragua, many farmers took a personal point of view when 
defining participation: “When I am part of the research process it is participation, when 
someone listens to me and when I may set my own criteria”. Participation, one farmer 
from Nicaragua said, is like democracy, a word that can be interpreted in many ways. 
The farmers explained that according to their way to see it, participation is real when 
they do it, when it is realised in practical terms. Participation is also to learn, especially 
when scientists and farmers on ground come together to solve a problem and both sides 
learn and listen. A Cuban female breeder said that an important factor is when women 
included in the programme are respected and asked for advice.  
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The literature on the concept of participation, often dwells on the degree of participation 
based on the initial contact between participants. The question is focused on whether 
scientists or development workers invite farmers to join programmes initiated within 
and for the formal sector, whether scientists seek to support farmers’ own systems or 
whether farmers themselves seek researchers for help in finding solutions on locally 
defined problems (CGIAR PRGA 2001). That initiatives had not come from the farmers 
themselves was not seen as negative to participation among the farmers attending the 
Mesoamerican meeting on PPB, “we all knew something had to be done to the situation 
and when we were presented with a possible solution of course we were willing to 
collaborate (and hope)”. Or, as a Honduran farmer put it: “It is always someone else 
who initiates what we do but at this point we can start making decisions and when they 
listen, it is participatory”.  
 
Costs and benefits  
 
Even so, we seek parameters to analyse participation and ways to weigh costs and 
benefits. The rationale is to improve the participatory breeding approach and to make 
possible a comparison between different projects and between participatory approaches 
and conventional breeding.  
 
PPB is in many respects considered more cost-effective than conventional breeding. 
The breeding process is probably faster when using the conventional approach since 
different localities can be used at the same time. Then again, diffusion is probably 
quicker and adoption rates higher when using the participatory approach because 
farmers observe, discuss, pass on and adopt what they see is working. Still, considering 
the time and work invested by farmers, it is not so far fetched to question whether the 
cost of breeding has in parts been passed on to the participating farmers. On this, the 
farmer participants reason as follows: 
 
First, farmers believe it is pointless to compare conventional plant breeding to 
participatory approaches. Conventional breeding gives neither benefits nor any access to 
good seed, they say. “The seed they give us have never worked.” Perhaps these are 
overstatements as INTA varieties are found in the fields and spoken of as acceptable in 
many areas. Yet in other more marginal areas, perhaps this is not so. Secondly, it is 
difficult for farmers to estimate costs and benefits of participating before any results 
have been realised. Thirdly, the farmers describe their input as time well invested since 
so far it has paid off.  
 
“It gives us seeds of varieties that will solve the problems that we had. 
We minimize the cost of production because we do not have to buy seed. 
It improves yields in our harvest.”  
 
Apart from cheap and secure access to adapted seed of good quality, farmers talked 
highly of the knowledge aspect: “It was a project that became much more important 
than we had expected.” The approach also has social benefits such as group 
organisation, recognition, pride and the events and exchange of experience among 
farmers and other participatory projects. As cost items the farmers mainly mention the 
time aspect (capacity building, field days, meetings and work) but also the risks of 
losing results to natural disasters and animals.  
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Fourth, is there progress? “Is there wisdom to treasure the aid? Is there willingness to 
work sustainably? If not, one farmer said, the programme does more damage than good. 
 
Sperling et al (2001) suggest that key variables for analysing PPB programmes include 
the institutional context, the biosocial environment, the goals set, and the kind of 
participation achieved, including the division of labour and responsibilities. Thro and 
Spillane (2000:7) believe a key institutional factor in PPB is the point of control or 
decision-making. In their words: who decides the objectives, determines the approach, 
and specifies what results and data are needed. One often talks about who owns the 
research process. This study will develop that thought and further analyse who owns the 
research result.  
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5. IMPACTS OF PLANT BREEDERS' RIGHTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION AND STRUCTURE OF ANALYSIS 
 
The first part of the analysis on the impacts of plant breeders’ rights (PBR) is concerned 
with the impacts of providing intellectual property rights for the bean system and 
farmers as users of seed. The following part deals with the issue from a plant breeders’ 
perspective, or more specifically, the second part looks upon the opportunities and 
constraints of intellectual property rights from the perspective of farmer breeders 
improving locally and individually while the third part addresses intellectual property 
rights issues in participatory breeding. The analysis will be followed by a general 
discussion in the context of national development.  
 
Unfortunately, there are not many analyses to draw on as most studies on the impact of 
PVP are conducted in the context of developed countries and even here, studies are 
scarce and empirical and the outcomes are difficult to separate from other ongoing 
changes (CIPR 2002:59-60). The analysis below will mainly draw on “An assessment 
of the empirical evidence of the economic impact of plant variety protection in 
developed and developing countries” by Dwijen Rangnekar for the British Commission 
of Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) and a study on the impacts of breeders’ rights in 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay by Jaffee and van Wijk (hereafter 
van Wijk 1995, since information is gathered from an earlier summary by van Wijk 
alone). 
 
5.1.1 Law vs. actual effects  
 
It is difficult to envision the future but so far intellectual property rights have little real 
importance in Nicaragua. The informal commerce is big, resources are few and those 
who save seed need not to buy. Laws are many but implementations is poor. While 
recognising national efforts to enforce laws, there is still a gap between law and 
outcomes. The national strategy on biodiversity (MARENA 2001) refers to the judicial 
order of Nicaragua as programmatic norms with a series of general principles and 
argues that there exist large deficiencies in the establishment of instruments and 
concrete mechanisms that permit its application and fulfilment. The strategy talks of 
instruments being adopted without the right scientific support since the investigations 
that should enrich the taking of these political decisions are limited. It further criticises 
unclear administrational procedures, referring to a shortage of capacity and stability in 
human resources (MARENA 2001).  
 
In general, there is mistrust towards the formal system and a general distrust and 
obedience towards laws and regulations. The reasoning goes “why should we follow the 
rules when the government does not”. Perhaps the fall of the former President Alemán 
and his corrupt brothers will give people new faith and trust in the system, but for the 
time being democracy and justice are mainly theoretical concepts. In this, intellectual 
property rights mean little to people when you may come away with murder if you have 
the right friend or size of pocketbook. Although people wish for better quality of life 
and seed, it is important to keep in mind that the general mistrust in the formal system 
could affect the success to develop it. These circumstances will largely hamper the 
impacts of any intellectual property rights.  
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5.1.2 Legal progress – one rice variety protected 
 
In January 2003, three years after the PVP law went into force there was only one 
protected plant variety in Nicaragua, the rice variety ANAR 97. The rights-holder 
ANAR is a national association of rice farmers with unique access to germplasm for 
breeding. Other applicants are INTA (the National Institute for Agricultural 
Technology), Oscar Alemán, a Nicaraguan sugarcane farmer, and a Colombian rice 
federation, Fedearroz. The registration office also received a US application for a 
transgenetic tobacco variety, which was later withdrawn. The rice variety INTA-N1 has 
passed the technical exam and the next step is for INTA to publish their intention in the 
Daily Official Gazette and to pass the technical review of the Committee (Gloria Zelaya 
pers. comm). The application process is still a learning process. Or as the involved 
parties say “we are all beginners and we learn as time goes”. And time really goes by. 
With no real routines, the application process is tardy, so slow that INTA’s rice variety 
no longer is found on the market. Nevertheless, while applicants, committees and 
offices are getting acquainted with administrative procedures, the farmers will be the 
true test bunnies.  
 
5.2 FROM THE PRODUCER PERSPECTIVE 
 
5.2.1 Free seed  
 
The effects of intellectual property rights are directly related to the type of seed farmers 
use in their sowing. Rights-holders only have control over varieties that are protected 
through the PVP Law. If farmers continue saving and selecting from older bean 
varieties, he or she should not directly be affected by plant breeders’ rights since 
protection of older varieties is not legally possible. The word should is used because of 
recent unresolved cases of US claims on for example the Mexican Yellow Bean and the 
Andean Nuña. However, in the successive mixing of varieties, most farmers will 
eventually include protected varieties in their seed collection.  
 
5.2.2 Private reuse allowed 
 
Self-pollinating crops such as the Common Bean are optimal for seed saving since they 
produce its own image. The PVP law legally protects this private reuse: farmers’ 
exemption gives farmers the right to use protected seed reproduction and multiplication 
in the own plot (Art. 12). Farmers can therefore buy seed from a protected variety and 
replant it as long as desired. Farmers may also sell the harvest; transaction of grains or 
raw material requires no authorisation.  
 
5.2.3 Informal exchange under control 
 
The farmer exemption in Nicaragua is strict since the PVP law obliges authorisation for 
informal sales or exchange of seed (Art 8 and 12). Thus, breeders’ rights are breached in 
all cases when seed is in transaction without authorisation and payment, also when 
farmers exchange seed with neighbours or sell seed on the informal market.  
From the right-holders point of view the second buyer is benefiting from the innovation 
without paying royalties and the seller is free-riding by collecting profit on someone 
else’s investment and competing in market shares. The informal market is therefore 
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prone to be put under scrutiny and the PVP law provides the rights-holder with legal 
rights to interfere in the informal market. PBR are legal rights, not contractual. This 
means that when a farmer is purchasing protected seed, he or she is agreeing with the 
holders’ rights of control.  
 
5.2.4 Enforcement through formal and private control 
 
The State gives the right, but enforcement is a private matter. The rights-holders must 
themselves play watchdog and in a sense leave breeding grounds for checkpoints. This 
approach resembles the Argentinean situation where rights-holders themselves actively 
control the seed market in an attempt to reduce the trade in seed multiplied without 
authorisation (van Wijk 1995). In Argentina, this has practically been solved through a 
collective control system embodied by a plant breeders association representing 80% of 
the plant breeders’ organisations (van Wijk 1995). Many commentators in Nicaragua 
doubt that PBR will have any direct effect on small-scale informal exchange (INTA, 
UNA, MAGFOR, PROMESA, farmers). “Intellectual property rights are a 
preoccupation for the formal institutions and seed producers”, says Gómez of UNA. For 
the small-scale farmer who produces seed for personal use or non-commercial 
exchange, Gómez continues, IPR is not a problem much less so in beans. One reasoning 
is that large seed companies or INTA do not consider it profitable or in their interest to 
limit non-profitable activities (Molina, INTA and PROMESA pers. comm). Still, in 
Argentina the rights-holders joined by the PBR authority have had great success in 
reducing the black market; the share of sales in unauthorised wheat seed decreased from 
83% to 22% in four years, and in the case of soybean seed from 75% to 48% in two 
years (van Wijk 1995). 
 
There are different types of informal markets and exchanges. The Argentinean figures 
are more concerned with ‘organised crime’ and the Latin American study found no 
negative effects in terms of the exchange on farmer level. The direct loser is probably 
the informal dealer who buys grains and sells it on as seed after some form of 
purification (van Wijk 1995 and Solleiro in Cervantes 2000). It is unlikely that big 
transnational seed companies enter villages in the search for unauthorised uses of 
protected varieties. Legally however, a company could claim compensation of US$ 14 
000 to US$ 60 000 from the Nicaraguan farmer who probably got the seed in exchange 
or as donation. This is a fine farmers cannot pay and Humboldt fear the actual 
punishment will be imprisonment or expropriation (Lanuza in CIPRES Memoria).  
 
In all essence, intellectual property rights are directed towards the formal sector. It is 
here any royalties may be claimed without setting up a large control apparatus and it is 
within the commercial sector royalties find their justification. The ways of 
compensation are regulated by contracts and the rights-holder usually gets 6-8 % 
percentage of the sales price. This is why an informal but legal transaction is unrealistic.  
 
5.2.5 Quality control over seed production 
 
The PVP law gives the rights-holders control over basically all activities involving the 
seed of a protected variety (excluding private use and research). Wilfredo Bejarano 
from ANAR says that the possibility of controlling seed production was the main reason 
for applying for protection on their rice variety ANAR 97. From its initial release in 
1997, the variety got very popular among rice farmers, but although going under the 
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name of ANAR 97 it had lost much of its characteristics under years of informal 
production and exchange. Because of its popularity and potentials, ANAR was 
supported by PROMESA in recovering the genetic identity of the variety. In 
collaboration with INTA, ANAR reproduced pure lines of the variety and now wishes 
to remain in control of the genetic quality of the seed. According to Bejarano, this type 
of protection was something they had waited for. Now ANAR will be able to combat 
the illegal black market, and to offer material for the sowing that meets the minimum 
quality requisitions set by the department of seed of MAGFOR and thus to meet 
farmers’ demand for good quality seed.  
 
Poor quality seed is considered a large problem. With the protection in place, ANAR 
can recoup its investment so that the quality of the research is retained. Although the 
controlling instance MAGFOR has the responsibility of classifying and certifying seed, 
PBR now give ANAR more control of who produces their variety, of coordinating the 
inspection, monitoring and follow-ups with the department of seed, and to make sure 
that multiplication is based upon genetically pure seed. Bejarano also points out that a 
formal system stimulates the production of quality seed by assuring higher prices. The 
issue of royalties, Bejarano says, comes second and is unlikely to emerge since ANAR 
would be requesting its own associates for money. 
 
5.2.6 Public seed 
 
Would INTA ask for royalties from users and producers of bean seed improved within 
its breeding program? So far, the INTA lacks any policy on seed production and 
intellectual property rights but the director of the seed research at INTA, José Manuel 
Bravo Báez, is doubtful towards royalties or any active control of the informal market 
(pers. comm.). As a public institute, Bravo says, INTA does not have the same goal as 
private companies. However, in respect of the three varieties for which protection is 
applied Bravo says the reason is to recoup some of the money invested in developing 
new varieties: “The State needs revenues and someone has to pay for the five years of 
investigation related to new varieties”. Bravo is aware of the (inter)national debate, 
"organisations say one cannot patent material coming from international organisations 
such like CIAT". The general agreement among breeders however is that the CGIAR 
centres only requirement is to be recognised in the Plant Breeder title.   
 
If INTA is to follow the trend of the public centres in Latin America, the institute is 
likely to protect all its future varieties. Today these public centres consider PBR 
protection “an important tool to defend their existence and to remain competitive vis-à-
vis the private sector” (van Wijk 1995). As a consequence “the increasing commercial 
perspective of the centres has a negative influence on the traditional free access to the 
centres’ germplasm” in so that it will “increasingly deny third parties access to the 
traditionally public plant germplasm it administers” (van Wijk 1995). That INTA would 
follow this trend is expected since the studied centres initially also used to release 
varieties at a low cost or free of charge to farmers and licence out the production of seed 
to the private sector on a non-exclusive basis. INTA faces the same budget restrictions 
and desire to share research costs if the private sector were to benefit from its work 
(Bravo pers. comm). Any future collaboration with private companies would probably 
also force INTA to restrict access to their germplasm because unrestricted access would 
erode private investment. Then again, it is possible for public breeding to recoup its 
costs on non-commercial crops by claiming royalties on cash crops and from those 
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actors that are commercially stronger, such as seed producers. Bravo also suggests this 
as the most likely outcome, to address (and charge) producers of certified seed.  
 
5.2.7 Royalties in seed production 
 
In Nicaragua, the production of certified seed is mainly small-scale (60%) and the rest is 
produced by INTA itself and the private seed industry (MAGFOR stat. 2003). In beans, 
there were more than 300 registered seed producers in 2002 (Eslaquit, MAGFOR pers. 
comm). These producers are small scale (1-1.5 ha) and as such, they do not draw the 
attention of the Seed department (but if it were not for them there would be no certified 
bean seed). To produce registered or certified seed demands access to area, technical 
knowledge and some planning because beans cannot be cultivated in the seed plot a year 
before the certified production.  
 
Today, INTA sells registered seed to the seed producers at a price below the real cost of 
development. INTA’s price is 776 cordobas/qq and after multiplication the seed 
producer may sell certified seed at 800 cordobas/qq (or lower if sold through a 
middleman) (Kauffmann, INTA, and Navarro, APROSEN pers. comm). Although the 
current production of certified seed is low, it is described by the formal sector as a 
promising business (PROMESA during Seed fair, Matagalpa, 2002). Since certified 
yields are expected to be high (0.8 qq seed produces around 35-45 qq), it could be a way 
to add value to production even after subtracting the increased cost per area that the 
producer must pay MAGFOR. Nonetheless, the production of certified seed is described 
by farmers ‘as risky as any business’ because at the end of the day, the seed might not 
be approved by MAGFOR and the farmer would have to sell the seed as uncertified or 
as grains, which gives a lower price (300-450 cordobas/qq). If the seed in question were 
provided with intellectual property rights, the seed producer would have to seek 
authorisation from the rights-holder and perhaps pay an additional royalty fee. 
Considering the economic situation of seed producers, it is questionable whether INTA 
will be able to recoup any research costs from this group. Another question is whether 
citizens are to pay twice (that is, if INTA was to collect revenues on tax basis and not 
from aid support). 
 
Plant variety protection could attract domestic production of foreign seed because 
breeders (or multinational companies) would feel secure in being able to control and 
collect royalties on seed production. Legal protections could therefore increase domestic 
seed production of foreign varieties thus giving job opportunities, limit seed imports and 
perhaps increase quality control. In other cases, when the producer competes with the 
market of the breeder, international transfer might be denied or conditioned with export 
restrictions (van Wijk 1995). PVP law could therefore serve as an effective non-tariff 
trade barrier, which ought to be an odd consequence of regulations originating in free 
trade agreements. Then again, it is quite standard that these regulations serve to protect 
certain markets on behalf of others.  
 
5.2.8 Few varieties released 
 
Xavier Eslaquit describes the advantages of the PVP law as an increased interest in the 
production of improved varieties, also by foreign companies that now may introduce 
varieties within a system that protects their intellectual property rights. That the 
provision of PBR leads to an increase in the number of new varieties released is a 
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common claim in the literature but Rangnekar (2002) questions whether the increase in 
numbers is correlated to an increase in agronomic value.  
 
From a study review by GRAIN (2002c), it seems impossible to say whether PVP leads 
to improved varieties or merely to a proliferation of varieties that differ in little more 
than name. The low threshold for distinctness seems to lead to the release of varieties 
only cosmetically different. Thus, breeders tend to adopt strategies of product 
differentiation and planned obsolescence rather than genuine improvements in 
agronomic traits (CIPR 2002:61, Rangnekar). INTA has by no means reached this point 
but is rather occupied with the fact that varieties applied for are becoming obsolete in 
the field before protection is approved. The so-called copycat breeding is limited in the 
Nicaraguan PVP law by extending the control of plant breeders’ rights to essentially 
derived varieties (Art 9, 11). A variety is essentially derived if it derives principally 
from the initial variety and at the same time conserves its essential characteristics. Two 
closely related varieties should therefore be difficult to protect within the intellectual 
system. 
 
What is then the chance of intellectual property rights inviting private varieties of beans, 
perhaps even foreign? As a starting point, the vast majority of bean seed is produced 
nationally and today no importation is conducted through formal channels (MAGFOR 
stat. 2003). However, Bravo of INTA says it is likely that the national strategy to 
strengthen the formal market will attract foreign seed companies and accordingly 
increase the multinational share on the seed market, in around 4-5 years. In this, the 
provision of PVP may play a part but perhaps more important are other regulations and 
policies affecting foreign invention. In the case of R&D expenditure by multinational 
seed companies in Argentina, companies indicate that the rise in R&D budget was 
mainly “due to changes in economic policies in Argentina and the need to improve their 
competitiveness” (van Wijk 1995). In the Nicaraguan context, Monsanto says it is to 
await the protocol on biosafety before introducing transgenetic crops (Cruit, PROMESA 
pers. comm).  
 
It is thought that the multinational enterprising in developing countries is likely to occur 
more because of an increased use of hybrids than because of the incentive of granting 
plant breeders’ rights (van Wijk 1995). Simultaneously, if intellectual property rights 
were incentives enough for multinationals to invest in technologies aimed at the 
developing world, there would be plentiful of hybrids adapting to developing 
conditions. Since hybrids cannot be copied, they come with an inherent intellectual 
property protection and in addition, they need no additional costly process of legal 
protection. Yet, as Busch (1995) queries, “where are all the investments in hybrid maize 
production in the developing world?” Still, self-replicating plants like beans make 
innovations particularly susceptible to exploitation and PBR might be the long awaited 
incentive to enter Nicaragua. Put in a different manner, are beans of interest for foreign 
rights-holders considering its replicability and uncontrollable market? Moreover, beans 
are not among the group of foreign favourites like fruits, flowers and vegetables. In 
conclusion, as Busch argues, the invention argument may hold but that IPR will be the 
incentive for multinational corporations to invest in developing nations is simply not 
supported by evidence. 
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5.2.9 Barrier to shifting seed source 
 
The obvious yet overlooked aspect is the real impact of intellectual property rights: do 
they increase farmers’ access to improved varieties? High technical standards and the 
increased time and costs of making available new varieties have its effect on research 
budgets. Reduced budgets might shift public breeding towards IPR crops. Monopolies 
on the production of seed, and the absence of competition could increase prices 
(Eslaquit pers. comm and Rangnekar 2002).  
 
Van Wijk (1995) argues that the overall result of PBR for the diffusion of seed might be 
an increased number of farmers reusing seed. Farmers might choose or be forced to 
recycle when the informal market is controlled and royalties increase formal seed prices 
(ibid). Solleiro (1995) believes protection will serve rather as an entry barrier where 
well-off farmers will be able to access improved varieties while resource poor remain 
without. PBR could therefore uphold the division between those who reuse and those 
who access new seed technology each season. This would be an effect contrary to the 
objectives of the national strategy for agricultural development.  
 
5.3 FROM THE BREEDER PERSPECTIVE 
 
During the debate leading to the approval of the PVP law, the director of MIFIC said 
that one of the advantages of the law was that farmers would be able to further develop 
introduced, improved varieties. This statement is much conditioned by the breeders' 
exemption and who is included therein. 
 
5.3.1 Breeder in legal terms 
 
Firstly, the breeder in question for intellectual protection is the physical person who has 
developed and obtained a variety meeting the requirements of being novel, distinct, 
stable and uniform (PVP regulation, Art 2). Secondly, the sphere included in the 
breeders’ exemptions is held wider: anyone involved in genetic improvement including 
farmers, centres of investigation and breeders (ibid). That is, if a farmer is to legally 
improve protected varieties there is a requirement of genetic improvement but in order 
to gain legal protection the improvement must meet the DUS and novelty criteria. One 
could therefore conclude that the PVP law acknowledges any genetic improvement as 
worth protecting but only DUS development are subject to plant breeders’ rights.  
 
5.3.2 To select within uniformity – impacts on agricultural practices 
 
Formal and future protected bean varieties are to meet the DUS criteria. Many farmers 
will continue selecting within these varieties but what is the effect of selection within 
uniform varieties, and why is it made?  
 
Firstly, farmers are traditionally producers, consumers and improvers of plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture. Secondly, selection is made based on phenotypes, 
characteristics we can observe and value such as plant vigour and seed colour. A plant’s 
phenotype is however not the direct image of its genotype. The same seed and genotype 
would not produce the same plant and phenotype on Swedish soil as in Nicaragua since 
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phenotypes are very much affected by its environment. Genotypes however are not. The 
grains of the plants produced under different conditions will genetically remain the 
same, even after many seasons of replanting. Yet, based on field characteristics a farmer 
could prefer one plant to the other and reuse its seed in the next sowing, thinking he or 
she is actually improving the material. Is there a real impact of selection, or is the effort 
in vain? The chances of successively improving the material through selection depend 
upon “the extent of genetic variation and the strength of relationship between genotype 
and phenotype i.e. heritability of the characters to be selected” (Chahal and Gosal 
2002:84).  
 
Yield and other economically important characteristics are strongly influenced by 
environmental factors and therefore more difficult to improve by the selection 
conducted by many farmers (Chahal and Gosal 2002:87). Agronomists of PROMESA 
argue that the material is unlikely to change even if farmers were to select individual 
plants. If genotypes are uniform, the selection of seed A over seed B will have no 
consequences since they are inherently the same. However, in the early 1900s W.L. 
Johannsen showed that commercial bean varieties include a variety of pure lines but 
more importantly and supporting, after these have been identified no further selection 
can be made as progenies will regress towards the mean of that particular pure line 
(Chahal and Gosal, 2002:74-81). This experiment was based on seed size and it is 
generally so that the relationship between genotype and phenotype is stronger when it 
comes to colour and size of the seed. If a farmer were to identify pure lines within a bag 
of commercial seed by successively selecting preferred characteristics, the question is 
whether this pure line would be considered distinct from the original variety. A rough 
estimation is that it would take a variety 20 or more years to become distinct under 
farmer management (Gómez pers. comm). 
 
Under natural conditions however even pure lines undergo changes. For a crop of only 
5-10% natural cross-pollination, natural crossings are rare but happen, especially if 
sown mixed with other genotypes. Genotypes may also suddenly change, that is 
undergo mutations. Chahal and Gosal (2002) argue that since mutations are recurrent 
most favourable mutations have already put their favourable marks on existing crops, 
but they will not rule out that new favourable mutations may answer to emerging 
problem. (Chahal and Gosal 2002:81-82). Thus reusing uniform varieties could produce 
new bean varieties, but only under close observation and effective selection.  
 
Thirdly, stability is defined within a certain domain. If brought outside of that domain, 
varieties will probably show different characteristics. If developed under more 
favourable conditions, varieties are likely to show less favourable characteristics in a 
less favourable environment. The question is whether a selection can bring out the best 
of the material. Is the instability genetic or is the variability a result of genetics meeting 
the environment? These question marks will be left hanging in the air. 
 
What should be said though is that although farmers may legally engage in developing 
protected varieties, the ‘new’ variety is likely to be considered essentially derived from 
the protected variety (even though derived from mutants). This means that innovative 
farmers are in any case restricted from commercialising the variety. How about 
protecting those varieties developed from free varieties? 
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5.3.3 Farmer varieties – other objectives     
 
The Nicaraguan regulation (Art 2) defines the process of breeding as the techniques and 
procedures that permit the development of novel, distinct, stable and uniform varieties. 
Thus, there is no legal requirement of crossing in order to attain breeding, which means 
that selection is breeding also in the legal meaning. Many varieties developed by 
farmers are distinct, uniform and stable. Should or could farmers seek protection for 
their informal innovations? Presented below are two examples of innovative farmers, 
their improvement process and thoughts on Plant Breeders Rights. 
 
Magdaleno Perez – bean breeder 
 
Magdaleno Perez, a farmer breeder in Santa Rosa, 
Ocotal, has developed a bean variety out of a seed he 
observed as distinct from others in a commercial seed 
bag (pers. comm). The seed, Don Magdaleno says, 
was not stable but demanded years of selections until 
it reached the uniformity of today. According to Don 
Magdaleno, the variety is clearly distinct from other 
varieties on the market and it is easy he says to 
distinguish this variety from others since the plant 
stem and flowers are pinkish. It is easy but equally 
necessary, he continues, to keep the variety pure; 
something he also demonstrates by discarding plants 
with white flowers found in his plot. Don Magdaleno 
seems disturbed that other farmers allow the variety 
to degenerate. It is such an easy step, he explains, to 
only select pinkish plants for seed collection and thereby assure its quality of unique 
resistance to diseases and high yields.  
 
Isidoro Zeledón – maize breeder  
 
Although it is easier to keep self-pollinating crops pure, these are more difficult to cross 
and therein create new diversity to select within. With maize, crossing is easier but more 
difficult to control. In 1993, Isidoro Zeledón Meza a farmer breeder in the Estelí area, 
crossed the improved maize variety NB-5 with Olotillo, a variety said to originate from 
the Pacific area of León (pers. comm). Zeledón had bought the NB-5 from a seed 
company in 1992 and observed its many good qualities. But he also noted that the husk 
did not completely cover the ear of the cob or as they say in Nicaragua, the variety 
showed a crazy head5. The bare head, Zeledón explained, invites and stores pests and 
diseases and allows water to enter and leave the cob. The NB-5 was therefore 
vulnerably to diseases and pests, had low resistance to drought which in turn affected 
the quality and overall yield of a variety that otherwise was very high yielding with 
large grains. Zeledón had in the previous season observed the flowering date of the 
variety Olotillo brought from León by a friend and could therefore plan the sowing of 
the two varieties aimed for the crossing. He chopped the male part off the improved 
variety and let the criolla pollinate the lot. The cross was successful and Zeledón 
                                                          
5 The problem of incomplete ear-cover by the husk can appear when improved maize varieties bred at 
high plant densities are planted at low density in less favourable environments (Almekinders and Elings 
2001:426). 
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observed a 60% decrease in incomplete covers. He was also pleased in seeing the cobs 
becoming larger and the vegetitative phase shorter but there were still some rotten cobs 
and crosses that did not properly fertilise. Zeledón selected plants for further breeding 
based on the development of the plant and cob, and then he selected cobs based on its 
seed structure. The latter is a criterion only important when producing seed, something 
Zeledón had learned by agronomists.  
 
In 1994, Zeledón planned and conducted a second cross between the initial cross NB-5 
x Olotillo and Olote Morado, which was a new variety to the area. The variety is fast 
maturing but originating from a drier area, San Lorenzo. At this time Zeledón was 
unaware of the origins of the Olote Morado and he regretfully discovered that half of 
the lot came out stained with colours, from white to black in one single cob. The 
Nicaraguan preference is again quite particular, tortilla of white maize is the cuisine and 
Zeledón had to work two extra years to recover the uniformity of white grains. During 
these years the lot was open to pollinate freely.  
 
In 1997, the non-governmental organisation INSFOP and its Farmer University 
(UNICAM) entered the picture. UNICAM helped in validating, comparing and 
distributing the variety within and outside of the community, a variety that now 
produced 45 qq/mz, an increase by 10qq/mz from the initial cross. The variety was a 
mixture of pinkish and white plants/straws but 90% of the cobs were white. By the year 
2000, after eight years of breeding, the variety had gained recognition for its qualities 
and UNICAM urged Zeledón to come up with a name for this new variety that was still 
going under the name NB-5. The variety was named ZEL –00 and today it has a wide 
adoption in the Estelí area as well as a diffusion up north to the area of Don Magdaleno, 
to Somoto, Ocotal and Mexico, and to the east of Matagalpa and Jinotega. 
 
 
Breeding strategy of ZEL -00 
 
 
NB-5   X  Olotillo 
 
+ very good yields   + covers top 
+ good cob 
+ good size of grain 
+ good vigour of plant 
- incomplete ear-cover 
 
 
NB-5 x Olotillo  X   Olote Morado 
 
- long maturity period    + short maturity period 
- coloured grains 
 
Selection of (NB-5 x Olotillo) x Olote Morado Æ ZEL -00 
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Intellectual freedom 
 
In Don Magdaleno’s ideology there is no such thing as intellectual property rights. His 
work becomes valid with the popularity and spread of the variety. In this sense, Don 
Magdaleno has recouped his efforts of developing, comparing and multiplying. The 
variety is known and popular in the area with great potentials of further distribution. 
Both Don Magdaleno and Zeledón are today connected to UNICAM, the farmer 
‘university’ and the varieties are distributed with the help of the university and the 
associated NGO INSFOP. But what happens if a seed company starts multiplying and 
making money on the variety: “That would be their problem”, Don Magdaleno said. 
 
Zeledón does not wish for intellectual protection and if so, INTA has made it clear that 
the breeding process must be done all over again. This although Zeledón clearly can 
describe the breeding process, its crosses and knows how to keep the variety uniform, 
stable and distinct. Yet, a breeder from INTA thinks it would be wise for Zeledón to 
seek protection, not to make money but to gain recognition for the breeding work. On 
this Zeledón says he does not wish to hinder the distribution of the variety, but “what I 
cannot accept is if a commercial seed company make money without consulting me”. 
Zeledón seems to think that the worst problem is not financial but rather the quality 
aspect in so far that he would not feel good about farmers accessing ZEL -00 without 
showing the proper characteristics: “I can only guarantee the seed that I have myself 
produced”.  
 
5.4 FROM THE PARTICIPATORY PERSPECTIVE 
 
The PPB in Pueblo Nuevo/Condega has entered the evaluation phase and is soon to 
release new improved varieties. This raises many questions surrounding the production 
of seed, distribution of seed and benefits, and the plant breeders’ rights. Although these 
issues have been discussed from the beginning, the breeding process has now reached 
the point where participants more clearly can see where the research is leading and can 
therefore sketch possible scenarios for the future. In a sense, it has reached the stage 
when participants must come to an agreement for the future path in order to strengthen 
the participatory plant breeding. We therefore talk not only about the production and the 
possible/preferred scale of distribution but also about how to continue the participatory 
research, with whom and using what material. The discussion below is focused on 
intellectual contributions and the pros and cons of plant breeders’ rights (PBR).  
 
5.4.1 Joint ownership in legal terms  
 
The Nicaraguan law on plant variety protection allows for joint ownership and it 
encourages applicants to specify each contribution but it does not state which 
contributions are required for a partner to be included (Art 15, 31). The general rule is 
that the right-holders are the ones who have created or discovered AND improved the 
material up to the point where it is considered a DUS variety (Art 1). Rights are equal 
between the contributors if partners have not agreed otherwise (Art 15, 31). Thus, 
partners are free to design their own contracts on how to share rights and benefits. 
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5.4.2 Rights and benefits – an open issue 
 
The Pueblo Nuevo/Condega programme is a typical case where institutional aspects are 
lagging behind the technical aspects of collaboration. PBR were new or perhaps a non-
issue when the programme was launched. Since it was the first PPB in the country, there 
were no national examples to learn from. Along the process, it also becomes clearer 
why legal and other institutional issues are so called laggers. Since the process is 
participatory and dynamic, it lies within the ideology not to be able to foresee the 
direction of the process and the exact outcomes. Such related aspects are lagging 
because decisions are closely dependent upon emergent breeding results. It is therefore 
difficult to decide upon issues directly connected to the result such as distribution scale 
and ownerships. Neither contracts nor decisions have therefore been made on the legal 
issue.  
 
5.4.3 Intellectual contributions 
 
In the Pueblo Nuevo/Condega case, intellectual contributions have been provided by 
different participants at different stages in the research process. More so, there are 
different contributions in each breeding strategy, from varietal selection to selection in 
segregating populations. What regards the bean material, CIAT and the University of 
Zamorano, Honduras have made crosses and early selections. INTA has also been 
involved in the selection process in the early generations and more so in the breeding 
towards pure lines, and is now mainly facilitating the process together with CIPRES. 
Farmer breeders successively select in the field and the other farmer participants give 
advice and select based on seed and consumer preferences. Aside from these intellectual 
contributions is the contribution of the farmers and formal breeders who developed the 
germplasm constituting the parental lines. These include farmers developing criollas in 
the northern parts of Pueblo Nuevo and farmers and breeders in other countries. 
Arguably, it is the farmer breeders who bring the material to the DUS criteria (if met at 
all).  
 
Table 6 depicts the quality of participation. It is important to remember that these 
elements are shifting with time and that although initiative came from above, farmers 
start taking control over decision-making as the programme evolves. “When we start 
understanding, we make the decisions”.  
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Table 6 Quality of participation in the PPB of Pueblo Nuevo/Condega  
 
i. Degree of participation 
Consultative (Information sought from farmers/ other clients, scientist-led) 
Collaborative (Task sharing along lines determined by formal research 
program) 
Collegial (Researchers support farmer-initiated/managed program) 
 
The first initiative came from the Netherlands, which in turn proposed to 
the national NGO CIPRES to start a PPB programme. CIPRES supported 
the idea and presented it to some fifty farmers in Pueblo Nuevo/Condega. 
After two years of collaboration, the farmers increasingly take control 
over the decision-making process related to ii. Thus, the degree of 
participation is moving towards collegial.     
 
ii. Functions performed by participants 
Technical expertise: Farmers, CIPRES, INTA 
Organisational skills: CIPRES 
Information giving (trade-offs and preferences): Farmers but CIPRES 
facilitates. 
Teaching/ skill building (extension): CIPRES, INTA and farmers who 
increasingly explain methods. Farmers also show interest in farmer-to-
farmer extension.  
Field labour: Farmers 
Provide inputs:  
Land: Farmers and CIPRES  
Seed: INTA, CIAT, University of Zamorano and farmers 
Funds: NORAD, Norway 
 
iii. Stage of involvement in breeding process 
Defining overall goals: Farmers, INTA and CIPRES. 
Defining breeding targets (e.g. identification of farmers’ plant ideotype 
and most valued characters): Farmers, INTA and CIPRES. 
Generating variability: Farmers, INTA, CIAT, Zamorano  
Selection in early segregating populations: CIAT, INTA, farmers (F3,4) 
Variety testing: Farmers, INTA  
Variety evaluation: Farmers 
Seed multiplication/ distribution: Farmers, CIAT (and INTA). 
 
 
 
5.4.4 Intellectual  claims 
 
Formal perspective 
 
Julio Molina, the breeder employed by INTA says that INTA will make no claims on 
ownership and neither will CIAT. It is good policy though, he says, to recognise CIAT 
for supplying germplasm and making crosses in the documentation surrounding the 
varieties. Gilles Trouche, CIRAD and Lazaro Narvaez Rojas from INTA, both working 
in the CIAT project argue that if INTA had only facilitated the breeding process by 
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providing methodological guidance, INTA would have no claims on intellectual 
property rights. When, as in this case, INTA has provided germplasm and initial 
selection, the intellectual issue is put in another light. The most logical solution though 
is to recognise INTA just as CIAT is to be recognised for providing germplasm. 
Furthermore, if INTA wishes to produce and distribute varieties improved within the 
project, the most respectful solution is to exempt INTA from paying any royalties.  
 
Most participants seem to think that the farmers alone should be the holders of any plant 
breeders’ rights. CIPRES and Molina suggest that the farmer more involved in the 
breeding of the chosen variety should earn more recognition, perhaps stand as a title 
holder with more percentage in the profit, and that the group of 50 collaborative farmers 
would be favoured otherwise, perhaps through exclusive rights to produce seed. 
CIPRES could initially work as the farmers’ representative, a task later handed over to a 
future association of the participating farmers. 
 
Farmer breeders' perspective 
 
So far, most farmer breeders in the project are positive towards protection of the 
varieties improved through the project. The farmers say the aim is to spread improved 
seed of good quality and they think the system of protection will secure this. From the 
start, the difference between registration of a variety within MAGFOR and the 
protection procedure at MIFIC was however not clear. It appears as if both registration 
and protection have been presented as the goal, given that the technical aspect of DUS 
was met. ‘What are hindering us from ownership one farmer asked, saying that they 
would for sure reach the technical requirements’. Apparently, there had been no 
discussions on PBR from the perspective of control or whether the project would benefit 
from a protection in real terms. In this, most farmer participants trust CIPRES to make 
the evaluation and decision. Most participants, from farmers to the INTA breeder, trust 
CIPRES with this responsibility as CIPRES ‘act for the good of the farmers’. It is clear 
that the final decision on whether protection is to be sought or not, lies with the farmers. 
However, this decision will foremost be based on the information and recommendation 
given by CIPRES. The role and opinions of the facilitating organisation and INTA for 
that matter is thus very crucial to the final decision. Information is value loaded and 
CIPRES has already given the direction. As a partner and part owner of the research 
process, CIPRES may independently of the cost-benefit analysis, decide upon its own 
ideological standpoint. As said, it is an organisation for rural development and research. 
The research and capacity building aspects are therefore heart issues for CIPRES but it 
has also outspoken wishes for income generating projects.  
 
Among the farmer breeders there are different ideologies and all are not pleased with 
the direction of the programme. One farmer said he would be pleased if the seed was to 
be distributed and would feel proud if farmers far away were to use the seed he had 
developed. “These seeds I own”, he said and referred to the seeds in his hand, “but my 
ownership is materialistic and reaches no further. It would also be silly to say I made 
this since there have been so many elements and people within the project.” He argues 
that if there is to be an owner, it should be the one making the project possible. Others 
in the group did not share this way of arguing. Through a discussion using the 
combination between the criolla and improved variety as an example, the participants 
listed the actors involved in the breeding work including themselves, INTA, CIPRES 
and Zamorano. What regards the criolla they pointed at themselves: "the producers had 
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done the work" they said, or more specifically the farmers of the north of Pueblo Nuevo. 
Finally, on the question of who owns the result they answered "We, because we have 
done all the work".  
 
In contrast to the vision of CIPRES and Molina, farmers seem to want to own the 
variety collectively. "This is one of the nicest things about the project", one farmer said, 
"to own something collectively and stand as an example to the world". Trouche and 
Narvaez Rojas both working in the CIAT project, support the spirit of collectiveness. 
They discuss the possibility of collective ownership but to include the name of the main 
breeder. The farmers seem to have a collective sense of ownership but speak of the 
varieties referring to the name of the main breeder. To name the variety after its breeder 
but to collectively authorise and collect revenues could be an alternative if the 
participants can and want to seek protection in the future.   
 
Participatory decision-making 
 
Formal participants could wave their intellectual property claims and participants could 
negotiate codes of conducts in the initial phase, but is the group to decide upon 
intellectual property matters before farmers get the feeling of breeding? The 
understanding comes with the cycles of selection, and with time comes the capacity to 
think wider and the empowerment to argue differently. As farmers more clearly see 
opportunities and constraints, they will also take greater part in the intellectual 
discussion. For that reason it is important to keep the issue open and to make clear that 
there are different options. Although not intentionally CIPRES set the route towards the 
DUS criteria, registration and protection and by doing so, farmers align to this 
development without thinking much about alternatives. Although these issues are 
complicated, it is important to invite farmers into the institutional discussion. As one 
farmer said, “participation needs to come in from the start when the aspects are decided 
upon since the one coming with an initiative usually also comes with a vision". Farmers 
have clear ideas about seed systems, reproductive controls and how they would prefer 
working together. This information is crucial to adhere if future systems and institutions 
are to respond to farmers’ objectives and moral beliefs.  
 
5.4.5 Technical limitations 
 
PBR will only be of relevance to the programme if varieties meet or are set to meet the 
DUS criteria. It is too early to determine whether the legal criteria will be met, but the 
answer is prominent in the case of the five bean lines selected from the segregated 
material. These five lines have entered the evaluation phase and soon information will 
be available as to whether there is consistent performance between different sites. The 
breeding process is still aiming towards the DUS criteria, which the formal plant 
breeder Molina believes will be best met if the selection is made by the agronomists of 
CIPRES while in the farmer’s field.  
 
Because the common bean is fertilising itself (selfing) it is rather a plant’s individual 
task to reach stability before the variety is considered stable. Stability must first be 
reached as regards each plant since, in simplified terms, if the germplasm still have 
heterozygous gene pairs at important loci the plant can develop in two different 
directions thus making the variety untrue to its description. The gametes are expected to 
become genetically identical under selfing within about ten generations (Chasal and 
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Gosal 2002:80). The lines of research are older and probably meet the criteria of 
stability.  
 
Distinctness in the plant protection context is a phenotypic criterion and the variety 
should prove distinct from other varieties in at least one characteristic. The lines appear 
to be uniform in days to reach flowering and maturity and on these criteria; they also 
appear to be distinct from each other (see differences 
in the degree of maturity between five lines sown 
vertically in the field of Don Juan). Even so, many 
farmers (visiting or participating) see uniformity also 
between four of the five lines and this might not be so 
peculiar since all lines are originating from the same 
combination and are genetically related. The 
evaluation will show whether the research lines 
further distinguish between yields. The seed is rather 
uniform in shape and size and they are described as 
having the weight of led. The colours are similar, a 
purple-reddish colour, somewhere in between the red 
criolla and the darker DOR. One line in contrast, is 
easy to distinguish because of its small, squared seed 
and perhaps also because plants can be sown more 
closely. All lines however are said to be resistant to 
the golden mosaic and tolerant to drought. On this 
basis, and with higher yields and seed distinct from 
INTA varieties, the bean material does have a legal 
case.   
 
5.4.6 Discussion: opportunities and constraints of PBR in PPB 
 
Firstly, it should be remembered that different actors might hold different interest in the 
PPB scheme, and although being different they need not be conflicting. The Pueblo 
Nuevo/Condega programme includes many different actors largely working in the same 
direction but with different aims. The sharing of benefits could therefore be perceived as 
fair although only some actors gain intellectual property rights. 
 
Main interests in PPB 
 
Farmers: Improved livelihoods through seed, income, knowledge, recognition and 
trust 
INTA:   Diffusion and adoption of seed 
CIPRES:  Rural and sustainable development 
CIAT:   Agricultural development 
Zamorano:  Research 
 
 
Opportunities of Plant Breeders’ Rights  
 
With PBR farmer breeders would be recognised for their work and presumably be 
protected from biopiracy. It would give legal control over activities including the seed, 
except for the exemption of farmers and breeders. Farmers would have a right to keep 
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all seed production within the co-operative. With the help of the formal sector, farmers 
gain knowledge of how to meet legal requirements (distinct, uniform and stable) and 
may integrate this knowledge into their agricultural practices if so wished. In theory, 
knowledge about formal requirements on breeding would give farmers the same 
opportunities as formal breeders. An NGO can help with administrative issues, legal 
requirements for collective ownerships and so on. The protection could strengthen local 
co-operation and innovativeness. 
 
PBR could generate income, as a percentage would reach the owner when seed is sold 
(formally). Money wise, royalties are around 8% of seed sales prices and cost of 
registration around US$ 630 (forms C$ 62, application C$ 2500, and title C$ 6250) plus 
cost of research and maintenance during the subsequent period of protection. There is 
also a need to register the variety with MAGFOR to the cost of around US$ 500 
(Molina pers. comm). 
 
Constraints of Plant Breeders’ Rights  
 
Apart from financial and administrative constraints and needs of creating legal entities, 
it should be questioned whether the DUS criteria answer to farmers’ criteria and if the 
scale of distribution makes a protection worthwhile. The variety must be kept uniform 
for the length of protection and innovative farmers would devote their time to a few 
varieties instead of improving ‘varieties’ each season. The legal aspects demand legal 
knowledge and administrative work that would complicate and slow down the breeding 
process. Plant variety protection is a slow process while the life span of varieties is 
short. 
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Figure 15 How the intended diffusion affects the decision-making in Plant 
Breeders’ Rights (PBR): If the seed is to stay within the local system in cycles A, B and 
C (and perhaps also D), farmer participants wish not to restrict the flow thus PBR is 
redundant. PBR is relevant when seed are to integrate into the formal system (arrows). 
Whether the breeding first merges into a formal breeding scheme (E) or if farmer 
participants seek PBR directly, they would gain control over the formal seed production 
and could for example collect royalties when certified seed is produced. Although 
quality control (G) is a standardised procedure, the rights-holders would be able to 
authorise preferred producers. If the participants were to produce seed themselves (H), 
PBR is perhaps not needed (see discussion below). In relation to genebanks (I) and 
foreign breeders, the participant would favour from a law on benefit sharing.       
 
Repute protection  
 
To enter the present protection system, farmers’ knowledge and innovativeness would 
integrate into the formal system, not the other way around. An alternative is to put trust 
in a more traditional protection system. 
 
In a process of dynamic production and fast release, the association will gain reputation 
based on seed quality and well-adapted varieties. This is more important than any 
control they may gain in relation to plant breeders’ rights. If farmers believe it to be 
economically viable to buy seed every season from the association then they will do so. 
If not, the participants have made clear that they have no desire to restrict any reuse, 
exchange or small-scale sales. If other seed producers start producing varieties coming 
from the participatory plant breeding, the participants would have few possibilities to 
prohibit the production and could be out-competed on large-scale advantages. In this 
perspective, a good reputation will be the best protector.   
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Intellectual protection in general 
 
Plant variety protection is only a small part of the intellectual contributions in question 
for recognition and protection in PPB. Depending on the development of legislations 
around intellectual property rights, patents and the sui generis intellectual community 
rights may be relevant in the future (see community rights chapter). 
 
The issue also concerns copyrights of PPB publications and as such, this paper is 
directly involved in the intellectual discussion. In copyrights there is no need for 
application; words are directly protected whereas ideas are not. Like in many 
publications, the intent is to share copyrights but as the print version reaches public, it is 
processed beyond the criteria of copyrights. Research results however are to be shared 
in the best code of conduct.  
 
Another intellectual issue is the knowledge and skills the programme generates. For 
instance, the farmer participants said that they could take on the role of teachers of 
(participatory) plant breeding. In fact, one farmer said that he in a way feels obliged to 
share information when people with interest want to learn more. However, it was agreed 
that it would be only fair to financially acknowledge time and expenses in relation to 
these capacity meetings.  
 
PPB builds IPR understanding 
 
By inviting farmers in the process behind formal varieties, there is an increased 
acceptance of intellectual property rights. Farmers involved in the Participatory Plant 
Breeding programmes have gained an understanding of the long and time-consuming 
process behind formal varieties and have therefore become more positive towards 
paying royalties and keeping protected varieties pure. Still, they say, the one with the 
title needs to be more humble. 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION: FROM THE DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
There is no question that Nicaragua is in need of incentives for, and investments in, 
research and development. The country suffers from a lack of funding, infrastructure 
and human resources. There are few private breeders in the formal sector and INTA is 
relying on foreign aid money for its breeding work. More so, the brain drain was not 
halted with the end of the war but is still a limiting factor on the intellectual level and 
for continuity in research and development. Another problem of continuity is that funds 
and policies often follow the political situation. It is likely that the fall of Alemán and 
the country’s more serious attitude against corruption and informal markets will attract 
foreign investments and make them more consistent. 
 
5.5.1 International reputation 
 
The bilateral agreement with the US and the following PVP law was seen by the 
governmental sector as an important step to gain international reputation as a serious 
and trustworthy country. Ambrosia Lezama, head of MIFIC, said for instance that for 
Nicaragua it is very important not to appear on a negative list and “the bilateral 
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agreement allows us to continue demonstrate that we are a serious country and that we 
wish to work by honest rules” (Corea 2001). Lezama argued that by working in an 
adequate and legal manner, Nicaragua will gain reputation for doing so and through the 
IPR implementation Nicaragua is sending out signals not only to the US but also to the 
rest of the WTO countries as being a serious country that complies with what it 
promises. Although the governmental side spoke of IPR bringing foreign material and 
technology to Nicaragua, the real background as all interviewees described it was the 
international pressure for trade harmonisation. 
 
5.5.2 Checks and balances 
 
Around US$ 10 million is the rough estimation of the cost of implementing a TRIPS 
intellectual property rights system in a country like Nicaragua (Byström and Einarsson 
2002:22). Like many structural adjustments, this procedure is supported by foreign 
money (e.g. Sida). This cost is to be recovered over time, perhaps more from the 
benefits of proving reliable as to intellectual property rights in harmony with 
international trade agreements than any direct increases in the R&D budget. In prospect 
is an increase in Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) but according to a review by 
Byström and Einarsson (2002:22) there is no clear evidence that the correlation between 
FDI and IPR is particularly strong but rather a factor among others in the decision-
making process. Its importance, they argue, is likely to diminish as IPR successively is 
standardised in all countries. Of more relevance, there is no clear evidence of IPR 
giving additional releases of varieties holding improved agricultural value. Even more 
distant is IPR:s correlation with farmers' access to improved seed.   
 
From the perspective of INTA, it seems as if the centre would have no trouble 
recovering its costs without the excuse of royalties, just by increasing the price of 
registered seed. The reason for not doing so today and its reluctance towards charging 
additional costs of royalties lies in the reality of seed producers with limited resources 
and possibilities to invest in risky business. Given the small certified market and the 
small likelihood of bean seed royalties reaching outside the formal market, IPR on bean 
varieties is unlikely to do much to the Nicaraguan R&D budget. 
 
5.5.3 Conditioned privatisation 
 
The path chosen for Nicaragua is indeed led by market forces. Orlando Nuñez Soto, 
director of the non governmental organisation CIPRES, talks of intellectual property as 
giving transnational companies monopoly on biodiversity as only one of the examples 
where State interest and natural resources are subordinated to the interest of 
transnational companies (Nuñez 2002). On this matter, PhD student Oscar Gómez (pers. 
comm) believes the essence of IPR is nothing more than securing the market and that 
IPR as incentives for plant breeding is only secondary. To his support, a recent study on 
the US wheat sector shows that PVP has served primarily as a marketing tool (Aston 
and Venner 2000 in GRAIN 2002c). Other US studies suggest that PVP does not 
increase R&D activities but more so the area sown to private varieties and the number 
of mergers within the seed industry (Butler and Marion 1985 in CIPR 2002:59). This 
trend is also widespread in developing countries much because mergers and acquisitions 
are perhaps the most effective means of obtaining freedom and access to gene 
sequences and technologies in a world of overlapping intellectual rights and cross 
licensing (CIPR 2002:65). In this lies an entry barrier for innovative start-ups, and a 
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danger of restricting public access to technologies, information or germplasm since the 
public sector is not in the same bargaining position.  
 
If looking into the near future, it is likely that the domestic breeding will continue to 
dominate the seed market, and therefore also the PVP applications in grains. This would 
be an outcome in contrast to the declaration by the Humboldt centre that “only 
transnationals will enter the protection process” since “our producers will not have the 
money nor the genius to register seed” (Lanuza in CIPRES Memoria). Even so, 
multinational companies do not have many seed breeders or intellectual property rights 
to acquire in Nicaragua but rather seed companies, which takes us to another issue. 
Although monopolies are legitimised through PBR, monopolies on the exploitation of 
plant varieties have outgrown their subject of protection and furthered these monopolies 
onto the food market, both vertically and horizontally.  
 
The privatisation trend opposed by many members of the civil society is being 
strengthened by the coming free trade agreement between the American countries 
(FTAA or ALCA in Spanish). On the intellectual matter, FTAA is only a reprint of the 
bilateral agreement (perhaps pushing for membership in UPOV 1991). People wishing 
to turn the development around have joined hands in the cause against what they say is 
the real background for IPR: trade interests looking to rule the world. During a forum6 
held in Managua in July 2002, over 1000 representatives from more than 350 
Mesoamerican organisations met and analysed the effects of FTAA, transnational 
companies and the mega plans of Plan Puebla Panamá. Like many great fora, 
intellectual property rights was discussed in the air of non-privatisation while some 
participants wished for patents for indigenous and local people under the pretence that 
genetic resources should remain under the control of those nurturing (from) it. In a 
world of black and white, there are good and bad protections. For those living in the 
grey zone, in reality or on the edge of integration, this thin line is more difficult to draw. 
 
5.5.4 Conditioned participation 
 
In the context of justice as fairness, the adoption of the PVP law came about in an air of 
non-equitable relations and was perceived as unjust by many involved parties and 
remained unknown for the great majority of stakeholders. Statements like “Everyone is 
free to seek plant variety protection”, could be reduced to "everyone with technical and 
financial means and desires to work towards the DUS criteria". This is the privileged 
sphere and under these conditions, many farmers lose command over genetic resources 
while plant breeders gain control. This would be a just situation if only farmers had 
been involved in the decision thereof. Now, that was not the case. Neither do farmer 
representatives have a permanent voice in the decision-making process or committee 
where future plant variety protections are discussed.   
 
"Yo participo, tú participas, nosotros participamos, vosotros participáis, ellos deciden". 
 
"I participate, you participate, we participate, they decide." 
(words from the Nicaraguan Movement for Civil Participation ) 
 
                                                          
6 Declaración Política del III Foro Mesoamericano “Frente al Plan Puebla Panamá el Movimiento 
Mesoamericano por la Integración Popular”. See 
http://www.foromanagua.com.ni/documentos/declaracion-III-foro-mesoamericano.PDF 
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5.5.5 Conditioned recognition 
 
Others put faith in the PVP application process in achieving justice in between 
innovators. For instance, Carlos Henry Loáisiga Caballero from UNA, believes that the 
PVP application procedure will secure any intellectual contribution made by farmers. It 
will show, Loáisiga Caballero argues, that the variety is of common knowledge and 
therefore put an end to the application procedure. His colleague Oscar Gómez asks 
how/whether this may/can practically be proven. Varieties may include characteristics 
from different localities and it will be a difficult task to assign inventorships to a certain 
individual or community. Then again, PBR aim not to recognise all contributions but 
rather those making a variety distinct, uniform and stable. This may be a systemic error, 
but in such a case, the problem lies in the paragraphs rather than in the application 
process.  
 
As a general reflection, it appears as if PBR leads to confusion perhaps even conflicts 
between farmers, breeders, seed companies, NGOs, ministries and governments. During 
a visit by Percy Smith, the Canadian farmer sued by Monsanto, the farmer drew up a 
scenario of neighbours telling on each other, spreading mistrust and competition. In 
Nicaragua, the conflicts so far lie in the breeding sector. Who is the actual breeder, who 
should decide whether protection is to be sought and who would receive or be asked for 
royalties? INTA in particular is in the centre of interest since it supports and facilitates 
private breeding initiatives. On this issue, Lazaro Narvaez Rojas of INTA who has been 
involved in many of the breeding processes leading up to protectable varieties of INTA 
and ANAR 97 says he makes no personal claims. However, on behalf of his employer 
INTA, he believes it is wiser to recognise the supportive role of INTA instead of 
clashing with its mandate. To ask for royalties while INTA is attempting to benefit the 
Nicaraguan people would perhaps not be such a fruitful idea.  
 
5.5.6 Conditioned seed development 
 
Monopoly for a limited time and then released for the good of society? In practical 
terms, rights-holders have monopoly on the whole life span of the protected varieties 
since to begin with, a variety normally becomes obsolete after five years and secondly, 
even a uniform bean variety would probably evolve into a distinct one in around 20 
years.  
 
Moreover, PBR provide protection only for knowledge answering to the formal norm 
and in this shut out more informal innovations. By doing so, it does not only give 
incentives for the development of a certain kind of plant varieties but it also provides 
certain kinds of knowledge a certain degree of protection and recognition. Apparently, 
farmer innovations must be formalised from the start before entering the formal sector. 
The interaction between formal and informal could be improved but would farmer 
breeders enjoy intellectual and individual protection? To be granted PBR, an applicant 
must demonstrate that the variety is new, distinct from other varieties, uniform and 
stable in its essential characteristics even after a number of reproduction cycles and 
even after years of protection. From the many talks with farmer breeders, it appears as if 
they seek quality protection in line with PBR requests but find little interest in 
intellectual protection, especially in relation to their fellow colleagues.  
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6. SUI GENERIS INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY RIGHTS 
 
It should be remembered that it is only plant varieties in its narrow meaning that are apt 
for protection within the PVP law. Any variety that does not meet the DUS criteria 
therefore falls outside of any intellectual protection. The question is whether other kinds 
of plant improvement will fall within the scope of the proposed sui generis intellectual 
community rights included in the future biodiversity law.  
 
6.1 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DRAFT  
 
In the proposed biodiversity law the State expressively recognises and protects, under 
the common denomination of sui generis intellectual community rights, the knowledge, 
practices and innovations of indigenous peoples and local communities related to the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and the institutions deciding upon 
these rights (Biodraft, Art 82:1). The draft, put forward by the Ministry of Environment 
and Natural Resources (MARENA), includes both tangible elements (ecosystems, 
species and genes) and intangible elements associated with the access of genetic 
resources found within the borders (Biodraft, Art. 2). Where PBR are granted when 
varieties meet the DUS criteria, the only requirement of community rights is that the 
knowledge, innovation and practices held by indigenous, ethnic and local communities 
are related to the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Members of 
the Crucible II Group (2001:80) argue that this subgroup suffers “from extraordinary 
vagueness; it is hard to know what kind of knowledge is meant to be included within 
such a description” and that “including this kind of language in a national law could 
potentially lead to enormous difficulties”. 
 
6.1.1 From conservation and sustainable use to protection 
 
Orúe (2002) argues that the drafted biodiversity law overrides its mandate set out in the 
general law of environment and natural resources (Art 70): protected areas, genetic 
resources, animal and plant species, conservation in and ex situ, and the sustainable use 
of biodiversity. Neither this list nor the CBD, Orúe writes, include any promotion of 
traditional knowledge, innovation and practices, or any community rights thereof. 
Knowledge per se, he argues, is in the public domain and can therefore not be put under 
anyone’s control. 
 
However 1) Intellectual property removes certain intellectual matters from the public 
domain into the private domain. When Orúe argues that knowledge and ideas are of 
public domain this would perhaps be the most preferred situation but the winds of 
change are blowing fearfully. Anyone thinking differently must be caught in the eye of 
the storm. Or, why does Orúe support the innovativeness of DUS breeders to make this 
journey from public to private but not as regards any informal knowledge? Is it because 
one is embodied by plants and the other one is not? On the contrary, Orúe argues that 
innovations are too real to be protected (Orúe 2002). 
 
However 2) the importance of indigenous and local knowledge, innovation and 
practices for in situ conservation and for the sustainable use of biodiversity is 
internationally recognised and according to the CBD (Art. 8j) it lies within a country's 
obligations to:  
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 “Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote 
their wider application with the approval and involvement of the 
holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage 
the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such 
knowledge, innovations and practices” . 
 
Now, if we agree that it lies within the mandate of the biodiversity law to respect, 
maintain and promote indigenous, ethnic and local knowledge, the next question is how. 
The Crucible II Group argues that “it is relatively predictable and justifiable to progress 
from recognising the value of knowledge to recognising the need to protect it” and again 
“there is very little conceptual or justificatory distance between the creation of access 
laws that include PIC provisions for indigenous and local communities and the creation 
of intellectual property protections for their benefit” (Crucible II Group 2001:41). 
 
6.1.2 Plant varieties and its associated knowledge 
 
That said it must be agreed that farmers’ knowledge and innovations in relation to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture fall within the scope of the law. Even though 
MAGFOR successfully negotiated with MARENA to exclude the utilisation of 
domesticated species from the draft, it still covers plant varieties in relation to its 
protection and conservation, and farmers’ knowledge thereof. By drawing parallels to 
the PVP Law, breeders' rights are more related to the protection of varieties and farmer 
breeders should therefore be natural holders of community rights.  
 
By using ‘knowledge, innovations and practices’ one could presume that the drafters 
wish for a protection system of both embodied and non-embodied knowledge. In such a 
case ‘knowledge’ could be referred to as the non-embodied knowledge (giving reason to 
parallels to trade secrets) and innovations as embodied knowledge such as plant 
varieties in its broad meaning. Any variety that does not meet the DUS criteria would 
therefore fall within the biodiversity law as any innovation related to the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity, if generated by indigenous, ethnic or local 
groups such as farmers.  
 
6.1.3 Exclusive rights 
 
In spite of many confusions and unclear terminologies, the Nicaraguan draft is foremost 
an access law that would give informal innovators a legal rights to fair benefit-sharing 
when their intellectual contribution is first being accessed. Contracts, supposedly drawn 
up during a prior informed consent (PIC) process, would determine any future rights of 
control. Yet, the Nicaraguan draft differs from other biodiversity laws in so far as it 
wishes to give community rights the status of exclusive rights, i.e. to give rights-holders 
the right to exclude others from accessing knowledge.  By being an all inclusive law of 
exclusive rights it opens up for many questions, especially in relation to plant varieties 
that have been developed by many different farmers throughout generations, perhaps 
also in parallel in different locations. Should the one looking to access negotiate with all 
and could there be such a thing as individual farmer breeders? The biodiversity laws of 
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Costa Rica and Bangladesh (draft) for instance are more concerned with the issue of fair 
benefit sharing by providing non-exclusive rights to receive royalties when an outsider 
wishes to access an intellectual property. The Costa Rican biodiversity law (Art 78) also 
excludes inventions essentially derived from knowledge that is associated with 
traditional or cultural biological practices from the intellectual property regime.  
 
6.1.4 ...with no breeders exemption 
 
By reading Article 81 in isolation it seems as if community rights are stricter than PBR 
because they would give no exemptions for farmers nor plant breeders: “The 
knowledge, innovations and practices of men and women of the indigenous 
communities, ethnic and local communities related to biodiversity are their cultural 
patrimony. These can only be used with the prior informed consent given by the one 
with rights to issue them”. However, by being a biodiversity law usually known to 
counterbalance PBR and industrial innovations, this draft is no exception in so far as 
indigenous, ethnic and local knowledge, innovations and practices are given protection 
but only towards the formal sector. The traditional exchange of biological resources and 
their associated knowledge within communities are exempted from the draft and its 
access regulations (Biodraft, Art 3.c, 81). The right to further improvement however is 
not. When informal innovations are to be accessed, formal breeders or any researcher 
for that matter must apply to the access procedures and herein lies a risk that the PIC or 
application will be denied (Biodraft, Art 81, 85). Could the formal sector forever be 
denied access to informal innovations? 
 
6.1.5 Access regulations - research constraints 
 
The legal consultant, José Orúe, and Xavier Eslaquit, the Director of the Seed 
Department are very critical to the draft’s negative attitude towards formal plant 
breeding and the effects the law is likely to have on crop improvement.  
 
To the expected annoyance of formal breeders and other researchers on biodiversity, 
each sample acquired must be preceded by a PIC and environmental impact study and 
approved by the licensing body (Biodraft, Art 61-68). These permits and environmental 
impact studies will surely complicate research and overload MARENA and the 
delegated body with administrative work. As much as routines and access procedures 
are needed in some cases, the research community with no commercial interest fear that 
these regulations could have negative impacts on the environment and agricultural 
development. Like the seed collection for this study, many collections of genetic 
resources are of small scale with no effect on biodiversity or nature, or with no purposes 
of exploitation. Still, it must be argued that nowadays it is difficult to know beforehand 
whether the research will hold commercial interests or not.  
 
Robert Blandino, director of Extension and Social Services at UNA, says there is no 
ethical code of conduct at the university (or any university in Nicaragua). The only time 
a researcher is asked for the ethics of his/her work is when working through the 
Swedish SLU cooperation. Blandino says there is no routine of asking for permission 
before taking seed or other resources from the field; actions are rather guided by culture 
than law and that these cultural norms are not always justified. “There is still plenty of 
resources and few people”. Furthermore, it is in peoples’ mind that you need not to ask 
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before taking resources. One reason is that research may lead to improvements for 
humankind, such as the development of medicines.  
 
The issue of access to seed and genetic information was however an issue in the 
participatory case study. Farmers had got a feeling of trade secrets and lacking routines 
the collections for the purpose of this study was based on trust and an outspoken desire 
to spread the word. This element of trust was however not formally tested when seed 
was brought out of the country for the genetic analysis and the question is whether any 
access laws will change this situation. On this issue Blandino said ironically, the only 
time law is applied is when taxes are to be paid. 
 
6.1.6 Participatory research – too formal? 
 
The question is whether participatory plant breeding projects are too formal for 
Community Intellectual Rights. In the Pueblo Nuevo/Condega case, much knowledge is 
coming from outside but the innovativeness/intellectual contribution lies within the 
community. One could argue that if farmer breeders are relevant for PVP then they 
would also be rights-holders of Community Intellectual Rights since the breeding 
techniques employed are part of traditional practices (perhaps not among the 
participants but among others like Don Magdaleno and Zeledón). The participatory 
innovations have advantages to informal breeding works because they are well 
documented.      
 
6.2 COMMUNITY RIGHTS VS PLANT BREEDERS’ RIGHTS  
 
Could it be that farmers’ innovations will have a better protection through community 
intellectual rights than if the farmers were to register for plant variety protection? In 
both cases it is the obligation of the user/access seeker to find out whether the resource 
is associated with any intellectual property right and if yes, contact the owner (Biodraft, 
Art 72, 73 and PVP, Art 79).  
 
6.2.1 Registration – shifts burden of proof 
 
The draft requires no prior declaration for the community rights to exist: “This right 
exists and is legally recognised by the mere existence of the cultural practice or 
knowledge related to genetic resources and biochemicals; it does not require prior 
declaration, explicit recognition nor official registration; therefore it can include 
practices which in the future acquire such status” (Biodraft, Art 82:2). From this point 
of view there are advantages with the community rights as farmers need not go through 
the costly, perhaps for them strange process to register their rights. There are however 
negative aspects (Crucible II Group 2001:100): “First, the community would have to 
prove that the knowledge the user relied upon was community knowledge. Second, in 
the absence of a registry, which from the user’s perspective is an institutionalised 
searching system, it may not be fair to hold a user liable who did not actually know that 
he or she was utilising indigenous or local knowledge. Consequently, the community 
may also be in the position of having to establish that the user actually had access to, 
and dishonestly relied upon, their knowledge.” 
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The registry of protected plant varieties leaves the unauthorised user accountable, 
dishonestly or not. That community rights do not require registration has natural 
reasons. Although informal knowledge systems have suffered from romanticism these 
types of knowledge, innovations and practice are still too dynamic and embedded and 
sacred to fit into a registry, and the procedure to register every part would not only be 
complex in time and space but also destructive to the knowledge system itself. 
 
6.2.2 Private or public control 
 
Any case of access also requires consent from the government apart from the PIC from 
the Real- and Intellectual Property Rights-holder (Biodraft, Art. 18, 63, 72 and 73). This 
governmental consent only concerns collective property right to intangible elements, 
probably referring to the knowledge, innovations and practices held by indigenous 
groups, ethnical and local communities and not collectively held PBR. Thus, breeders 
with protected DUS varieties are not priorly informed, but on the other hand farmer 
breeders do not have ‘private’ control but must be patronised by the government. Some 
members of the Crucible II Group (2001:108) argue that it would be better for 
communities if governments were part of the deal: “Why should indigenous and local 
communities have to get their national government’s permission to do what they want 
with their protected knowledge when patent, copyright and plant breeders’ rights-
holders do not have to do the same thing?” 
 
6.2.3 Control or benefits  
 
Plant breeders’ rights are stronger as rights-holders have rights in regards to any person 
in the jurisdiction and control over the exploitation of the genetic information 
throughout its life span (or a maximum of 20 years). Community rights on the other 
hand never expire but nor can they be transferred, i.e. informal innovations cannot be 
sold and remain with the status of being informal. Moreover, community rights are only 
concerned with the act of acquisition and from there the parties are to decide upon the 
further rights through contracts associated with the licensing. The conditions for 
benefit-sharing is not regulated in the draft, only that the access contracts shall include 
indications of benefits, signalling the form and opportunities for an initial, later and 
possible distribution (Biodraft, Art 70c). Furthermore, the PIC shall state the regalia, 
which in turn are to include an initial compensation and thereafter royalties on 
downstream commercialisation (Biodraft, Art. 78). Where other countries mandate a 
50% or more financial sharing, the Nicaraguan draft has chosen to leave the negotiating 
to the parties while offering assistance in the bargaining process to support just 
distributions (Biodraft, Art 75). Equitable sharing of benefits between farmers and 
transnational corporations through contracts is unlikely to occur given the unbalance in 
powers and capacities: 
 
It is doubtful whether any profit-conscious bio prospector, working 
within a highly permissive patent system, would pay for knowledge or 
genetic material that could be obtained surreptitiously, by payment of a 
token sum, or for free. Moreover, once the basic information is obtained, 
biotechnology and the contemporary patent system leave ample scope for 
cosmetic changes that would permit patents to be obtained on that 
information or genetic material. (Mgbeoji 2001) 
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6.3 DISCUSSION 
 
The counter-balance, sui generis intellectual community rights, comes with good 
intentions but with low technical feasibility. Though respecting that the Biodiversity 
draft is but a draft, the scope of knowledge, the conditions for the protection, the rights 
conferred on rights-holders or whether the law will be retroactive are still unclear. Also, 
according to the analysis by Orúe (2002), its current reading is on several points in 
conflict with the Constitution and in the words of Mario Ruiz Castillo, MIFIC (pers. 
comm), "the drafters do not seem to take into account other laws already in force". 
However, Ruiz does not rule out that a future biodiversity law could lead to changes in 
other laws including the PVP law. The draft however is yet to be approved by the 
National Assembly and judging from its many contradictions it is a draft that will be 
drafting on, due to its complex matters and because environmental concern and informal 
knowledge do not have the powerful guardians.  
 
There is a deficit though, since there are no laws controlling parties from taking, using, 
and reproducing indigenous and local knowledge or when collecting genetic resources. 
However, in the breeding context, community rights in the current reading would limit 
informal and formal knowledge systems from coming together and in this restrict the 
potentials of collaborative forces in the search for improved varieties and improved seed 
systems. Formal and informal are complementary systems and the future lies where 
these capacities are combined and dually supported. 
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7. GENETIC ANALYSIS – A TOOL IN IPR AND PPB? 
 
This chapter takes on a genetic angle on intellectual property rights and in this analyses 
the potentials of biotechnology in analysing the technical requirements of distinctness 
and uniformity. The analysis also examines the genetic variation in bean lines with 
identical origin and selection criteria but under the selection of different farmers in 
different environments. The breeding process of the bean lines in question took place 
within the programme of participatory plant breeding in Pueblo Nuevo and Condega. 
7.1 PPB IN SEGREGATING BEAN POPULATIONS 
 
7.1.1 Selection process 
 
The crosses in question for the PPB process were made at CIAT, Colombia and brought 
to Nicaragua and INTA in generation F2-F3. The formal breeder of INTA-Estelí further 
selected the material, e.g. discarded non-red material, and the selection reached the 
farmers in generation F4 and F5. Six farmers were each given 15 bags of seed of three 
different combinations/families: 
 
Bag 1: (MAM 38 x DICTA 17) F1 x Tío Canela  
Bags 2-5: Tío Canela 75 x (catrachita x de celaye) F1 x (FEB 212 X VAX 6) F1) F1  
Bags 6-15: (VAX 3 x Catrachita) F1 x Tío Canela 75.  
 
In primera 2000, each farmer sown 60 rows, 15 plots of four rows, (4X130 seeds). The 
lines developed under farmers' management in heterogeneous environments from river 
banks to mountain areas. Each farmer then selected individually a maximum of 20 
plants per family based on his/her preferred criteria.  
 
In the second season, postrera 2000, farmers sowed one row of 65 seeds from each 
selected plant. From these 200-300 rows, the farmer selected and saved seed from 
around 30 rows. The seed now in generation F6-F7 were kept separated and marked 1-
15 based on family and 1-20 based on plant (max. 75 bags/farmer). In primera 2001, the 
farmers narrowed the selection and sowed 9-15 lines in plots of three rows á 5 m (180 
seeds/rows). During this season, Maria Elsa Hurtado faced problems with saturated soils 
and could not continue experimenting. The remaining five farmers each selected two 
plants from the two most preferred lines.  
 
In postrera 2001, the farmer selected his favourite plant from his most preferred line. 
This selection was based on total yield but seed was taken from the most preferred plant 
with the most pods, most seed per pod, most preferred colour, size and weight of seed. 
Together the farmer breeders had five lines in generation F7-8. As it happens, these all 
come from the same combination (VAX 3 x Catrachita) F1 x Tío Canela 75. Two of 
these are from the same family, bag 12, and originate from the same cross as bag 7. This 
combination includes breeding efforts by Zamorano, Honduras, Stephen E. Beebe and 
Stephen R. Temple from CIAT, the national program of Guatemala and farmer 
innovations in e.g. the Dominican Republic (CIAT webpage and Beebe pers. comm). 
See table 7 for selection process. 
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Table 7 Farmers selection in segregating populations. 
Selection Primera 2001  
Farmer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Selection 
Postrera 2001 
New 
Line Number 
c c c c c c c c c c c c   cJosé Manuel 
González,  
Paso Hondo, 
Pueblo Nuevo 
  s         s   s
 
12 
 
2 
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c cSantos Luis 
Merlo,  
Rosario,  
Pueblo Nuevo 
     s s    s s s  s
 
6 
 
5 
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c  Jairo  
Videa,  
Río Abajo, 
Pueblo Nuevo 
     s      s    
 
13 
 
6 
c c  c c c  c c c c c  c cJuan Feliciano 
García,  
Santa Rosa, 
Condega 
          s s    
 
12 
 
1 
c c c c c c c c c c c c c c  Pedro  
Gómez,  
Lima,  
Condega 
      s   s s   s  
 
7 
 
3 
c: cultivation 
s: selection 
 
In the summer season of 2002, seed of the five families were sowed with the purpose of 
multiplication. Unfortunately, due to an extremely hot and dry summer and irrigation 
restrictions by local authorities, production was very low and there was a shortage of 
seed for the evaluation phase planned for primera 2002. Seed saved by the 
experimenting farmers therefore complemented seed for the evaluation phase. 
 
7.1.2 Variation in phenotypes 
 
In Postrera 2002 the five lines were evaluated in 45 fields in the area of Pueblo 
Nuevo/Condega. Yields had not been measured to give the final prioritisation when this 
thesis left the field, but many farmers preferred line number 1, closely followed by 
number 3 and 5. All lines are said to be uniform based on days to flowering and 
maturity, resistance to the golden mosaic and tolerance to drought. The seed is rather 
uniform in shape and size apart from number 4, which is considerably smaller. The 
colours are similar, a purple-reddish colour, somewhere in between the red criolla and 
the darker DOR. The evaluation phase will show whether the lines further distinguish 
between yields.  
 
The farmers have up until now selected individually though largely based on the same 
selection criteria. However, after the harvest of Postrera 2002, the participants met for a 
culinary test of the five lines. Unfortunately, the preparation failed in being identical 
and no conclusion could be made on the basis of taste and cooking abilities on this 
occasion (Herrera pers. comm). Still, through discussions mentioned earlier it was 
evident that lines still in the research process had differences in taste.  
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7.1.3 Variation in genotypes 
 
Heterozygous gene pairs make possible a great number of homozygous families (Chasal 
and Gosal 2002:81). When seed was brought to the farmers in F4-F5, they still 
presented variability and instability and still included heterozygous gene pairs. This 
means that although the farmers selected the same combination, the bags included 
related but different genotypes say A, B, C, D, E, F and G. Farmers are likely to select, 
unconsciously or not, different genotypes although generally selecting on the same 
criteria. If the preferred characteristic is A, this seed will be selected but since selection 
is made based on phenotype some E and G might have been included (Gómez pers. 
comm). This means that although two farmers have the same preference, the end line 
may not be the same.  
 
Moreover, populations of beans are expected to contain a mixture of groups of 
individuals that are genetically uniform. According to Chasal and Gosal (2002:81), 2n 
kinds of homozygous families are possible, if n is the number of heterozygous gene 
pairs in the initial heterozygote controlling one character. That is, if a particular red 
colour is governed by for example five loci, there are 32 different pure lines for this 
colour, from each of the seed in the initial segregating population. Although the lines in 
the PPB originate from the same combination they are therefore expected to be 
genetically different in between lines but also within lines (although the latter difference 
is expected to be smaller). 
 
Furthermore, the bean lines in question are believed to have reached the third technical 
criterion of stability, which is preferred since the genetic analysis below includes 
replanting. 
7.2 GENETIC ANALYSIS 
 
7.2.1 Methods and material 
 
PCR based RAPD 
 
A simple technique was used to examine the relation between populations. Short 
regions of the DNA molecule were randomly copied and electrophoresed. The banding 
pattern represents a reflection of the overall structure of the DNA molecule. DNA 
fragments of the same size are assumed to represent the same genetic locus (Briand et al 
1998). Two closely related individuals are therefore expected to produce more similar 
banding patterns than two individuals that are more distant in evolutionary terms 
(citation Brown 1995:248). This phylogenetic technique is referred to as PCR 
(Polymerase Chain Reaction) based RAPD (Random Amplified Polymorphic DNA) 
analysis.  
 
Plant material 
 
The seed was collected randomly in the field at the time of harvest. Seed was collected 
from distinct plants and kept separated. For primer screening, seed of generation F9-F10 
was collected by farmers, one agronomist and the author during primera 2002 at Don 
Juan’s plot in Condega. This seed was then planted in the green house from where 
young leaves were collected. For the genetic analysis, a similar grouping collected seed 
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of F10-F11 during postrera 2002 but this time in Pueblo Nuevo in a plot at 900 m 
altitude. This seed was brought to Sweden and planted at SLU, Uppsala. What regards 
the material for the genepool analysis, red seed was bought on the Nicaraguan food 
market and brown seed was accessed through SLU geneticist. This seed was also 
selected randomly and planted at SLU. 
 
DNA extraction 
 
Young leaves were harvested from each plant (app. 3 leaves, 1 cm long). When using 
the UNA laboratory, leaves were either frozen or used immediately in the extraction 
process. The material was then mortared directly in the plastic bag it was collected from 
where the grounded material was put in a tube. After adding a buffer the material was 
centrifuged and the thereafter the liquid was pipetted into a new tube and the extraction 
proceeded using the mini kit A from QIAGEN. At SLU, the extraction process was 
more effective since leaves were collected, frozen in liquid nitrogen, and grounded to a 
fine powder. Buffer was added and the extraction process continued using the same kit 
and protocol.      
 
Reaction mixtures and processes 
 
Reaction mixtures contained 1.5 µl plant DNA, 2.0 µl primer, 2.5 µl Taq 10 X buffer 
with (NH4)2SO4, 2.4 µl MgCl2, 1.0 µl of 10 mM deoxynucleotide triphosphate (dNTP) 
mix, 0.5µl Taq DNA polymerase (5 U µl-1), and 15.1µl MQ water. Chemicals were 
supplied by TaqGold and Fermenta, with best result using the latter. 
 
The reaction mixture (25µl) was placed in a thermal cycler (Techne and Hybaid) and 
initially heated at 94 °C for 2 min at UNA, 2.5 min at SLU and 9 min when using 
TaqGold. Then followed 45 cycles of denaturation through heating (94 °C for 1.1 min) 
when base pairs split at DNA melting point, hybridisation by cooling (30 °C for 2 min) 
when primers attach randomly to the templates and synthesis at extension temperature 
(72 °C for 2.5 min) when the enzyme DNA polymerase (TaqI) synthesises new 
complementary strands. After the amplification, the mixture was run through a final 
extension step (72 °C for 7 min). 
 
The PCR products plus 5µl loading buffer (20-30 µl) were analysed through agarose gel 
electrophoresis. Bands representing the DNA were visualised in 1,4% (w/v) agarose gel 
stained with ethidium bromide. DNA was quantified by ethidium bromide fluorescence 
on a UV transilluminator or TV, in reference to a marker with known quantities of λ 
DNA (Fermenta’s EcoRI+HindIII, Marker 3).  
 
7.2.2 Selection of primers 
 
Material from the five lines was screened against 17 primers under two different 
amplification conditions. The screening procedure included 50 tests using the primers 
B5, B6, B7, D3, D4, D6, D7, D8, D9, D11, D12, D13, D14, D15, D17, D18 and D19. 
These primers were chosen due to availability and their success (B category) in other 
RAPD on the common bean (Briand et al 1998). Primers D3 (5’- GTCGCCGTCA -3’) 
and D8 (5’- GTGTGCCCCA -3’) were chosen for their ability to produce bands in the 
lines as well as showing polymorphism. Table 8 shows the screening result.   
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Table 8 Primer screening where numbers indicate number of bands.  
Primers 
Ind. B5 B6 B7 D3 D4 D6 D7 D8 D9 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15 D17 D17 D18 D19
11        -           
14 0  0 1    2           
22    0    7           
24        -           
25        6           
26 0 0 3  0 0     0  0      
32   0 3 0 2  2   0      0  
33        0           
34    7    3           
35        3           
52    6               
53 0 0 3 1 0   3   0       0 
61   0        0      1  
63 0 0 0 5 1  0 1  0 2 0 0   0 1  
66 0 0 0     7           
 
 
By changing laboratory and extraction method, the pattern quality improved hugely and 
as the quality improved, the patterns showed that the selected primers were not optimal. 
Instead, the pattern suggests that gene structures answering to the primers are identical 
between lines and within lines.  
 
These differences in visualisation probably are a result of a faster and more effective 
extraction process and of the quality of the chemicals being used in the PCR process. 
Consequently, the analysis and patterns from UNA, Nicaragua will only serve for 
identifying primers and will not be included in the comparison between lines. Thus, the 
change of laboratory environments was unfortunate because much work was done 
without leading to real data.  
 
7.2.3 Genetic analysis between PPB lines 
 
For the purpose of the genetic analysis 36 plant individuals were analysed, seven 
individuals from line 1, 2, 3, 6 and eight from line 5. In total 112 samples were run 
through gel (60 for primer D3 and 52 for primer D8 including replicates).  
 
As mentioned, the pattern suggests that gene structures answering to the primers are 
identical between lines as well as within lines (see photo below of 19 individuals of 
three lines using D8.). 
  
  
Table 9 shows that amplified fragments are missing in some samples and are present in 
others, but by examining the band patterns it appears that repeated tests will give the 
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characteristic band pattern in all the samples, if only repeated enough times. That is, 
fragments may be absent due to the research process and appear present when the 
process better conserves and amplifies the DNA fragments. The banding pattern 
therefore suggests that the lines under research are closely related.    
 
Table 9 Banding patterns of PPB lines using two primers. 
Plant Individual Banding pattern with 
Primer D3 
Banding pattern with 
Primer D8 
Line 1 
12   I                                   (1) 
  I            I            II        (4) 
   I      I  I                        (1) 
13   I  I     I  I            II        (8)    I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
14   I II     I  I            II        (2) 
  I II     I  I            II        (2) 
          I  I      I   I             (2) 
 
16   I                                    (1) 
            I  I            II        (8) 
   I      I  I      I   I             (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
17   I II     I  I            II        (2) 
  I        I  I             II        (4) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (8) 
   I      I  I      I   I             (5) 
18   I I      I  I            II        (4) 
  I I      I  I            II        (7) 
   I      I  I      I   I             (1) 
19   I        I  I            II         (4)  
Line 2 
20   I  I     I  I           II         (4)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
21   I                                    (1) 
  I I      I  I            II        (7) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
21* same extr.occasion   I II     I  I           II         (1)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
22   I  I     I  I           II         (4)            I                   I       (3) 
23   I  I                     II         (5) 
  I  I     I  I           II         (7) 
                    I   I              (2) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
24   I  I     I  I           II         (7)    I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
29   I  I     I  I           II         (4) 
  I  I     I  I           II         (7) 
 III      I  I     I   I    I I     (3) 
Line 3 
31                                                                            **  (2) 
32   I                        II         (1) 
  I           I            II         (4) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
33   I II     I  I           II         (2) 
  I        I  I            II         (7) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
34   I        I  I            II         (4) 
                                **   (7) 
 
34*  different extr.occasion   I  I     I  I            II        (5) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (7) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
35   I  I     I  I            II        (4)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
38   I II     I  I            II        (2) 
                                       (4) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (6) 
39   I                         II        (1) 
  I        I  I            II         (4) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
Line 5 
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50   I        I  I            II         (4) 
                                       (7) 
                    I   I              (2) 
52   I                                    (7)    I      I  I     I   I              (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
                                       (6) 
Plant Individual Banding pattern with 
Primer D3 
Banding pattern with 
Primer D8 
53   I        I  I            II         (4) 
                                       (7) 
                    I   I              (2) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9) 
54   I  I     I  I            II        (5)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
55   I                         II        (1) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (5) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (1) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
57     I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
58   I  I     I  I            II        (5)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
Line 6 
60                                        (7)                     I   I              (2) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9) 
61   I  I     I  I            II        (5)    I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
63   I                         II        (1) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (5) 
   I      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
65   I  I     I  I            II        (1) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (5) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (7) 
                         I             (1) 
III      I  I     I   I    I I      (3) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9) 
67   I        I  I            II        (5) 
           I  I            II        (7) 
           I  I     I   I             (5) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9) 
68   I  I     I  I            II        (5)    I      I         I   I             (1) 
          I  I      I   I             (5) 
68* same extr.occasion   I  I     I  I            II        (5) 
  I  I     I  I            II        (7) 
   I        I  I    I   I             (5) 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9) 
Marker II  I  I       I  I       I   I       I  I       I  
No. of tests                                        60                                         52 
**When the cell shows no 
pattern the sample showed 
no clear bands. 
Number in parentheses 
shows gel occasion. 
 
 
 
 
7.2.4 Genetic analysis between genepools 
  
Since the research lines all came from the same combination of parents they were 
destined to be much related and perhaps it was not so surprising that the selected 
primers could not detect any differences on the genetic level. However, from the 
analysis above it is impossible to tell whether the lines are closely related or whether the 
primers represent gene structures that are present in most common bean geneplasms or 
plant material in general. Since the banding patterns only suggest that the lines under 
research are closely related, it was interesting to continue comparing the research lines 
with varieties further away in terms of relatedness. The gene material from the 
participatory breeding was therefore compared with a red criolla from Nicaragua and a 
brown seeded variety Stella. The latter is cultivated in Sweden but judging from its 
large size, its origins are probably found in the Andean gene pool (photo review in 
Gepts and Debouck 1991 and pers. comm by Gómez).  
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Result and discussion 
 
The RAPDs analysis did not detect any differences between the red criolla and the lines 
under research but it did find differences in the banding pattern between red beans and 
the brown Stella (Table 10). In other words, the analysis could divide the material into 
two groups corresponding to the Mesoamerican and Andean genepool.  
 
For this purpose, primer D8 was more efficient in visualising differences in gene 
structures. Primer D3 should nonetheless be ruled out since observations suggest more 
bands of middle size in the Stella material than in the Mesoamerican gene material. In 
this case it was difficult to distinguish between gene pools using D3 due to poor band 
quality but it is likely that repeated tests of better research quality will show differences 
also when using primer D3.  
 
Table 10 Banding pattern of varieties Stella and red Criolla using two primers. 
Plant individual Banding Pattern with D3 Banding Pattern with D8 
1Stella   I  I     I  I                     (8)*  
2Stella   I  I     I  II        I            (8)
  I  I     I  II        I            (8)
    I          I     I  I             (9)
    I          I     I  I             (6)
3Stella   I  I     I  II        I            (8)     I          I     I  I             (9)
6Stella   I  I     I  I                       (8)     I          I     I  I             (9)
8Stella                             II         (8)     I          I     I  I             (9)
9Stella   I  I     I  I                       (8)                                        (9)
1Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)                 I   I   I             (9)
2Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)    I      I  I     I   I              (9)
3Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)    I      I  I     I   I              (9)
7Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)
 
   I      I  I     I   I              (9)
8Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)
  I  I     I               II         (8)
   I      I  I     I   I              (9)
   I      I  I     I   I              (6)
9Rojo   I  I     I               II         (8)    I      I  I     I   I              (9)
Research variety   I  I     I  I            II           I      I  I     I   I    I I      
Marker II  I  I       I  I       I   I       I  I       I  
Comments Difficult to draw 
conclusions due to poor 
band quality. Observation 
suggests more bands in 
middle part in Stella plants. 
The two tests of 2Stella and 
3Stella show very similar 
patterns why better 
research quality might 
dinstinguish between 
genepools.    
Easy to separate Meso 
American genepool 
(research varieties and land 
variety) from Andean 
genepool (Stella). Plant 
individual1Rojo may have 
been polluted with Stella 
DNA in PCR process. 
*Number in parenthesis shows gel occasion. 
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7.3 DISCUSSION   
 
Genetic analyses imply much resources, patience and humbleness to the results. This 
analysis should be valued in that perspective. From a study on the red-seeded criolla, 
Oscar Gómez concludes that molecular and phenotypic traits indicate a high level of 
genetic diversity within and among land varieties (forthcoming article). That the lines 
and varieties of this research hold genetic variation within populations and between 
varieties is a fact; the question is how to detect it. By using appropriate primers, it 
should be possible to identify a unique marker for each research line. Another question 
is whether it is valid. Agricultural research is left with poor resources and the question 
is how to best make use of funds and human capacities. That biotechnology holds 
solutions to some specific problem is not so far fetched. Marker assisted selection could 
increase selection rate and accuracy, but it would at the same time remove parts of the 
improvement process from the farm. The issue lies in the definition of agriculture and 
farmers’ tasks and who is in control over the technology.  
 
Genetic analysis aiming at examining whether different selection processes leads to 
genetic variation, is of an academic interest than of value for the participant in plant 
breeding programmes. Genetic analysis in the context of intellectual property rights is 
of value if protocols, primers, markers and tools were made available and accessible to 
all parties in need. Even if developing countries such as Nicaragua have access to 
equipment, they tend to have limited resources to maintain laboratories and to keep a 
continuous operation (Busch 1995). Nonetheless, DNA analysis in this respect could 
only be used as a complementary tool to common sense. Although a genetic difference 
could be established, it needs to be examined whether it has any agricultural relevance 
and whether it is sufficient for establishing a new, protectable intellectual property right 
on behalf of former innovators. The fear is that genetic engineering, in the context of 
IPR, will be used as a tool to slightly modify land varieties in order to receive and 
legally claim an altered marker (genetic structure).   
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8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In Utopia, governments have time, capacity and resources to support and place 
innovativeness where it best belongs and to build along the path of sustainable 
development. In Utopia, powers are extension of people’s free will, given to 
governments in trust and returned in truth. In reality, neither governments nor people 
exist in an institutional vacuum but in a context of international agreements among 
dubious driving forces looking to rule every far corner and piece of mind.  
 
For Nicaragua, a sustainable development must be based in the rural- and agricultural 
sector. Instead, for development Nicaragua has chosen to rent land and labour to Asian 
industry. Small-scale farming, though supporting the country, is given limited interest 
and so are long-term strategies for conserving genetic diversity and environmental 
services. To understand why, there is a need to look beyond national circumstances and 
into the dynamics between local and global politics.   
 
Global orders 
 
The global order is corporate control over food and agriculture. To meet this end, 
countries must adopt a standardised intellectual property rights system. Nicaragua 
agreed to a version that undermines farmers’ rights to exchange and informally sell 
seed. This outcome was mainly due to an international pressure, a poor understanding of 
its real effects and limited participation in the legislative process, not because of 
national demands for research incentives. In this context, Busch (1995) argues that new 
biotechnologies and intellectual property rights are strategic tools in the restructuring of 
world agriculture and as such are used to change the rules of the game in ways that are 
likely to be highly unfavourable to most developing nations. Although having potentials 
in technical and benefit-sharing terms, these tools must therefore be analysed in their 
social context.   
 
While the definition of agriculture is open, the coping strategy of farmers is framed by 
regulations and incentives. The global order says specialisation. Farmers should 
concentrate on production in a narrow sense and purchase new seed for every season in 
order to reap the fruit of the newest seed technology developed by specialists. From a 
wider perspective, to integrate farmers in the sphere of specialists should in no sensible 
way provoke the global order of specialisation. In every community, there are 
innovative farmers (farmers who are more interested in experimenting) and among them 
are those specialised in improving seed. In cost-effective terms, it is rational to include 
end-users in the development of a product (especially if the end-user is an expert and 
will be taking on fundamental tasks in the development process). Now, farmers’ 
innovativeness is already included in the development of every seed because of 
generations of domestications and improvements. At the same time, farmers’ 
knowledge and capacities are increasingly recognised in the international debate. Still, 
the global order of appropriation of farmer practices is on-going and in this process the 
control of how and which plant material is to be developed is gradually shifting from 
rural households to the formal breeding sector. Farmers are at best invited into the 
breeding process when plant populations are already fixed, or when seed is released as 
uniform and stable varieties. More better-off farmers might prefer it this way. Farmers 
who produce industrially seek varieties that perform uniformly and respond to uniform 
market demands. Resource-poor farmers on the other hand have criteria that are more 
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complex and they usually lack resources (or desires) to buy seed and other inputs that 
are needed to adjust their heterogeneous environments to uniform seed (such as 
pesticides, fertilisers and irrigation).  
 
There is a problem of fit, between formally improved varieties and marginal 
conditions, and between plant breeders' rights and agricultural practices.  
 
The problem of seed security is also related to poor access and availability of suitable 
varieties. By not being the prime target group, farmers living in marginal or 
heterogeneous areas are likely to be excluded in distribution schemes, and when 
included likely to discard varieties because of low adaptation potential. In beans, the 
problem is that harvest results purple, not red. The problem is that the next season, 
grains are not even purple. The season is too short and the harvest only turns pink. The 
problem is that supply does not answer to demand. It would be wrong to say that the 
supply side, seed companies and formal breeders, do not know what is demanded or 
wish to meet every demand. Rather, the problem is that private breeding programs do 
not see incentives in breeding towards the preferences hold by the marginalized farmer. 
The problem is that these farmers do not have the consumers’ power and therefore do 
not matter when breeding targets are set, and the problem with beans is that they can be 
reused without any new revenues reaching the developer. A parallel problem is that 
public breeding faces diminishing budgets and that resource-poor farmers are left on 
their own to cope with problems that are new, bigger, global, and perhaps even 
universal. These farmers have the most to win by remaining with knowledge in plant 
improvement because their local capacities might be the only solver to emerging 
problems. Simultaneously, there is an intensified pressure towards this group to 
purchase new seed for each season and as seed technologies are offered with promises 
of virus resistance and nutrition, this group is vulnerable as well as risk taking. It should 
be remember that resource-poor farmers in general also have most to win by an 
agricultural development, considering their daily struggle to move from subsistence 
farming to income generating production and towards an overall improvement of rural 
livelihoods.  
 
Technology as such is not harmful but there is a need to look beyond technology itself 
and into the dynamics between technology and the forces behind it. The problem is that 
the so-called agricultural modernisation is generated by policies made on the 
international level by people living far away from any marginal reality. The problem is 
that it is enriching multinational companies on behalf of local economies and 
livelihoods. The problem is that it is a system run by international politics instead of 
local needs and agricultural, social or economic measurements and a system resting on 
subsidies and intellectual property rights.  
 
As breeding became a specialised profession and taken out from its context, the cost of 
innovativeness was perhaps not increase but measured in money. Intellectual property 
rights came around as an instrumental approach to recoup and protect breeders' 
investment (an approach that is/was not needed (or desired) when breeding is contextual 
as part of the cost is covered by the direct benefits, in social as well as productive 
terms). In return of granting exclusive control through intellectual property rights there 
would be a generation of improved varieties for the good of society. Yet, many benefits 
disappear into a legal apparatus or accumulate on someone’s high tower of copper 
coins. For small-scale farmers, plant variety improvement remains a tedious job with 
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few incentives other than inherent curiosity. Do intellectual property rights serve their 
purpose?  
 
Protection of what and for whom? 
 
Farmers who develop new varieties have a sense of, perhaps not ownership, but a 
personal responsibility that the variety answers to what is being promised, independent 
of how many times it may change hands. Does this call for intellectual property rights? 
To continue, farmers hope their seed will reach as many hands and fields as possible, as 
long as the seed is accessed and managed in trust. Does this call for intellectual property 
rights, or does it call for some sort of quality control or is it the same thing? 
 
Numerous farmers wished for a more controlled system of seed supply and would like 
to be reached by formal extension services, technology assistance and improved seed. 
As such, a trustworthy and efficient formal seed market could benefit local seed 
improvement, seed access and therein food and plant genetic diversity. Judging by the 
name, a law on plant variety protection is on the right track. Nevertheless, by 
scrutinising the rights of control given to the rights-holders, the main subject of 
protection is the intellectual contribution rather than the variety per se. The rules are 
therefore not primarily designed for protecting the variety, but as the formal market is 
strengthened to enforce these rights, there is a (positive) side effect of formal quality 
control. Still, a system of quality control could function without intellectual property 
rights. The generation of improved varieties supposedly could not.  
 
The informal sector provides most farmers with most of their seed. The formal system 
provides fewer, but certified ones. In many respects, the two systems hold a multitude 
of similitude. The largest difference is that in the formal sector, plant improvement is an 
end in itself. Is the monopoly given to rights-holders a fair price to pay for the 
generation of improved varieties? Or rather, are we to trust monopolies in achieving 
food security for all? On the international level, multilateral agreements are to free the 
seed. Thus, across borders, a clear and harmonised system of intellectual property rights 
could increase the flow of genetic material, as transfers are regulated and (some) 
intellectual contributions secured. This could be all positive since agriculture is 
dependent on a continuous flow of genetic diversity between borders and continents. 
Then again, if the pressure to provide intellectual property rights is not all altruistic, the 
pressuring powers expect economic benefits on the future seed market. Again, plant 
breeders’ rights are foremost a marketing tool. They demand no improved crop 
performance nor exists evidence that PBR lead to an increased innovation in relation to 
the needs of resource-poor farmers. Thus, in the light that PBR restrict traditional 
practices, small-scale farmers are likely to pay the price without reaping any great 
benefits.  
 
The issue of protection is larger than that of seed and genetics. It concerns agricultural 
systems, rural livelihoods and the identity of people. In fact, it concerns us all. 
Intellectual property rights as such are not harmful, but like one farmer said: the one 
with the title needs to be more humble. In fact, the one behind the law must be more 
humble. It should not be denied that breeders’ rights have a point. Why should not 
breeders be acknowledged and paid for their work just like programmers, authors or 
musicians? This point becomes stronger as farmers and breeders meet on equal terms in 
a framework of making money. The down side is that intellectual property rights 
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regimes tend to ignore the existence of other relationships and ways to act in the world. 
As these regimes gradually impose on other knowledge systems, there is a need to look 
beyond knowledge as power and look into the dynamics between how knowledge is 
valued and protected in relation to the one in power to make judgements and design 
protection systems.  
 
Local systems have many mystiques beyond the eye of a stranger, but their role in 
developing, producing and distributing seed is quite tangible. Local systems have been 
shown to work for generations yet their inherent benefits and capacities are overlooked 
when agricultural sectors are to develop and become more efficient. If the strategy is to 
modernise, to develop or to formalise, it is important to join forces and to give farmers a 
chance to participate in the negotiation of their own profession. It is also important to 
give farmers a collection of choice, and not only force them to jump on the train of seed 
transfer because it is seen as the only way, perhaps not forward but any way.  
 
Many farmers have already entered the debt trap and much local material has been lost. 
The paragraphs of intellectual property rights law cannot take the full blame. The threat 
against informal exchange, local seed improvement, seed access and therein food and 
plant genetic diversity is rather found in the systemic shift that is taking place. Seed 
companies and extension services will continue promoting seed purchase from certified 
sources. The extended hand of US will continue changing disguise and reappear with 
new approaches on restructuring the seed system. Many farmers in contrast are awaiting 
a government that supports local innovativeness, entrepreneurships and alternative 
routes. With a government that trust market forces to elevate the country from poverty 
and low human development indexes, small-scale farmers may wait in vain. It is within 
this context that traditional practices are threatened, and with them the farming 
communities.  
 
Conservation and progress 
 
For many farmers the criolla or landrace represents a continuation of traditions brought 
down through generations, and as such, it is a practice not easily exchanged for seed 
from unknown and external sources. To step beyond the narrow field of plant variety 
protections, the issue is not whether traditional materials should be conserved or 
protected because they represent a seed treasure of collaborative efforts or because they 
hold good traits. The issue is the negotiation between different interests in relation to 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.  
 
For one, material should be conserved if it is of value to the farmer. In this task, formal 
actors in conservation and plant breeding could be of much assistance in making this 
conservation feasible through improvements, diversified markets, etc. What regards the 
rest of the diversity, one cannot force a farmer to conserve poor performing varieties to 
the benefit of future generations. This is foremost a task of environmentalists, and a 
challenge for plant breeders and others to find ways where farmers voluntarily take on 
this task (through improvements, diversified markets, etc). It should not be denied that 
the joining of local and formal systems has its difficulties and could provoke changes in 
the two. Then again, that is the purpose, is it not? Many problems of today need to be 
taken on from an interdisciplinary perspective, and in this situation perhaps the solution 
is found by moving criss-cross over knowledge systems and by going deeper into the 
way we perceive life and, intellectuality.  
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If we were to define agriculture like it is understood traditionally, including a successive 
improvement of seed, the flow of seed would be freed. Farming would be an act of 
genetic improvement and as such, farmer activities would be exempted from any 
intellectual property rights. Now, under the dominant definition, seed exchange is seen 
in the perspective of trading agricultural inputs and as such competing with the 
monopoly created by laws on plant variety protection. A multifunctional interpretation 
on farming would have tremendous effects for the conservation of plant genetic 
diversity for food and agriculture and of agricultural practices. A multidimensional 
approach on agricultural development would have tremendous effects for its 
sustainability. To change farmers seed practices and to select within local material 
might have impacts on genetic diversity but it might also be a way to make local 
structures compatible and to make way for a sustainable rural development. Again, what 
is to be conserved and what is to be developed? 
 
Can we agree that it is beneficial to develop a working alternative to uniformity, to give 
farmers a fair chance to choose seed and in continuation an agricultural system? Can we 
agree that this development might even include the conservation of agricultural 
traditions and local material? Because the next question is whether the participatory 
plant breeding approach is only a transitory phase until we are aligned with the 
agricultural systems designed by the Northern sphere.  
 
Participatory plant breeding is not only about meeting the needs of marginal areas. It is 
about respecting a diversity of knowledge, generating a genetic diversity that meet the 
needs of its users and it is about equitable relations between plant breeders and between 
the global and local. In this lies the difference as we search for the best approach to 
protect the sphere where objectives of development, conservation and research meet. A 
global food system is not there to improve the livelihood of resource-poor farmers. 
Neither are intellectual property rights.  
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Maria Elsa Hurtado, bean breeder 
José Gómez, maize breeder 
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Juan Feliciano García, bean breeder 
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Mamerto Mendoza Mendoza, bean breeder 
Oscar Alemán, sugar cane breeder 
 
Academic sector: 
Aldo Rojas, PhD student, UNA/SLU 
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Kjell Havnevik, SLU 
Marie Nyman, SLU 
Anders Kvarnheden, SLU 
 
Private sector: 
Wilfredo Bejarano, ANAR 
Nelson Navarro, APROSEN 
José René Orúe Cruz, legal consultant  
 
Public sector: 
Xavier Eslaquit, Director of Department of Seed 
José Manuel Bravo Báez, INTA-CNIA 
Aurelio Llano González, Head of bean sector, INTA 
Lazaro Narvaez Rojas, Breeder, INTA 
Marianela Kauffmann, INTA 
Julio Molina, INTA 
Mario Raíz Castillo, MIFIC 
Gloria Zelaya, MIFIC 
 
Civil sector: 
Gilles Trouche, CIRAD-CIAT 
Magda Lanuza, previously Humboldt centre 
Denis Pommier, IRAM 
Julio César Gómez, ADDAC 
Tony Cruit, PROMESA 
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TERMINOLOGY  
 
Biological diversity means the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological 
complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, between 
species and of ecosystems.  
Biological resources includes genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, 
populations, or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or 
value for humanity.  
Country of origin of genetic resources means the country, which possesses those genetic 
resources in in-situ conditions.  
Country providing genetic resources means the country supplying genetic resources 
collected from in-situ sources, including populations of both wild and domesticated 
species, or taken from ex-situ sources, which may or may not have originated in that 
country.  
Domesticated or cultivated species means species in which the evolutionary process has 
been influenced by humans to meet their needs.  
Ex-situ conservation means the conservation of components of biological diversity 
outside their natural habitats.  
Genetic diversity is an element of biodiversity referring to the variation between 
individuals within populations, among populations within species, and among species 
(UNEP web glossary). 
Genetic material means any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin 
containing functional units of heredity.  
Genetic resources mean genetic material of actual or potential value.  
In-situ conservation means the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats and the 
maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings 
and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they 
have developed their distinctive properties. 
 
Source: CBD, Art. 2. 
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ADDAC Association for the Diversification and Agricultural Development 
of the Community (Nicaraguan NGO) 
ALCA   Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (FTAA) 
ANAR   Asociación de Arroceros (Rice Association) 
APROSEN Asociación de Productores de Semilla del Norte (Seed 
Association)  
BRL   Biodiversity Rights Legislation 
CBD   Convention on Biological Diversity 
CBDC Community, Biodiversity, Development and Conservation 
Program 
CGIAR   Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
CIAT   International Centre for Tropical Agriculture 
CIMMYT  International Centre for Wheat and Maize Improvement 
CIPR   Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
CIPRES Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Desarrollo Rural y 
Social (Nicaraguan NGO) 
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique 
pour le développement (French research centre) 
DOR Bean type 
DUS Distinct, Uniform and Stable 
FAO    UN Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FDI   Foreign Development Investment 
FTAA   Free Trade Area of the Americas 
GATT    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GRAIN  Genetic Resources Action International  
GRULAC   Group of Countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
G x E   Genetic x Environment 
INTA   Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agraria 
IPR   Intellectual Property Rights  
IRAM Institute de Recherches et Applications des Méthodes de 
Développement (French NGO) 
ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture 
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MAGFOR Ministerio Agropecuario y Forestal (Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry) 
MARENA Ministerio del Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales (Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources) 
MIFIC Ministerio de Fomento, Industria y Comercio (Ministry of 
Promotion, Industry and Commerce) 
NGO   Non Governmental Organisation 
PBR   Plant Breeders’ Rights 
PCR   Polymerase Chain Reaction 
PIC   Prior Informed Consent 
PRODESSA Centro de Promocion y Asesoria en Investigacion para el Sector 
Agropecuario (Nicaraguan NGO) 
PROMESA  USAID National Seed Improvement Project  
PPB   Participatory Plant Breeding 
PRGA Program  System wide Program on Participatory Research and Gender 
Analysis for Technology Development and Institutional 
Innovation of the CGIAR 
PROFRIJOL El Programa Cooperativo Regional de Frijol para Centro 
América, México y El Caribe 
PVP   Plant Variety Protection 
RAPD Random Amplified Polymorphic DNA 
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency  
SLU Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
UN    United Nations 
UCA   Universidad Centroamericana 
UNA Universidad Nacional Agraria (National University of 
Agriculture) 
UNAG   Union Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos 
UNAN   Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme 
UNEP   United Nations Environmental Programme 
UPOV   Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
USAID   US Agency for International Development 
WHO    World Health Organisation  
 
 
